DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION IN ZIMBABWE: THE ZIMBABWE PEOPLE's REVOLUTIONARY ARMY's EXPERIENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE BUILDING

A Thesis

Submitted to the Department of Politics and International Relations

of the

Faculty of Humanities

at the

University of Johannesburg

by

Mandlenkosi Ndlovu

216075385

In Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor Litterarum et Philosophiae in Politics and International Relations

September 2019

Johannesburg, South Africa

Professor Cheryl Hendricks

DEDICATION

To my late father Menye Jeremiah (M. J.), mother Elinah Ndlovu and all gallant ZIPRA ex-combatants for their supreme sacrifices towards the liberation of Zimbabwe.

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to offer my profound and deepest gratitude to Professor Cheryl Hendricks for her invaluable contributions in shaping this study. Her critical comments made the completion of this study possible.

I would also want to acknowledge the material and moral support that l received from my family members. In particular, l would like to thank my young sister, Dr Sifiso Ndlovu for her unwavering assistance in every way that made it possible for me to register and undertake this study. The moral support from my wife Siphephile Ndlovu, daughter Trish, and my sisters, Dr Sibonokuhle Ndlovu, Oslina and Nomagugu kept me motivated throughout the research. Professors Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Morgan were also great sources of inspiration. Staff at Zimbabwe Open University and Hillside Teachers' College libraries also played critical roles towards the completion of this study in various ways.

Special thanks go to the many Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) ex-combatants who took their special time and carefully narrated their experiences in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes. Without their co-operation, it would have been a mammoth task to complete this study. Last but not least, l would want to thank all my family members for their moral support. My mother Mrs Elinah Ndlovu and late father Menye Jeremiah (M. J.) Ndlovu gave me a solid educational foundation through their many sacrifices for my education at the early stages. My son Dumisile Nkosentsha Ndlovu played a pivotal role through assisting with information communication technologies. Thank you Gatsheni.

ABSTRACT

The study is an analysis of the efficacy of government led Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes in the context of ethnic based political and military formations that are competing and hostile to each other. It seeks to understand how such a government led DDR process impacts upon the peace building process in the aftermath of a conflict. Many DDR practitioners, policy makers and academics advocate for government leadership and ownership of DDR processes. The justification is that local ownership enables buy-in from local actors and that it makes DDR processes effective and sustainable. This thesis questions this often-iterated peace building judgement. It is a qualitative study that generates most of the data through semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The focus is on the experiences of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) in the DDR process in Zimbabwe during the periods 1980-1984 and 1997.

The study is guided by an analytical framework, which draws on Theory of Change reasoning. It therefore seeks to provide information that can produce change through transforming negative mindsets in behaviour, attitudes, feelings, perceptions, and confrontational relationships between and among ex-combatants, their commanders as well as the political leadership into positive ones for effective implementation of DDR programs. The central argument is that a government led DDR program that is implemented in the context of ethnic-based political and military formations undermines peace building efforts. In the context of Zimbabwe where ethnicity was politicised, the DDR process tended to be partisan, incomplete, inadequate, and skewed in favour of the group with political power. The result is the marginalisation and persecution of those deemed 'Other' in the integration of the armed forces as well as in the general socio-economic and political systems of the state. The post-conflict environment therefore remains insecure and unstable and the state quickly slides back into conflict. A failed DDR process undermines other elements of the peace building process.

The thesis recommends that robust and timely intervention processes that promote reconciliation and political inclusivity as well as mindest transformation be implemented in the political and military spheres to lessen negative attitudes, behaviours, perceptions, feelings, and relationships and pave way for mutual respect, co-operation, trust, confidence and unity between different political and military formations. A context-specific DDR approach based on clear understanding of the background relationships between political and military formations should be implemented to enable the depoliticisation and de-ethnicisation of the DDR process. The presence of a neutral third party to facilitate, supervise and underwrite the DDR process is a critical prerequisite to the successful implementation of government led DDR processes in the context of entrenched ethnic-oriented rivalries and hostilities between parties. The third party is to avoid the manipulation and abuse of the process by one party (governing party) at the expense of other parties.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
APs	Assembly Points
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
CMF	Commonwealth Monitoring Force
DAC	Development Assistance Commission
DCAF	Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DSD	Defence and Security Division
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
FLS	Frontline States
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
GNU	Government of National Unity
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JHC	Joint High Command
JMC	Joint Military Command
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program
NDDRC	National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
NDP	Natioanal Democratic Party
NPRC	National Peace and Reconciliation Commission
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PBC	Peace building Commission

PF	Patriotic Front
PF-ZAPU	Patriotic Front- Zimbabwe African People's Union
PSD	Peace and Security Department
RF	Rhodesian Front
RSFs	Rhodesian Security Forces
SEED	Soldiers Employed in Economic Development
SIDDR	Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TOC	Theory of Change
UANC	United African National Council
UN	United Nations
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations
UNITA	Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOSAA	United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
VAP	Veterans Assistance Program
WVCF	War Victims Compensation Fund
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People's Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZPM	Zimbabwe People's Militia
ZWVA	ZIPRA War Veterans Association

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is an integral part of post-conflict peace building processes. Inappropriate and/or inadequate DDR programs create restive ex-combatants who are recidivist and always resort to violent means to achieve their objectives in post-conflict environments. However, properly designed and implemented DDR processes and programs are pivotal in the achievement of peace, security and stability. The majority of studies on DDR concentrate on the interrogation of all the ex-combatants at the country (macro) level. This thesis examines the effectiveness and effects of a government led DDR process implemented within a context of ethnic based political and military formations, which are embroiled in mutual mistrust, fear, suspicion, and hostilities on one group of ex-combatants and general peace building. The fundamental question is: Can one of the protagonists-turned-into a governing party successfully lead in the planning and implementation of a DDR process in the context of political and military formations that are competing against each other for economic resources, positions, political power and influence as well as legitimacy?

Zimbabwe, since independence, is still trying to find an effective resolution to its demobilisation and reintegration problems that can bring closure to the grievances raised by the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) ex-combatants. In short, the grievance was that the DDR process was politicised and manipulated by the victorious party at the expense of their rivals who were also part of the DDR process. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) that was rivaling the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) during the liberation struggle for the leadership of the envisaged independent state, assumed the sensitive and delicate task of spearheading the peace building process. This was to occur in an environment laden with inter-party rivalry and mistrust. ZANU managed the DDR process with

little technical and material support from the international community. This thesis argues that the security environment negated the implementation of an inclusive, balanced and non-discriminatory DDR process. It was in the interest of ZANU to see ZIPRA combatants swiftly disarmed, but not viably reintegrated. It is crucial to mention from the onset that ZIPRA and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) were competitors; jointly participating in the DDR process under a ZANU led government. The DDR process turned out to be inadequate and incomplete and, it will be argued, served to perpetuate instability and insecurity that undermined the peace building process.

The intriguing issue about the relationship between ZIPRA and ZANLA is that they seemed unable to co-exist peacefully before and after independence even though both were fighting against the same colonial force. Instead, ZIPRA was able to co-exist with Umkhonto WeSizwe (MK) fighters of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. ZIPRA and Umkhonto WeSizwe launched a couple of joint operations within Zimbabwe before 1980. ZIPRA was able to forge mutual trust and friendship with armed forces from another country but failed to do so with ZANLA from the same country. ZIPRA and ZANLA fought each other at the rear bases during joint training sessions. MK and ZIPRA launched joint operations in 1967 at Hwange areas and at Sipolilo (Guruve) in 1968. However, ZIPRA and ZANLA trainees clashed in June 1976 at Morogoro training camp in Tanzania. The fighting led to the death of about one hundred and fifty ZIPRA trainees (ZAPU Information Department, 2012; Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 2000). They fought each other at the front and they competed for operational zones: for example, in areas such as Beitbridge, Mberengwa, Mwenezi and Chiredzi, among others, ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas fought each other (ZAPU Information Department, 2012). The same was true of ZANLA which at various times operated with the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in the eastern highlands of Zimbabwe but shunned ZIPRA or even became violent against it. This was a clear manifestation of deeply

entrenched exclusive mindsets and polarised positions, bordering on inability to compromise, tolerate, accommodate, empathise, unite, and work together. To date, there are undertones of ZIPRA ex-combatants' misgivings against the government as well as an element of mutual mistrust and suspicion between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants.

The fighting spilled into the independence era as they also clashed where they were assembled before being merged into a single army or demobilised. Even within the integrated national army, their relations were antagonistic. The DDR process in Zimbabwe therefore provides a case study where the government that emerged from one of the former liberation movements leads the process. The governing party and its military wing had a clear history of antagonistic relationships with its rival liberation party and its military wing. The case of Zimbabwe's DDR process was an interesting one where rival political and military formations were left on their own to unite and integrate one another respectively.

1.2 Background

Zimbabwe attained independence on 18 April 1980 and immediately implemented DDR processes that were aimed at achieving security and stability within the new post-colonial state. There were high hopes for peace, unity and security among the general population and even amongst the ex-combatants. However, the DDR process proved to be problematic. There were clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants within a short period after the attainment of independence. Their clashes had serious security repercussions that undermined peace building efforts.

Challenges in the implementation of DDR adversely affected peace building in Zimbabwe. Other peace building processes like the elections, the coalition government, the national policy on peace and forgiveness, the socio-economic developmental programs and the creation of the

country's single national defence force were undermined by the protracted antagonistic relationships between the two nationalist parties and their armed wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA.

DDR in Zimbabwe was directed at three armies: ZIPRA aligned to PF-ZAPU, ZANLA aligned to ZANU-PF, and the Rhodesia Security Forces (RSFs). After the Lancaster Conference in 1979, ZANU decided to run for elections without ZAPU. It had to use a different name to seperate itself from the ZANU of Ndabaningi Sithole. It suffixed its name with PF which was an acronym for the Patriotic Front. ZAPU prefixed its name with PF. ZANU's decision to collapse the PF and contest the elections alone compounded competition and friction with ZAPU. Such competition and friction did not lay a sound foundation for post-independence unity and stability. The RSFs had been fighting to uphold the hegemonic interests of the Rhodesian Front (RF) of the white minority regime, whilst ZANLA and ZIPRA fought to achieve socio-political and economic emancipation. As pointed out before, the DDR process failed to ensure sustainable peace and unity as former rivals started to fight and undermine each other again during the process of creating a single national army. The post-independence conflict was exclusively Black on Black.

The Lancaster House Constitutional talks of 1979 did not help the situation. It skirted fundamental technical details on how the post-independence DDR process was to be handled. In fact, issues to do with DDR processes were left to the new incoming government (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). It is crucial to note that ZIPRA and ZANLA had coalesced around ethnic identities during the liberation war. ZIPRA was predominantly made up of Ndebele speaking guerrillas, whilst ZANLA was chiefly made up of the Shona speaking people from the north-east (Brickhill, 1995).

Like their military wings, the parent political parties were more or less constituted along ethnic and regional lines. In addition, the struggle for independence ended through a negotiated

agreement without outright military victory from any of the parties. This impacted on the enforcement of disarmament and the roll out of demobilisation and reintegration programs. The new post-colonial government was decided on the basis of the outcome of a national election that was held in the first quarter of 1980. The results of the national election were again disputed as PF-ZAPU alleged that ZANU-PF used its guerrilla forces to influence the election in its favour.

The 1980 election was overwhelmingly won by ZANU-PF whilst PF-ZAPU came a distant second. Rather than diminish the level of ethnic bifurcation in the nationalist movement along Ndebele and Shona fault lines, the 1980 election results accentuated it. The two parties were thus reduced into regional organisations as the majority of people who voted for PF-ZAPU mainly came from Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands inhabited by Ndebele speaking people, while ZANU-PF garnered its support from Mashonaland and other areas inhabited by the Shona speaking people (Sithole, 1999). The wedge between the nationalist parties along regional and ethnic lines did not augur well for DDR processes that were put in place by a government largely formed on an ethnic and regional basis.

Even though ZANU-PF invited PF-ZAPU and the RF into a Government of National Unity (GNU), in 1980, and pronounced a national policy of reconciliation, the military situation remained cumbersome as rivalries and hostilities escalated during the integration process amidst accusations of favouritism towards ZANLA ex-combatants and discrimination against ZIPRA. A key source of the critical peace building challenges therefore emanated from the military sectors and spilled over to other sectors. First and foremost, thousands of combatants from ZIPRA and ZANLA did not heed the call to get into APs so as to kick start the DDR process (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 2000; Todd, 2007).

The guerrilla armies had also held back some of their best weapons and best military personnel in neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique. These were to serve as a security guarantee should there be a break-up of the peace agreement or a renewal of hostilities between former arch-rivals and adversaries (Alexander et al, 2000). Although the retention of weapons and military personnel by both ZIPRA and ZANLA in their rear bases during the transition period was mainly for security reasons, the strategy further fuelled mistrust and suspicion between the two.

The third development that adversely affected relations between ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants were clashes between them at APs. These clashes led to loss of lives and were reminiscent of the wartime clashes between the two guerrilla armies which were to a large extent couched in ethnic terms. There were arms caches on ZIPRA properties which were purportedly earmarked for use to topple the ZANU-PF government. The situation became worse after the alleged unearthing of weapons on ZIPRA-owned farms, in 1982, as ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU could not see eye to eye. More over, ZIPRA-ZANLA relationships, both at APs and within the newly constituted security arms of the state, especially in the army, deteriorated to the lowest ebbs (Alao, 2012; Kriger, 2003; Musemwa, 1995; Nkomo, 1984).

As a result of the arms cache 'discoveries,' ZANU-PF arrested senior ZIPRA commanders on charges of treason. The arrest of senior ZIPRA officers triggered a chain of events that exacerbated the already fragile security situation. A significant number of ZIPRA cadres at APs as well as some of those who had integrated into the ZNA deserted into dissidence, whilst others crossed into neighbouring South Africa and Botswana for safety (Alexander et al 2000; Kriger, 2003; Dzinesa, 2005; Musemwa, 1994). On the political front, senior PF-ZAPU politicians who were part of the GNU were dismissed from the government in 1982 and some of them were persecuted thereby signalling the collapse of the GNU.

In response to the problem of dissidence, ZANU-PF deployed a Brigade known as the 5th Brigade into Matabeleland in early 1983 to hunt down ZIPRA ex-combatants who had deserted into the bush with their weapons. In the course of its operations, the 5th Brigade committed heinous acts of brutality against civilians leading to about 20 000 casualties in Matabeleland and the Midlands in a conflict that engulfed the two regions up until ZANU-PF merged with PF-ZAPU into one party on 22 December 1987 (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resource Foundation, CCJP/LRF, 1997). The operations of the 5th Brigade were eventful. Within a very short period, it had caused serious loss of human life amongst the Ndebele speaking people thereby sharpening the feelings of ethnic differences between the Ndebele and the Shona. Those feelings further divided the nation and militated against effective DDR. Although the signing of the Unity Accord ended acts of dissidence as well as the conflict in Matabeleland, simmering ethnic tensions persisted as the 5th Brigade was not only seen by the Ndebele people as a military unit bent on containing dissidence but as a Shona army that was targeting the Ndebele people for ethnic cleansing (Mashingaidze, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). What is clear is that there was a serious problem of division, mistrust, and hostility between key stakeholders to the DDR process in Zimbabwe.

Since the first demobilisation and reintegration process was problematic, it was repeated later. The first process was between 1980 and 1984 and the second one was launched in 1997 and it involved all the ex-combatants throughout the country (United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2005). Three years after the signing of the Unity Accord, ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants formed the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). The major aim of the association was to articulate the grievances of the ex-combatants. The ZNLWVA successfully got the government to award its members a lump sum gratuity and a monthly life pension (Kriger, 2003; Dzinesa, 2005; Sadomba, 2011). After

receiving the reintegration assistance, in 1997, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants also worked together in leading the land occupations of the early 2000s.

What is to be noted is that both processes were led by the government. Although ethnic tensions between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants had significantly subsided in 1997, the government did not take cognisance of early challenges that had afflicted ZIPRA ex-combatants in its second reintegration program. The period of collaboration between ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants was short-lived. When ZAPU was revived by Dumiso Dabengwa, Cyril Ndebele and Thenjiwe Lesabe among others, in 2009, many ZIPRA ex-combatants broke ranks with the united ZANU-PF party and became active members of the revived ZAPU (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Being involved in opposition politics *per se* is not a problem. However, it appears the ZIPRA ex-combatants took with them the grievances they had over problematic DDR experiences and hoped that ZAPU would provide a platform for them to articulate those grievances.

Furthermore, some ZIPRA ex-combatants severed ties with the ZNLWVA in 2016 and formed an exclusively ZIPRA ex-combatants constituted association which they called the ZIPRA War Veterans Association (ZWVA). To date, members of the ZWVA always call for and attend meetings which articulate ZIPRA grievances in the DDR process, chief among them being the call for the government to return ZIPRA ex-combatants' properties that were confiscated in 1982 at the height of the political and military wrath that ZANU-PF/ZANLA directed against PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA. ZIPRA ex-combatants had bought a variety of movable and immovable properties during the period they were at APs to facilitate smooth economic reintegration of their members.

Zimbabwe has remained divided along Ndebele and Shona ethnic lines and there is residual antagonism related to the armed struggle and the DDR process. This study assesses the DDR

process as led and put into effect by the Zimbabwean government in a situation where there were ethnic-linked animosities between political and military entities.

1.3 Problem Statement

The United Nations (UN), through its Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS, 2006), observes that DDR programs that are significantly led and controlled by externals usually fail to effectively link up and coordinate successfully with local leaders. As a result, such DDR programs fail to be relevant to local contexts, and in most cases, leave local stakeholders to the DDR process disatisfied (IDDRS, 2006).

However, the case of DDR in Zimbabwe contradicted the expectations of many in the policy community as the government led and locally-owned DDR process was characterised more by rivalries and hostilities than by harmony and peaceful co-existence and left some stakeholders disgruntled. The DDR processes were far from being transparent and inclusive and therefore undermined the foundational pillars of the peace building process. The ethnic and regional fault lines that fragmented political parties during the struggle for independence and which were again exhibited in the 1980 general elections did not vanish. Instead, they continued with much intensity within the military circles because the two former guerrilla armies were now expected to work and live together in creating the new security sectors of the post-colonial state. Due to ethnic animosities, the DDR process was largely partial, incomplete, and marginalised the ZIPRA ex-combatants.

The results of this DDR process were the continuation of disunity, conflict and the emergence of 'dissidents' affecting peace and stability in Zimbabwe. The other crucial elements of the peace process such as the GNU, implementing the policy of national reconciliation and economic recovery and reconstruction efforts, especially in Matabeleland and the Midlands where the 'dissidents' and the 5th Brigade operated, could not fully materialise. To date, ZIPRA

ex-combatants and the people of Matabeleland in general complain that the government has not instituted programs aimed at deliberately bringing them into the mainstream economy. As noted by the IDDRS (2006), one of the fundamental aims of putting in place DDR programs after a conflict is to obviate the recurrence of conflict and to make sure that peace and stability thrives for other peace building processes to succeed. In Zimbabwe, this was not the case as DDR produced negative results. Put differently, DDR achieved the opposite of what it was expected to do. It perpetuated instability and insecurity.

First and foremost, the results of the 1980 elections which were a foundation of the post-independence government were disputed. As alluded to earlier, mistrust and outright hostility continued between ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants at APs before the disarmament process could be fully completed. Political rivalry and clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA within the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) undermined the creation of an impartial, united and non-political army. All these developments led to the disintegration of the national unity government which was a cornerstone of an inclusive state.

Efforts to eradicate dissidence brought conflict to Matabeleland and Midlands regions thereby threatening development projects that were at their embryonic stages as the two regions were characterised by fear and insecurity. In fact, economic recovery and reconstruction activities in Matabeleland, where most of the ZIPRA ex-combatants hailed from, were stalled between 1982 and 1987 due to security concerns associated with banditry and the 5th Brigade. The DDR process was therefore implemented in an environment characterised by competition for power, economic resources and legitimacy.

The fundamental issue that is brought to the fore by the Zimbabwean case is that it is not only the question of who leads and owns the DDR process which contributes to its success or failure. There are other conditions or factors that need to be looked at critically which contribute

towards the successful planning and implementation of DDR processes, for example, the issue of mindsets of, and relationships between political parties and military factions that are key stakeholders to the process.

Thirty-eight years after the start of the implementation of the DDR programs, ZIPRA ex-combatants are still at loggerheads with government as they argue that their economic woes are government-induced as a result of a partisan and ethnically-oriented reintegration process which disempowered them through the confiscation of the properties that were meant to guarantee them economic security. Despite the unity agreement of 1987 and the formation of the ZNLWVA, there are still some pronouncements by the ZIPRA ex-combatants that depict a fair level of polarisation, mistrust and hostility between them and the government and to some extent with the ZANLA ex-combatants. The above developments, the thesis argues, are a manifestation of an incomplete, politicised and ethnically oriented DDR process. The reintegration program of 1997 did not totally solve the challenges of the ZIPRA ex-combatants. Continued lack of positive peace forced some ZIPRA former fighters who experienced physical abuse in the 1980s to become perpetrators of physical violence and/or acts of intimidation against civilians in the post-2000 period.

ZIPRA ex-combatants complain that discrimination between them and their ZANLA counterparts with regards to access to economic opportunities and resources persist to date. For example, they point out that once ZIPRA ex-combatants retire from the army, they sink into poverty whereas ZANLA ex-combatants are seconded to head government departments (Southern Eye, 2016). The other complaint by the ZIPRA ex-combatants is that the 1997 reintegration assistance was insensitive to their earlier reintegration challenges. They say that the reintegration support was universalised and treated unequal ex-combatants equally. Whilst most ZANLA ex-guerrillas successfully reintegrated in the 1980s, many ZIPRAs could not establish sustainable livelihoods due to confrontations between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU.

Their co-operative schemes and business ventures were disrupted when they were at their embryonic stages (Kriger, 2003; Todd, 2007). By 1997, many ZIPRA ex-combatants were in a weaker economic position compared to their ZANLA counterparts. The 1997 reintegration program, like the 1980-1984 DDR process before it, was also led and owned by the government.

It is pivotal to note that, in general, the demobilisation and reintegration process in Zimbabwe, and that of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in particular, is an interesting one because it continues to significantly influence current political trends in the country. The DDR process in Zimbabwe is a case which appears to defy international policy pronouncements and expectations because it did not facilitate effective peace building. Local ownership of DDR processes may be necessary but that is not a sufficient guarantee of successful DDR and larger peace-building and if unchecked may enable opportunities for discrimination against former rivals. In short, there were serious negative perceptions, attitudes, feelings, behaviour, and relationship problems which adversely affected DDR programs in Zimbabwe and these divided PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA from ZANU-PF/ZANLA and made unity and peace difficult to achieve. These problems resulted in, or deepened the levels of division, intolerance, hostility, and violence between the two and negatively affected the whole DDR process and peace building in general.

ZANU and ZAPU adopted and maintained hardline positions during the liberation struggle. They were unwilling to compromise, unite, share, assist and accommodate each other. These hardline positions were also adopted and maintained by their respective military wings. However, after their defeat in the 1980 elections, PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA seemed to be amenable to compromise and co-operation, whilst ZANU-PF and ZANLA ex-combatants, having been emboldened by their emphatic victory in the elections, maintained their hardline stance. This scenario presented and continues to present challenges to the peace building efforts because the governing party that was supposed to spearhead inclusive peace building processes was the

one bent on pursuing exclusive strategies that alienated PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants. To date, many ZIPRA ex-combatants are bitter because of the government's approach to the issue of their properties which they lost in the DDR process. The government appears to be adamant to have frank and inclusive dialogue over the issue (ZIPRA ex-combatants' properties) that would, according to ZIPRA ex-combatants, bring lasting solutions to their economic challenges and heal their broken hearts.

1.4 Research Objectives

The aim of this thesis is to articulate the impact of the Zimbabwe government led DDR process on the ZIPRA ex-combatants and its consequences for peace building in the country in general.

The study is guided by the following objectives:

- To contextualise Zimbabwe's DDR processes in 1980-1984 and in 1997;
- To highlight the impact of ethnic rivalries and hostilities in the planning and implementation of Zimbabwe's government led DDR processes;
- To identify the nature of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in the DDR processes;
- To evaluate the impact of the DDR process on peace building in Zimbabwe;
- To make recommendations for more sustainable DDR processes that can be implemented in the context of rival and ethnic based political and military formations like in Zimbabwe.

In pursuit of the above objectives, the study seeks to answer the following research question:

- What challenges are associated with a government led DDR process that is taking place in the context of rival ethnic based political and military formations still suspicious and to some extent hostile to each other?

1.5 Research Methodology

This is a qualitative study. The qualitative approach facilitated a protracted interrogation of the experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR processes using different data collection methods. Specifically, interviews, focus group discussions, desk study and observations were the instruments that were used to generate data. This research primarily tries to capture experiences and this is more effectively done through the use of qualitiative data collection methods that facilitate discussions, explanations and some probing. Opinions, feelings, motives, perceptions, explanations and causes of certain actions and behaviour can best be expressed in qualitative terms not statistically. It is Creswell's (2007) view that rich data in qualitative research is usually gathered through scrutinising relevant documents, observing action and behaviour of crucial participants as well as interacting orally with them.

Sources were validated through triangulation. This entailed the use of different sources on the same object of study to check on the authenticity of the research participants' responses. A qualitative approach also provides procedures of accessing detailed unquantifiable facts which can be collected through observations and conversations with participants (Berg, 2001; Mouton, 1998; Leedy and Ormrod, 2013). The detailed data was generated through talking directly with ZIPRA ex-combatants and that was achieved through visiting their residential areas, their work places and allowing them to narrate their stories and provide insiders' perspectives.

1.5.1 Research Design

A case study was used. A case study illuminates the general by looking at the particular (Denscombe, 2003). By interrogating the experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants in greater detail, generalisations can be made to similar cases. The case of ZIPRA ex-combatants was chosen in particular because it challenges the prescript of local ownership and leadership of

peace-building processes. The thesis argues that ZIPRA ex-combatants were marginalised through the DDR process that was government led and locally owned. The case study enabled protracted engagement with few participants thereby leading to rigorous treatment of the subject under study. It also allowed the researcher to probe deeply and to analyse intensively.

Magwa and Magwa (2015) state that a case study enables the researcher to go into the bottom of real-life situations and experiences of the participants using multiple sources of evidence. Creswell (2007) indicates that the utility of employing a case study is that the researcher becomes unobstrusive. He draws meaning from and interpretes what the participants tell him and does not allow his personal experiences or what he reads from the literature to obscure the particapants' views, opinions or feelings.

1.5.2 Sampling

The researcher conducted interviews with thirty-seven male participants, all of who were active in the war of independence, either from a political or military side. On the battle fronts, ZIPRA was exclusively a male fighting force. Although women made up at least 10% of ZIPRA (in the ZIPRA Women's Brigade), all of them remained in the rear bases throughout the duration of the liberation struggle (Brickhill, 1995:66). It was only male ex-combatants that went through APs, disarmament and demobilisation processes. A few women were integrated into the ZNA when they eventually came back home in 1980 and some partook in reintegration processes. However, it was difficult to locate them hence the rationale to interview male ex-combatants who were readily available.

All the participants were aged between 57 years to 75 years during the period of the study. The eldest were in the command structures during the liberation struggle and had a brief stint in the ZNA whilst some of them did not become part of the military establishment after independence. The sample included ex-combatants who experienced DDR from different vantage points: there

were those who demobilised in 1980, who were in the ZNA until retirement; former 'dissidents'; victims of 5th Brigade and 'dissident' abuse; former PF-ZAPU political leaders as well as those who furthered their education after the war and later worked in the public service. The wide cross section of the population provided a wealth of experience which made a holistic analysis and balanced conclusions possible.

Through purposive sampling, the researcher got access to the first group of participants. The purposive sampling technique was used because the researcher identified certain participants who were potentially able to provide significant data relevant to the research question and the objectives of the study. The Mafela and ZIPRA Veterans Trusts provided vital information on the key participants and on how they could be approached. The two Trusts have some important information on the history of PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants.

Basically, purposive sampling enables the researcher to handpick participants that are directly useful to the study (Magwa and Magwa, 2015). Prominent former commanders of ZIPRA and a few rank and file ex-combatants in the vicinity were interviewed first because they were well known by the researcher. As the research unfolded, the snowballing technique was used to access other participants. Rapport was quickly developed between the researcher and other participants because he was introduced to them by people whom they knew. The first group of participants who were identified purposively were asked for the names of other participants who could be rich sources of evidence.

1.5.3 Data Collection Instruments

Four methods of collecting data were used. These were interviews with key participants, focus group discussions, desk study, and observations.

1.5.3.1 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews with thirty-seven participants were used to achieve a holistic understanding of ZIPRA ex-combatants' point of views, feelings and experiences about the DDR processes. Through interviews, questions were asked about facts, beliefs, perspectives, feelings, and motives, as well as past and present behaviours of ZIPRA ex-combatants in relation to the DDR process. Face-to-face interviews enabled the interpretation of non-verbal bodily and facial cues that enriched the researcher's understanding of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences. Dawson's (2002) view on interviewing is that it facilitates a holistic comprehension of the participants' point of views or situation. One-to-one interviews were conducted in venues chosen by the participants and the language of interaction was vernacular in most cases to facilitate maximum understanding of the questions by the ex-combatants. The English language was not used in most cases due to low formal educational levels of most of the ex-combatants.

As observed by Kothari (2004), interviewing has a multiplicity of merits over other data collection instruments. There is greater flexibility in the structuring of questions; personal and sensitive information can be collected through face-to-face interactions, and misinterpretations of the questions which are always the case in a questionnaire method can be avoided. It is for these merits, coupled with the calibre of most of the participants that the study heavily utilised interviews. Most of the discussions centred on sensitive issues like conflict and violence and the interrogation of these issues needed face-to-face interactions in order to get to the bottom of the case. Results of interviews were tape-recorded. Key arguments were also written down during the course of the interviews.

1.5.3.2 Focus Groups

The improved security situation in the country made it possible for the researcher to successfully conduct two focus group discussions. Ever since the unity agreement of 1987 and more specifically after the second reintegration exercise of 1997, ZIPRA ex-combatants are at liberty to openly discuss challenges that they experienced in the DDR programs and they are free to discuss these challenges even in groups.

Focus groups yielded insightful information from ZIPRA ex-combatants. There were five participants per focus group. The participants in focus groups came from among the group of thirty-seven male participants who were initially interviewed on an individual face-to-face basis. Besides generating a wide range of responses in a single meeting, focus groups were utilised because they afforded participants a chance to ask questions and remind each other on issues they would have forgotten as the study was carried out thirty-seven years after the inception of DDR processes. Some timid participants were able to overcome fear and insecurity and air out their views in the presence of their colleagues. According to Gumbo and Maphalala (2015), when participants discuss among themselves in groups, they improve the quality of data being sought.

As with all group interviews, some ex-combatants were unwilling to reveal their thoughts on sensitive, personal, political, and emotional issues in the company of others. Individual face-to-face interviews were arranged to cater for such ex-combatants. The researcher took advantage of the ex-combatants' Burial Society meetings to conduct focus group discussions. Many ZIPRA ex-combatants convene their Burial Society meetings on Sundays where they reside. The researcher waited for the end of their meetings and conducted the discussions thereafter. Participants had a very positive attitude as discussions centred on themes that ex-

combatants wanted to provide a lot of details on. Results of focus group discussions were also tape-recorded.

1.5.3.3 Observation

ZIPRA ex-combatants' behaviour, thoughts and actions were observed directly in two meetings they convened under the auspices of the ZWVA at Castle Arms Motel, in Richmond middle income residential suburb.

Permission to attend the meetings was sought from the organisers. The advantage of an observation is that one can obtain an unadulterated account of the true nature of the phenomena under observation (Chitiyo, Taukeni and Chitiyo, 2015). Participants responding to surveys or interview questions tend to give socially desirable responses, whereas through observation, every aspect of the phenomena can be observed in its natural setting through unobstrusive means.

1.5.3.4 Desk Study

Relevant and more recent literature on DDR and peace building concepts was reviewed and analysed in depth to corroborate evidence from other sources. The literature included books, journal and book articles, reports, policy documents on DDR in general and in Zimbabwe in particular. Literature relevant to DDR issues in Zimbabwe include the War Victims Compensation Act (1980) and the War Veterans Act (1992 and the 1996 Amendment), as well as theses related to the study, memoirs and autobiographies of prominent political figures who participated in liberating Zimbabwe as well as in DDR processes. United Nations reports, and newspaper articles on the phenomenon of DDR and peace building were also analysed. Searches of relevant websites including those of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control

of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the African Union Compendium on DDR also constituted some of the key data gathering methods. Included in the list of literature that assisted in gathering data was the analysis of two peace settlements that were relevant to the DDR process in Zimbabwe. These were the Lancaster House Constitutional agreement of 21 December 1979 and the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987.

1.6 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework for this study is underpinned by the logic of Theory of Change (TOC). TOC asks that we identify initiatives that seek to induce positive change, i.e., those things that need to be done that will lead to the desired change that is sought. It seeks to explain why and how we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context. In its simplest form, a TOC can be expressed in the following form: 'If we do **X**, **Y** and **Z,** it will lead to **W** or if we do **X**, it will lead to **Y**, which will lead to **Z** which might possibly lead to **W**' (Woodrow and Oatley, 2013:8).

Put differently, a TOC can be stated as: 'If we conduct **A** activities, to produce **B** outputs, in **C** settings/contexts, then we will produce **D** outcomes, which will ultimately contribute to **E** impacts' (Parsons, Gokey and Thornton, 2013:8). In other words, a TOC is an articulation of our assumptions and how and why we believe that certain actions/activities will result in specific results or developments. An example of a TOC is: 'If we provide employment to ex-combatants, then we will reduce incidences of criminality and inter-communal fighting because unemployed ex-combatants are likely to embark on violent activities as a means of livelihood' (Woodrow and Oatley, 2013:8). In the peacebuilding fraternity, a TOC is about how interventions contribute to peace, justice, and stabilty.

A TOC is not new *per se* but became prominent in the post-2000 period. It originated in the theory-based program evaluation literature of the 1970s (Nan, 2010). A TOC is useful in the

peace building arena because there are many untested approaches, propositions and programs that donors and implementing partners roll out. A TOC oriented analytical framework is appropriate for this study on DDR because it is context-specific and change-oriented.

A TOC is a tool that is intended to strengthen the quality of design and implementation of a program. As such, it is intended to be practical and helpful. Ideally, a TOC should help a program to be relevant and effective. According to Woodrow and Oatly (2013), a TOC is context-specific and not universal. How change can be delivered in one context does not necessarily mean that it can be directly transferred to another setting. An advantage of a TOC in DDR is that it helps to build an evidence-based, clear, and practical theory that focuses on identifiable pathways. It is in this regard that Rogers (2014) states that a TOC should begin with a sound situation analysis. Research findings are the crucial evidence that guide a TOC.

A TOC also helps in the building of an intervention strategy that is testable since it is specific and based on assumptions. Stein and Valters (2012) view assumptions as prerequisites for the desired change. A thorough mapping of underlying assumptions would enable better and more efficient DDR programs to be drawn up. Vogel (2012) states that infact; assumptions are 'theories' within TOC thinking as they encompass values, beliefs, norms and ideological perspectives about a program.

Parsons et al (2013) indicate that a TOC operates through a Results Chain that provides a theoretical model with pathways to the envisaged change. The interrelated components of a TOC are grouped into inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts. Parsons et al (2013) clarify that inputs are raw materials that lead to project success; activities lead to the realisation of a project's objectives; outputs are the expected positive results of an intervention process whereas outcomes are what people benefit from different and specific activities that are applied

to a particular context. Impacts are ultimate critical changes one hopes his or her project will contribute (Parsons et al, 2013:8).

As indicated in figure 1 below, a TOC results chain is linked together by causal pathways which indicate how desired change is to be achieved. Though a TOC map or pathways is represented diagramatically, descriptive details are always added to clarify some issues and make readers understand some linkages and relationships. This is done in detail in chapter seven.

Figure 1: Theory of Change Results Chain



Source: Parsons, Gokey and Thornton, 2013:8

The study focuses on ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR processes. As indicated earlier, the DDR programs were implemented within a context of mutual hostility, fear, mistrust, and suspicion between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. Intolerance and fear persisted at the expense of tolerance, mutual understanding and peaceful co-existence. The argument is that the government led DDR process in Zimbabwe was partisan and incomplete and that this impacted negatively on peace building efforts. The analytical framework for the study is schematically represented on page 24. The study mainly deals with unquantifiable issues like attitudes, perceptions, feelings, relationships, and experiences. As a result, the pathways that lead to the desired change are not rigid.

In other words, any of the inputs and activities on the left-hand side of the diagram overleaf can contribute in one way or the other to any of the outputs on the right side depending on how they are applied and on how stakeholders to the DDR process react to them. There is no one activity which is directly connected to a specific output. All the inputs and activities can be applied in a flexible manner, provided they suit the context and can bring about the desired mindset transformation and change that ultimately leads to peace, security, unity and stability.

Although TOC reasoning is part of liberal peace building methodology as is also the case with DDR which is essentially constructed in terms of liberal peace building theory, this thesis adds another dimension by emphasizing on the importance of peculiar contextual factors that are relevant in DDR programs, that is, the nature of relationships between political and military formations before and during DDR processes. Whilst liberal peace building applies a standardised and prescriptive (one-size-fits-all) model across different post-conflict scenarios predicated on liberal democracy and market economics, a TOC embedded analytical framework facilitates the interrogation of DDR processes in a specific context. It works through flexible methods and mechanisms which involve concerned stakeholders in a program at the local level in activities that shape their future and relationships. It is not top-down and prescriptive but bottom-up, inclusive and elicitive.

Figure 2: TOC embedded Analytical Framework



The analytical framework employed in this study enables one to analyse fully the development and effects of a 'Security Dilemma' which may take place during the roll out of DDR processes in a context like that of Zimbabwe. In short, a 'Security Dilemma' develops when the intentions

of one party are misinterpreted. Activities that are meant to increase one party's security may be misinterpreted by another party as being meant to be offensive (Xu, 2012). The misintepretations of intentions and activities of party **A** may raise security fears in party **B**. In response, party **B** may prematurely resort to the use of violence in the belief that it is enhancing its own security. By doing so, party **B**'s actions may perpetuate cycles of hatred, hostility, fear and mistrust (Babbit et al, 2013). In the end, physical fighting may take place, further straining relationships.

1.7 Conceptual Clarification

Different DDR programs take place within specific political processes. As such, it should be understood that there is no specific blueprint or theory that can universally apply to all contexts (Defence and Security Division (DSD) of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the African Union Commission (AUC), 2014). Besides that, the concept of DDR is relatively new as it gained currency in the late 1980s. It is also a more practical than theoretical process. The thesis deals with ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR processes and uses the definitions, principles and clarifications of the DDR concept as enunciated by policy makers, practitioners and academics to have a clear treatment of the subject.

The thesis does not attempt to develop a new conceptual framework of the DDR process, but will note gaps and overlaps with regard to the DDR process in Zimbabwe and offer recommendations on some better alternatives where possible. Key concepts are defined and clarified so that readers have a common understanding of the issues under discussion. The concepts are Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration as well as Peace building. For the conceptualisation of the last concept, the thesis taps from Boutros Boutros-Ghali's ground breaking definition of peace building in his, *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) and the Peace building Commission (PBC) for the United Nations (2005) for further clarifications on pertinent peace

building activities. For DDR, the study will use UN policy documents, especially the IDDRS and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) as well as the DSD of the PSD of the African Union Commission (AUC), 2014).

1.7.1 Defining Peace building

The concept of peace building was comprehensively defined in 1992 by the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. According to Ghali (1992), peace building refers to any action meant to develop and support structures and institutions that would obviate the resumption of violence after parties have stopped fighting. Ghali made it clear that military victory on its own does not guarantee sustainable peace. He opined that more activities that are non-military in nature are critical in developing consensual peace. The peace building thrust as enunciated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali speaks more to development-oriented interventions that support and solidify peace.

Some of the interventions that were specified by Ghali involve the creation and strengthening of national institutions, providing for the disarmament and reintegration of previously warring parties, monitoring elections, and advancing reconciliation processes, and creating conditions for the resumption of long-term development among others (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This definition is important because it refers broadly to three critical dimensions of peace building. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC, 2005) identifies these dimensions as security, socio-economic development and the governance and political dimensions. The IDDRS (2006) proposes that these post-conflict processes that are meant to build peace should be implemented in an integrated not isolated and haphazard manner for them to be effective.

The UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee of 2007 also played a critical role in explaining how sustainable peace can be realised. It added more voice on the clarification of peace building to inform practice. The contribution of the Committee was on its emphasis that peace

building should aim at capacitating national institutions and responding directly and effectively to the needs of different constituencies concerned (2007). One has to hasten to say that in order for the peace building strategies to be effective, they should be integrated, well-sequenced and speak directly to the root causes of the preceding conflict.

Since Boutros-Ghali's conceptualisation of peace building in 1992, a lot of scholars, policy makers and institutions have dedicated their attention to the peace building discourse. The expansion in peace building activities has increased our conceptualisation of peace. There are two versions of peace according to Galtung (1989). These are negative and positive peace. For negative peace to prevail, people should not engage in physical fighting using whatever methods and weapons. Positive peace entails the absence of systemic violence or that violence that is non-physical and is usually hidden within socio-political and economic structures of society but can cause death in the long term (Curtis, 2013). Cockell (2010) noted that negative peace alone is not sufficient in building a fully functioning state. He observed that it is not only bombs and bullets that maim and kill people but also such things as hunger, disease, and depression among others that cause problems to people which can ultimately lead to death. The concept of peace building encompasses both negative peace and positive peace.

The PBC outlines other crucial peace building strategies that anchor sustainable peace and these could also be relevant to post-conflict contexts where both political and military formations are divided and hostile to each other. According to Almqvist (2014:10), it is critical to ensure security and end hostilities as the first building block towards peace. However, the PBC for the United Nations adds some critical dimensions in peace building. It notes the significance of promoting reconciliation processes and fostering inclusivity in all peace building processes to ensure their sustainability. It also calls for the effective absorption of ex-combatants and others into civil society so that they do not revert to violent means of earning a living (Almqvist, 2014).

The element of promoting reconciliation and inclusive political institutions is vital in cases of lingering divisions, hate, competition, and an eagerness for revenge. It is crucial to note that other resources for peace building could be available, but if there is no political unity predicated on genuine reconciliation and a spirit of inclusivity, vital resources and efforts could go to waste because durable peace prevails if people pull in one direction, speak with one voice and support all progressive national programs.

1.7.2 Defining DDR

The three elements of DDR will be defined and conceptualised separately since they are key for this study.

Disarmament

According to the UNDPKO (1999), Ozerdem (2002) and the IDDRS (2006), what is central to disarmament is to ensure that weapons are collected from the former warring parties and either re-utilised in a legitimate way or destroyed. The process of collection also includes documentation whereby the type/make, quantity and even serial numbers of weapons are recorded. This ensures safe and transparent management and disposal of weapons. The collection of arms takes place in or outside the conflict zones (Knight, 2009). Besides the collection of arms, disarmament entails disabling mines (demining) and booby traps (UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, UNOSAA, 2005). Disarmament is also used as a strategy of boosting confidence and trust between rival political and military formations so that they could work together in a politically cumbersome post-conflict environment (Gleichmann, Odenwald, Steenken, and Wilkinson, 2004). If carried out successfully, disarmament is significant because it helps to create an environment that is secure and stable to an extent that other peace building elements cannot be disturbed.

Disarmament is basically a military function and is executed immediately after the cessation of hostilities. Usually, disarmament takes place when ex-combatants arrive at APs or cantonment centres after a ceasefire. Knight (2009) articulates that the collection of weapons can be intensified through a couple of strategies. One of them is whereby combatants are given food, goods or cash in order for them to surrender in their weapons. The practice of cash for weapons was mainly practised in Liberia and Cote d'voire (Knight, 2009). In some cases, conflicting parties voluntarily agree to hand in weapons, whilst in cases of outright victory by one of the parties, the vanquished party is coerced to surrender its weapons by the victor. This was the case in Ethiopia where the former army of the Derg government was disarmed forcefully following its defeat in 1991 (Kingma, 2000).

It is Knight's (2009) observation that, when conflict ends through a negotiated agreement, combatants are generally encouraged to hand in their weapons on a voluntary basis. This was the case in Zimbabwe. In case of an externally-supervised disarmament process, peace keepers collect weapons from the combatants. On the strategies meant to achieve disarmament, Omach (2013) concludes that there are basically two. These are forceful and voluntary. In this study, the disarmament process took place in the context of a negotiated peace agreement where there was no outright military victory by any party to the conflict. It was voluntary amidst competing political and military factions. In a context of mutual mistrust, insecurity and hostility, carryingout successful disarmament could be a challenge.

Demobilisation

Demobilisation is defined as the renunciation of military status and structures. In simple terms, it is the systematic departure of combatants from military duties and structures into civil life (IDDRS, 2006). It is the opposite of mobilisation as it means the renunciation of the military status and the adoption of civilian one. It means that soldiers get out of their military structures

through either downsizing or completely disbanding as the situation on the ground dictates (UNDPKO, 1999). The importance of demobilisation is that it signifies transformation from war to peace and helps in freeing some resources from the army into other productive sectors.

When combatants change their status from a military to a civilian one, they are usually assisted materially and financially so that they meet their immediate basic needs. This support is referred to as reinsertion. In this study, this process is treated as part and parcel of demobilisation and not a stand-alone process which comes in between demobilisation and long-term reintegration. Reinsertion support is in most cases used to cater for the ex-combatants' short-term needs. These can also encompass those of their families and/or dependants (IDDRS, 2006). Among other things, reinsertion assistance can include food, clothes, medical services, vocational training, and employment/entreprenueral skills development, seeds, building equipment and sometimes tools (Kingma, 2000). Although reinsertion is usually standardised, there is some room for flexibility to cater for different needs of different interest groups like disabled ex-combatants, women, child soldiers or those settling in either rural or urban areas (Ozerdem, 2002; Michael, 2006).

Reintegration

Ozerdem (2002) and the IDDRS (2006) define reintegration as a process whereby ex-combatants are assisted in different ways to cope with civilian life. Ex-combatants can be assisted socially, politically, psychologically and economically to make that necessary but difficult transition from a soldier to a civilian. The assistance is not permanent but is made in such a way that it leaves ex-combatants in a position to sustainably stand on their own. Above all, there is no defined time frame for this process. It can take a long time, depending on the economic status of the ex-combatants, that is, whether or not they still need support to fully establish themselves. IDDRS (2006) adds that reintegration always stretches over a long time

and requires a lot of finance and other materials for it to succeed. Unlike reinsertion assistance, reintegration facilitates the transformation of military personnel into full-fledged and peaceful civilians if ever it is properly done (Knight, 2009). Reintegration has three main dimensions. These are the social, economic and political dimensions. Many policy documents on DDR emphasize on the first two dimensions at the expense of the last.

Political reintegration is implicit in UN literature pertaining to DDR. For example, the IDDRS (2006) highlight the usefulness of ex-combatants formally organising themselves using channels of representation to voice their concerns. Soderstrom (2013) believes that the policy community seems to assume that political reintegration is an automatic by-product of social and economic reintegration. By definition, political reintegration means the creation of structures and platforms which can be used by ex-fighters together with their families to take part in legitimate political processes and activities of the communities that they join or re-join after conflict (Nilsson, 2005; Soderstrom, 2013).

Knight (2009) emphasizes that reintegration is critical because it assists ex-combatants to (re)settle and be acceptable in post-conflict environments (social dimension). It also makes it possible for them to lawfully engage into political events and processes that take place in their communities (political dimension), and to use peaceful means of survival (economic dimension). It should be noted that in most instances, reintegration takes place after the successful accomplishment of the two processes of weapons surrender and demobilisation. It is thus a long-term civilian process which demands a lot of resources for it to succeed.

1.8 Ethical Considerations

All the participants were assured of their security, both physically and in psychological terms. Since the study deals with a wide cross-section of the ZIPRA ex-combatants some of whom experienced traumatic conditions, special care was exercised to avoid opening up old wounds

and/or raising false hope among the participants. The researcher did not at any time promise to make the conditions of those who were negatively affected by the DDR processes better, but only assured the participants that the findings would be published in an academic report.

Informed consent was observed throughout the study. Personal security was also guaranteed. It is only those participants who were comfortable with their real names used in the study who are referred to using their actual names. Anonymity was observed on all those who did not want their real names published. The use of pseudonyms was meant to give security to the participants who thought that the nature of their responses could create security problems for them. Some of the participants who provided key information in this study personally experienced brutal killings of their kith and kin, whilst others experienced maiming of various magnitudes, torture and beatings, kidnappings and 'disappearances' of friends and relatives, hence careful ethical considerations were practised.

The participants were made aware of the fact that there was no coercion for anyone to be involved in the study. Particapation was voluntary and they were free to terminate it at any time without any problems. Participants were also told that their views, perceptions, facts, opinions, and suggestions were confidential and would be used solely for the purposes of the study. Those who were unwilling to divulge information after getting the above security guarantees were not compelled to participate in the research.

1.9 Scope of the Study

The thesis focuses on two major DDR processes of 1980-1984 and 1997. In the first phase there was the implementation of the three processes of DDR, but in 1997 there was only reintegration. Intervening periods in between and after the two processes mentioned above are also interrogated for a clear, balanced and more comprehensive picture of the issues under

investigation. The focus is primarily on ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences, but where possible, the experiences of ZANLA are briefly interrogated for comparison purposes.

1.10 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The **first chapter** is an introductory one. It highlights the objectives of the study, discusses the statement of the problem and justifies why a study on the experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in the DDR processes is a necessity. There is also conceptual clarification, an analytical framework and methodology of the study.

Chapter 2 is a literature review. It interrogates policy guidelines pertaining to the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of DDR programs. A few cases of DDR programs at the international and regional levels would be discussed in order to have an understanding of the general trends on different DDR programs, especially with regards to the various actors involved, leadership and ownership of DDR programs as well as external assistance involved. Crucial literature on DDR in Zimbabwe is also reviewed.

Chapter 3 gives a brief but very important history of ethnic relations in Zimbabwe. It starts by defining and clarifying the concept of ethnicity. The chapter traces the history and dynamics of ethnic relations right from the pre-colonial era, through the colonial period and into the time of the liberation struggle. It focuses mainly on the ethnic relations between the Shona and the Ndebele. The issue of ethnicity saw the liberation movements and their armies fragmenting into antagonistic factions whose relations were characterised by mutual suspicion, mistrust, rivalry, hostility and violent clashes in some cases. Zimbabwe was led into independence by parties and armies that were competing for political space. It is therefore important that readers understand the political context under which the government led DDR process was planned and implemented in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 4 focuses on the actual DDR process in Zimbabwe. It explains the immediate contextual background under which the DDR process was implemented. The chapter starts with the peace agreement that paved the way for independence mainly focussing on how it spoke to issues pertaining to DDR. Policy issues with specific reference to Zimbabwe are the main focus of this chapter. The key issues that are discussed are the nitty-gritties of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs. It deals with the actual number of forces that constituted the three armies; the numbers earmarked for disarmament and those for demobilisation, how they were disarmed in practice, and the modalities for demobilisation and reintegration. Reintegration programs that were on offer are also briefly discussed. The processes leading to the creation of the ZNA are also interrogated in detail. The chapter ends by looking at the 1997 reintegration exercise.

Chapter 5 presents the findings of the study. It draws data from interviews, focus group discussions, observations and secondary sources to articulate the experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in the DDR processes. Special focus is on their experiences at APs, in disarmament and demobilisation programs, within the ZNA and in civilian life as demobilised ex-combatants. The chapter unpacks the arms cache 'discoveries' and the phenomenon of dissidence and analyses how it unfolded in relation to the DDR process. Focus is also on how ZIPRA ex-combatants fared in and experienced reintegration programs like co-operative schemes, job opportunities, educational advancements, recognition and conferment of hero and heroine statuses, how they experienced the 1997 reintegration program as well as their physical and human security. Although the study is exclusively on ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences, continuous but brief references would be made pertaining to the experiences of the ZANLA ex-combatants and to a minor extent the RSFs in order to develop a solid, unbiased and balanced view of the ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in the broader DDR process and in relation to other ex-fighters. Throughout the discussions, the issue is to evaluate the efficacy

of a government led DDR process in the context of ethnic based political and military formations that are competing for power, influence and resources.

An analysis of the consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR processes is presented in **Chapter 6.** The implications of their experiences on the other elements of peace building like the elections, the government of national unity, the policy of national reconciliation, the creation of a single national army, and on peace and stability in general are analysed in greater detail.

Chapter 7 concludes the entire study. It proffers recommendations on alternative and viable ways of planning and implementing DDR processes in the context of a government led DDR process in an environment characterised by ethnic rivalries and hostilities between parties to the process. It answers the research question on the possible challenges that emanate from a government led DDR process in the context of ethnic based political and military formations.

1.11 Conclusion

The chapter provided an outline of the thesis. The background of the study and problem statement were clarified. Research objectives, methodology and analytical framework that underpin the study were also presented, and where necessary, elaborated. The chapter provided a perspective on why a study on the effects of a government led DDR process for peace building in a context of ethnic-based political and military formations is compelling. The next chapter reviews relevant literature on DDR at the international and local level.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the key literature on DDR generally and in Zimbabwe in particular. It also explores the policy guidelines pertaining to the development and implementation of the DDR process. Since DDR is very crucial and a foundational pillar of stability and peace, the chapter also analyses some of the determining factors for its success. The issue of local ownership and leadership is focused on as it will help to contextualise government led DDR processes such as the Zimbabwe program. In addition, the chapter also unpacks a few cases of the experiences of ex-combatants in DDR processes globally and regionally.

2.2 International Literature on DDR

The dominant literature on DDR is written by policy makers and practitioners and less so by academics. The key themes discussed in the literature revolve around the significance of DDR in a post-conflict environment, implementation modalities of DDR programs, funding procedures and agencies, the place of DDR in peace agreements, as well as the issue of ownership and leadershisp of DDR programs and processes. At the international level, the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG DDR) and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) contributes towards a coordinated program of development and putting into effect DDR programs. The UN IAWG DDR published the IDDRS in 2006 with a set of internationally accepted definitions and operational guidelines for DDR processes. SIDDR focuses on other crucial issues of the DDR process like funding, political and peace building aspects of DDR (SIDDR, 2005; IDDRS, 2006).

Drawing from lessons learnt through the implementation of DDR programs, other organisations and institutions have added to the literature which assist academics and policy makers in the conceptualisation and evaluation of DDR programs and processes. The World

Bank, through its Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes region (2002); the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2010), the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO, 1999), the European Union Concept for the support of DDR, the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA, 2005), and the African Development Bank Group (2011), among others, have been instrumental in developing DDR literature for policy makers and practitioners.

In Africa, the African Union Commission (AUC) through its Defence and Security Division (DSD) of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) developed the African Union DDR capacity Program in 2014 which crafted National DDR Frameworks and operational guidelines for the African continent. Although the guidelines specifically speak to DDR processes in Africa and advises on strategies of engaging national institutions, mobilising funds and the creation of synergies with external partners to operationalize effective DDR programs among other things, the guidelines do not run parallel to other DDR policy initiatives. It is complementary to other DDR frameworks like the IDDRS, SIDDR, ILO, and the EU Concept for the support of DDR among others (AUC, 2014). ILO guidelines provide practitioners on DDR with strategies on how sustainable and effective employment can be created for ex-combatants (http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/). Unlike AUC (2014) frameworks, ILO guidelines are not specific to any continent but complement guidelines from other institutions and policy makers.

On the academic front, the leading scholars on DDR at the conceptual level are Lamb and Ginifer (2008); Alusala and Dye (2010); Lamb (2012;2013); Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer (2004); Knight (2009); Kingma (1997, 2000, 2001); Muggah (2010); Ball and Goor (2006); Berdal (1996); Baare (2005); Bryden (2007); Nilsson (2005); Humphreys and Weinstein (2005); Rufer (2005); Buxton (2008); Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010); Soderstrom (2013), and Banholzer (2014) amongst a host of others. Academics have utilised

the DDR frameworks developed by international organisations and institutions to further clarify the concept of DDR. They do so by focussing on different scenarios/contexts to analyse pre-conditions for successful DDR, its sequencing, design and implementation variations which could produce best results. Most of the academics' attention is on the process of reintegration. This could be because of the fact that reintegration is mainly a civilian program which takes place in communities where ex-combatants are absorbed whilst disarmament and demobilisation are mainly military roles with a short life span.

2.3 Detailed Discussions of International Literature

2.3.1 Significance of DDR

The most important aim of implementing DDR programs after or during a conflict is to ensure that post-conflict societies enjoy stability and security in order for them to start focussing on developmental issues rather than conflict. Alongside other peace building elements, DDR can create a post-conflict environment with adequate safety measures to obviate the recurrence of violent conflict. DDR is not the panacea to post-conflict challenges (IDDRS, 2006). However, it complements other peace building processes like political power-sharing arrangements and efforts that are meant to address the underlying causes of conflicts. More specifically, disarmament helps to separate combatants from their weapons and breaks their relationships with their command structures. It also helps to build trust and confidence among and between different stakeholders to the DDR process. For example, between ex-combatants and civilians. It can also facilitate peaceful elections, reconciliation processes, as well laying a foundation for long-term development (Ball and Goor, 2006; Knight, 2009).

For Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010), the importance of DDR lies in the fact that the collection and incineration of weapons may push ex-combatants away from war-time mind-sets that legitimised violence to civil mind-sets that believe in solving differences amicably.

Put differently, DDR helps to mitigate the risk of post-war violence. If DDR is not effectively designed and implemented, it can create challenges to the ex-combatants. For Nilsson (2005), ineffective DDR incites violence through disgruntled ex-combatants who quickly re-arm themselves in order to achieve their objectives. Nilsson (2005) also explains that ineffective DDR programs can also give incentives for disbanded guerrilla groups to remobilise and embark on acts of criminality and banditry. Berdal (1996) views the main motive behind DDR as the drive to make the government the only authority with a legitimate control over the use of force, not any individulas or groups of people.

Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) see DDR as one of the effective strategies of spoiler management. Through DDR, national leaders can legitimately give ex-combatants, their families and/or dependents some benefits which can make them lead peaceful lives. These benefits can even go a long way in dealing with the major problems that led to physical fighting thereby cultivating sustainable peace. The authors also concur that besides that, DDR can be used to legitimise warring factions through engaging the leadership of various military factions into decision making processes regarding DDR processes. By so doing, DDR helps to neutralise potential spoilers and promotes peace.

In many cases, ex-combatants do not willy-nilly revert to violence to achieve their objectives. There are extenuating circumstances that persuade them to embark on violence or to refuse to disarm and demobilise. In Nilsson's words, "one of the factors influencing whether combatants and their commanders choose to disarm and demobilise is what kind of life awaits them as civilians" (2005:33). After a conflict, some ex-combatants become so marginalised that they lack basic economic, social and psychological support after demobilisation (Nilsson, 2005; Banholzer, 2014). Furthermore, many ex-combatants possess low educational qualifications and technical skills after conflict.

Due to their low educational qualifications, many ex-combatants fail to successfully compete with civilians for formal jobs hence it is crucial that they receive support from the government and other stakeholders in DDR to guarantee their economic security. Buxton (2008) perceives reintegration as a form of humanitarian assistance that does not only empower ex-combatants, but all other war-affected actors and entire communities as well. Put differently, it is a form of thanking them for their roles in defending the state or liberating it from an oppressive and exploitative regime. Kingma's (2001) analysis of the rationale for reintegration resonates with Buxton's. He explains that any support that ex-combatants receive after a conflict can be viewed as a form of compensation for foregone education and other opportunities.

Once ex-combatants are disarmed and demobilised, they do not only lose physical security associated with carrying weapons, but also lose political and social prestige, loyalty and respect from the local population which they gained by virtue of being armed and in uniform (Lundin, 1998; Lyons, 2004 cited in Nilsson, 2005). According to Nilsson (2005), ex-combatants who are not incorporated into any legitimate military structures after conflict always lose the status they had during fighting. In this light, it is important that governments devise other strategies that could make ex-combatants feel they are respected in society. That could be done through giving them new socio-economic and political roles in society that maintain their status and keep them recognised by the people (Spear, 2002 cited in Nilsson, 2005).

Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010) argue that DDR can produce some unintended negative effects on peace and security. Their argument is that DDR may lead to macro-insecurity which is usually a result of a feeling of vulnerability which ex-combatants experience after disarmament and demobilisation. Ex-combatants would always feel insecure especially if their opponents remain armed. It is the view of the two authors that DDR can also cause civilian resentment towards ex-combatants if it is targeted exclusively to benefit ex-combatants. Nonetheless, despite some challenges that can militate against its intended goals, reintegration

benefits are a powerful tool that can hasten disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. Though DDR has a lot of benefits in the peace building field, it can be undermined by competition and hostility between political parties and inter-military faction suspicion and fear as the case of Zimbabwe will illustrate. It is pertinent to assess contextual factors before any intervention is implemented in order to achieve the desired change that would be effective and sustainable.

2.3.2 Factors that promote DDR success

Drawing from lessons learnt from past DDR programs, both policy makers and academics have made several recommendations which they think can facilitate successful DDR. However, the guidelines and recommendations should not be used as a tight blue print. The success or otherwise of any DDR program is dependant on different factors. These, according to the AUC (2014) and Rufer (2005) include the nature and intensity of the preceding conflict, how it ended, the nature and status of the parties to the conflict, national capacities, ownership and leadership of DDR programs among other factors that can directly or indirectly affect the peace agreement, peace process and DDR in general. The other context is that of ethnic based political and military formations which this thesis deals with. IDDRS (2006) explains from the onset that its own set of policies, guidelines and procedures are mainly relevant in a peace keeping environment. Based on contextual specificities of post-conflict environments, IDDRS can be used flexibly by other bodies. It can be noted that even though the standards were drawn for a specific setting, they provide a vital and broad framework to analyse various DDR processes, including the case of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in Zimbabwe.

2.3.2.1 Political Will, Trust and DDR-specific Peace Agreements

The first critical pre-condition for DDR success where the opinions of many academics and policy makers converge is the need for the prevalence of political will, trust and commitment by parties to the DDR programs and the peace process. Secondly, specific DDR guidelines should be made part and parcel of peace negotiations and agreements so as to avoid disagreements and conflict later. The implementation of peace processes in relation to DDR has always been stifled by mutual mistrust and suspicion between warring factions (Knight, 2009). The major reason for the mistrust and suspicion is that disarmament and demobilisation involve sensitive political and power relations issues. For example, the DDR process was delayed in Sierra Leone because one of the stakeholders to the DDR process, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was untrustworthy. Knight (2009) also mentions that the RUF breached the peace agreement and went to the extent of attacking the UN peace keepers. In Mozambique, both FRELIMO and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) held back about 5 000 and 2 000 troops respectively as insurance should hostilities start again (Dzinesa, 2013:288).

In the light of disagreements which later crop up between and among parties to a DDR process, SIDDR (2006) recommends that an overall framework for DDR be provided for within the peace agreement. In the same vein, Gleichmann et al (2004) stipulate that it is important that such issues like the number of forces to be disarmed and demobilised, the nature of the envisaged reintegration programs among other things be clarified in the peace accord, but should not be written in a way that would stifle innovation and flexibility in the midst of unforeseen circumstances. Furthermore, agreements arrived at by all stakeholders should be supervised by a neutral party to check on delays and breaches to the agreement. The supervisory commission should have representatives from all parties so as to build trust and confidence amongst the former warring parties (Gleichmann et al, 2004). Even if the peace agreement is

DDR-specific that is no guarantee that political parties and military forces would develop the much-needed trust and will that would enable the success of the DDR process. Using a TOC framework, it is possible that if trust, political will and confidence are lacking between parties to the DDR process for whatever reasons, it can be built and this could be done through a number of engagement processes between the parties to the process.

However, Gleichmann et al (2004) urge flexibility in the framing of DDR within a peace agreement. Rufer (2005) urges that DDR procedures and guidelines should be meticulously outlined in the peace agreement. Rufer's reasons for proposing a detailed DDR framework to be incorporated in the peace agreement are simple: suspicious and hostile factions tend to disagree and undermine each other if they are not guided by specific guidelines. Among other things, he states that the peace agreement should give DDR programs some time framework, organisation and implementation responsibilities, monitoring mechanisms; stipulations on the amount and number of weapons to be handed in and combatants to be demobilised and those to be integrated into the national armed forces as well as the eligibility criteria for entry into the reintegration process (2005).

Rufer (2005) and Nilsson (2005) believe that it is only through developing the above framework that transparency and accountability can be created that can facilitate effective monitoring and evaluation once the DDR programs are implemented. It is believed that a detailed program of action that is contained in a peace agreement also binds all stakeholders and ensures program success (Nilsson, 2005). Although this approach could be an effective starting point to ensure sustainable DDR, one has to note that situations on the ground change and it is important to be sensitive and relevant to the prevailing conditions at a particular period during the implementation process of DDR programs to produce desired results.

With regard to the specification on DDR details in a peace agreement, the AUC (2014) believes that providing too much detail on DDR issues in a peace agreement may have the problem of stifling flexibility and pragmatism. A general framework could be the starting point and details could be left to the planning and implementing bodies. In this regard, the AUC (2014) recommends that in each and every country that is implementing DDR programs there should be a National DDR Commission (NDDRC) that develops a DDR policy following the broad parameters provided for in the peace agreement but also recognising local contextual factors.

One of the challenges could be how to foster political unity and build an inclusive and professional army in the midst of political and military formations that are divided by ethnic rivalries and suspicions which is the thrust of this thesis. Contrary to what most academics believe in, Banholzer (2014) notes that DDR programs can also be launched while the conflict is still raging before a peace agreement is signed so as to have a pacifying effect on the ex-combatants who would be encouraged to lay down arms due to the incentives provided by reintegration support. So, to some, flexibility and pragmatism are of paramount importance in influencing the success of DDR programs.

It is no guarantee that all DDR processes that are underwritten by a peace agreement are always successful. There are a lot of other related and interlocking factors that are crucial determinants of successful DDR. The DDR process in Angola was stipulated in the Bicesse Agreement of 31 May 1991, but the process was undermined by lack of commitment by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), one of the key parties to the agreement. Coupled with meagre funding from the international community as well as lax security measures that led to the desertion of soldiers from cantonment areas; both UNITA and the Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) retained contingency fighting capabilities which led to the resumption of fighting between 1992 and 1994 at a cost of about 300 000 lives (Dzinesa, 2013:285).

Arguably, there is no guarantee that a DDR process that is stipulated in a peace agreement will always lead to peace and stability. For example, DDR became fruitless in Cambodia despite the 1991 ceasefire and DDR-specific peace agreement signed in Paris and the injection of a whopping US$ 2 billion to facilitate the demobilisation of around 150 000 soldiers (Ferry, 2014). The Khmer Rouge regime refused to cooperate as it claimed that the Supreme National Council, a quadripartite body set up to promote reconciliation was not neutral. Besides the issue of the availability of resources and a DDR-specific peace agreement, attitudes, perceptions, feelings, relationships, and behaviour of ex-combatants and their respective political parties are some of the crucial factors that can promote or hinder the success of DDR processes.

Gleichmann et al (2004) posit that all parties must agree to disarm and demobilise. Further to this, the peace process and DDR should receive support from the armed forces command and that military leaders should have effective control over their forces. Not only should the field commanders pledge theoretical support, but they must demonstrate genuine and practical political will to avoid breaches to the peace agreement (Ball and Goor, 2006). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the World Bank efforts to implement disarmament and demobilisation through its MDRP proved to be a mammoth task because of the prevalence of a multiplicity of militia groups with loose command structures (Michael, 2006). Besides the problem of many loose militia groups without clear and robust command structures, successive DDR programs in the DRC have been negatively affected by other different factors. There are continued incursions of various fighting factions into the DRC from Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. The central government at Kinshasa is not very strong and does not have firm control over the entire country. The government is always negatively affected by both political and economic crises. Last but not least, DDR programs have been adversely affected by the dearth of funds (Knight, 2009).

The political will should not only be dedicated towards guaranteeing the peace agreement and the structural issues pertaining to DDR but should also be extended to cover commitment from political decision-makers and international institutions and donors to fund the often long and expensive reintegration process (Gleichmann et al, 2004). It is for this reason that Gleichmann et al (2004) believe it is critical that during the negotiation process of the peace agreement and the preparation of DDR programs, donors be consulted and included. The availability of adequate funds can act as an incentive that persuades recalcitrant combatants to disarm and demobilise.

2.3.2.2 Funding

As alluded to above, timeous and adequate funding is one of the critical prerequisites for successful reintegration. Funding is not only needed to cater for reintegration assistance. According to the UNDPKO (1999) funding in DDR programs cuts across a wide spectrum of activities. All of the three components of DDR need urgent funding. The UNDPKO (1999) notes that funds are needed to transport combatants to APs and later to their chosen areas of settlement; for the management of APs, upkeep of a lot of ex-fighters at different sites, and for the provision of cash and other incentives to encourage combatants to disarm and demobilise. Kingma (2001) states that the largest source of funds for DDR programs usually come from the international community. Key funders of the DDR comprise of Canada, the EU, Germany, and International Committee for the Red Cross, Sweden, UN Development Program, the United States of America, World Bank and the World Food Program among others (Kingma, 2001). The funding has to be adequate, sustainable and timely to enable the successful implementation of all the DDR programs.

As noted by Ball and Goor (2006) and Knight (2009), it is always difficult for countries emerging from violent conflict to raise enough resources on their own to successfully fund DDR programs. Conflicts, especially violent ones require a lot of resources for their

prosecution whilst on the other hand, conflicts also extensively damage resources that are unexploited thereby making it a mammoth task for states emerging from conflicts to single-handedly fund their post-conflict recovery and reconstruction programs. The support for DDR has to be swift so as to cater for the ex-combatants' basic needs during the reinsertion phase and avoid despair at APs.

However, funding alone is not the answer to all DDR challenges. As indicated earlier, a huge sum of US$2 billion was injected to facilitate demobilisation by the international community through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) between 1991 and 1993. However, the demobilisation process in Cambodia was not all that successful as one of the factions, the Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate (Ferry, 2014:135). On the contrary, Dzinesa (2013:277) illustrates that adequate funding combined with the cooperation of the different belligerents always yield far much positive results in terms of encouraging ex-combatants to disarm and demobilise. Dzinesa (2013) gives an example of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia which had substantial funding of US$416 million and managed to achieve successful disarmament and demobilisation. In Angola, meagre funding of US$ 132.2 million coupled with other challenges undermined DDR and the peace process (Dzinesa, 2013).

External aid can sometimes create some unintended challenges if it produces some disparities in communities in economic terms through what can be viewed as 'preferential' treatment of ex-combatants at the expense of other members of the receiving communities. Many policy makers recommend that during the initial phases of the DDR process, most reintegration assistance be channelled towards the needs of the ex-combatants due to their vulnerability as a result of having been directly involved in conflict. However, after some reasonable time, support should cascade down to every conflict affected party and spur general development in the communities for all the people if it is to avoid stirring antagonisms in the community. It is

in this context that Kingma (1997; 2001) and Buxton (2008) underline the centrality of balancing support extended to former fighters and that of other civilian members of the community if reintegration support is to avoid dividing communities on the basis of ex-combatants and general civilians. Buxton (2008) explains that if reintegration assistance is only given to the ex-fighters, civilians usually become resentful and unwelcoming; viewing ex-combatants as the only ones compensated for enduring the vagaries of conflict whilst in actual fact conflict adversely affects both armed and unarmed people. If members of the community are involved in projects undertaken by the ex-combatants, they may easily reconcile.

Lewis, Harris and do Santos (2010) posit that the best strategy of fostering robust cordial relationships in communities is to also capacitate the communities so that they are able to cater for the needs of ex-combatants as well as theirs. The Ugandan government was able to foster harmonious relationships in communities where ex-combatants returned to. It achieved that through establishing what it termed the Veterans Assistance Program (VAP) which among other things dealt with specific and special needs of former military pesonnel; gave attention to the provision of social services, assisted ex-combatants with productive skills, sensitised the civilians about the needs of returning former fighters. Using donor funds and its own resources, the government helped to capacitate communities so that they could smoothly absorb the ex-combatants in social services (Lewis, Harris and dos Santos, 2010). As a result, Uganda was able to achieve a more successful reintegration program due to its sensitivity to the plight of both ex-combatants and receiving communities.

Gbemisola (2010) notes quite a number of negatives in reintegration support which is solely distributed in the form of cash payouts to the ex-combatants. Willibald (2006) also observes that even though paying ex-combatants in cash during reintegration programs enable them to have freedom in using the money on what they think can sustain them, that is, it gives them the best option to determine their own needs. He also notes that cash accelerates disarmament and

demobilisation, and can stimulate institutional capacity building through encouraging banks to manage large amounts of money. However, he is not oblivious to the fact that cash payments have a lot of demerits as a method of facilitating economic reintegration. Willibald (2006) contend that cash payments can fuel illicit and illegal arms deals and trigger the smuggling of arms across porous national borders. For example, arms were bought in Liberia where they were sold for US$ 300 each and re-sold in Cote d' Ivoire where they were sold for as much as US$ 900 each (Knight, 2009:44).

The smuggling of weapons between Liberia, Cote d' Ivoire and Sierra Leone escalated due to cash incentives. Huge sums of cash can be abused in gambling and alcohol by ex-combatants with little skills of financial management. It is also Willibald's (2006) view that cash payments may not motivate ex-combatants to find employment and may cause civilians to hate them if they are viewed to be in privileged positions when compared to other members of the same community (Gbemisola, 2010). Civilians may interpret the awarding of cash payments to ex-combatants as tantamount to rewarding perpetrators of violence. Knight (2009) recognises the fact that whilst lump sum payments may stimulate a lot of economic activities in communities, the injection of large amounts of money into an economy can also collapse the value of the local currency. Disbursing reintegration assistance in small cash quantities has its own challenges. In Mozambique, the disbursement of reintegration support in small cash quantities diluted the impact of the payments. Much of the money was spent in non-productive sectors. The result was that many ex-combatants did not experience significant improvements in their socio-economic status (Alusala and Dye, 2010). The economic challenges that affected ex-combatants in Mozambique despite having gone through DDR programs led to a second program of reintegration support that was rolled out in 2009 to specifically cater for the plight of desparate ex-combatants.

The economically-crippling effects of an ineffectual DDR process in Zimbabwe forced the government to disperse several thousands of Zimbabwean dollars in cash into an already fragile economy in 1997. The ex-combatants did not benefit much as inflation rendered the Zimbabwean dollar useless within a few weeks. Whatever its unintended demerits, adequate funding is pivotal in the realisation of successful DDR programs, provided the resources are distributed fairly among and between deserving beneficiaries. Inspite of all the unintended repercussions of cash payments in DDR programs, the African Development Bank Group (2011) emphasizes that if there are to be any significant and positive changes in the lives of ex-combatants, both socially and economically, then adequate funding should be availed to back all DDR programs. For example, the Ex-combatant Reintegration and Community support Project (PRAC) in the Central African Republic (CAR) operated with a lean budget of US$13, 2 million in the years from 2004-2008. Quite a number of ex-combatants failed to successfully reintegrate and as a result, some of them re-joined armed groups in Chad and Sudan (Lamb, 2012).

2.3.2.3 Responsiveness to Special Needs of all the Actors

For any meaningful change to happen, support in any program should be targeted towards specific needs of the recipients. Rufer (2005) proposes that there should be the profiling of combatants at APs before demobilisation so as to ascertain their different needs, challenges and aspirations. Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, (2004) believe that the needs of the ex-combatants' families should be prioritised as well. Rufer (2005) gives an example of ex-combatants with some university background who may wish to work in professional sectors in the urban areas. He contrasts them to ex-combatants of peasant background who may wish to get pieces of land in the rural areas and practise farming. In this context, it is therefore not prudent to treat different ex-combatants uniformly as if they have universal needs and aspirations. For example, ex-combatants who are disabled and those who either suffer from

psychological trauma or HIV/AIDS infections have specific and special needs which are different from the rest of the normal ex-combatants. IDDRS (2006) gives priority to the satisfaction of the special needs of various actors in a DDR process to ensure its sustainability.

Due to its insensitivity to the needs of female ex-combatants, the government of Namibia had to contend with demonstrations by disgruntled female former combatants who were calling for government assistance (Dzinesa, 2013). The case of the disabled ex-combatants who barricaded roads in Mozambique further illuminate the insensitivity of both the Mozambican authorities and the UN Mission to Mozambique (UNOMOZ) to their special needs. For the female ex-combatants in Namibia and disabled ex-combatants in Mozambique, there was no reintegration but dumping (Dzinesa, 2013:291). Dumping means demobilising soldiers and pushing them into civilian life without developing mechanisms to assist them cope with civilian means of livelihhod.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2010) treats the issue of employment as fundamental in DDR processes. For ILO, employment is conceived as a special need of the ex-combatants. ILO categorically states in its foreword that ex-combatants only become fully reintegrated into civilian life if they are engaged into productive employment which enable them to accumulate resources for investment purposes (https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5). It is not any kind of employment but effective and relevant employment that can transform an ex-combatant into a proper civilian. ILO has a bias towards the employment of ex-combatants as a vehicle towards sustainable reintegration. For example, Mozambique had to repeat its reintegration program in 2009 because quite a large chunk of ex-combatants in that country failed to secure decent employment and could not sustain themselves economically (Lamb, 2013). Although South Africa's DDR was successful, in terms of employment opportunities, some of its ex-combatants faced some daunting challenges due to stiff competition for jobs with some well-educated young blacks. About 6 000 soldiers who were demobilised by 1995

returned to impoverished conditions as they could not secure decent employment (Van de Merwe and Lamb, 2009:2; Lamb, 2013).

2.3.2.4 DDR Implementation Mechanisms and Modalities

There are different views on the sequencing of DDR processes. According to the UNDPKO (1999) DDR should be implemented in a linear way, that is; disarmament should be followed by demobilisation and then reintegration should be the third and last aspect. Nilsson (2005) has a different view. He states that the linear perspective is rather traditional. For Nilsson (2005), it is not always possible to make a clear distinction between the three processes in terms of where one ends and where the other starts. Combatants may hide weapons for security reasons, and in that context, it can be prudent to have disarmament run alongside reintegration. Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010) posit that it is important to keep combatants with their arms up until a period when their physical security fears are allayed. Disarming combatants before maximum security guarantees makes the disarmed groups vulnerable to attacks from their opponents noted Sambanis and Schulhofer (2010). It is for the same reasons that disarmament was delayed for a long time in Zimbabwe but with disastrous repercussions.

Banholzer (2014) accepts that DDR consist of three components but also states that it is not always the case that all the three elements are implemented in all post-conflict environments. In some countries only disarmament and demobilisation are implemented at the expense of reintegration, whilst others skip disarmament and demobilisation and concentrate on reintegration. UN traditional peace keeping missions were obsessed with disarmament and demobilisation, but the multi-dimensional approach to peace keeping embraces reintegration which is viewed as part and parcel of the broader peace building and developmental trajectory of post-conflict communities. What is important to note though is that the three processes are

complementary, that is, the implementation of one helps in the smooth operationalization of the other irrespective of the sequence in which they are done.

Besides the question of sequencing, different writers and policy makers are of the view that DDR programs should be implemented in an integrated approach. This means that they should be harmonised with other national processes and policies. The AUC (2014) concludes that if DDR programs are not integrated with other peace building processes, they are unlikely to be successful. It is suggested that DDR programs be linked to land distribution and employment programs; Security Sector Reform (SSR), and transitional justice policies among others. On the aspect of SSR in particular, the African Development Bank Group (2011) reveals that it is pertinent that the relationship between DDR and SSR be fully appreciated so that peace building initiatives become successful.

Like Knight (2009), the African Development Bank Group (2011) and Dyck (2016) note that the failure or success of either DDR or SSR affects the other. For example, post-conflict peace agreements always emphasize the absorption of armed groups involved in conflict into the national army and the dismantling of the surplus security apparatus. However, Dyck (2016) observes that if former combatants are poorly trained, that can adversely affect quality and professionalism in the security sector. The African Development Bank Group (2011) concludes that successful DDR programs cannot therefore be drawn and implemented in isolation. It is for the same reason that this thesis dwelt at great length on ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences within the ZNA. The nature of the military integration as well as experiences of ZIPRA ex-fighters in the ZNA significantly impacted on the entire DDR process.

2.3.2.5 Ownership and Leadership of DDR Programs

There has been a growing realisation that quite a number of programs and projects in the Third World are directly controlled and driven by donors to an extent that true partnership with

national institutions and authorities is lacking. The UN notes in its IDDRS (2006) that while the UN may be called upon to provide the much needed financial and technical resources in DDR programs, it is the prerogative of national and local actors to lead the DDR process since the greatest responsibility of mantaining peace, security and development in local communities and nations rest on their shoulders.

According to the AUC (2014), national ownership of DDR programs is critical because it ensures that any intervention measures that are meant to bring about desired change are influenced by contextual factors and dynamics. Relevant information on the local dynamics and context of any post-conflict environment is intended to make DDR practical and helpful. As it has been explained earlier, the understanding of local contexts is critical in facilitating robust interventions in DDR processes. Valters (2015) concurs with the AUC (2014) pertaining to the importance of first of all understanding relevant background factors before any intervention processes are rolled out. He argues that the purpose of any intervention should be primarily based on searching for solutions rather than validation and that there has to be a paradigm shift from trying to match donor prescriptions with whatever challenge that is faced towards ensuring that change is located in local contexts. It is important that even if the national government gets support from somewhere, the leadership of DDR processes from start to the end must be in its hands. The DDR process in South Africa was locally planned, owned and implemented and was largely successful (Dzinesa, 2005; Seibel and Wirtz, 2006). Examples of actors that may assist the national government in making sure that DDR programs are properly rolled out are the military, local government authorities, churches, the civil society, political parties as well as traditional leaders among others (AUC, 2014).

SIDDR (2006), in its final report, recommends that national leadership and institutions should take responsibility in the leadership of DDR because their cultural, social, economic and historical experiences and knowledge of the post-conflict environment would enable them to

be pragmatic and flexible in methods and mechanisms of DDR. Even if national governments are weak and lack capacity, the principle of national ownership of DDR still applies. What national authorities should do is to be involved in all the preparatory stages of the program in order to take over responsibilities once capacity is reasonably developed (AUC, 2014). DDR programs that are exclusively led by external partners risk the challenge of crumbling once the partners withdraw.

There was tension between government officials and the in-country staff of the MDRP in the Central African Republic (CAR) because of lack of meaningful national ownership of the program (Lamb and Ginifer, 2008). What made the issue of local ownership of the DDR process problematic in the CAR is that the country has weak capabilities due to the debilitating effects of coups. N'Diaye (2012) argues that there was little drive at cultivating local ownership of the DDR process in the CAR because of inadequate political will. The real intention according to N'Diaye was to manipulate the DDR process and use it for soliciting for foreign support as well as for pacifying opponents, especially armed groups (2012). Local ownership and leadership ensure the sustainability of DDR programs, especially the reintegration process (IDDRS, 2006).

Michael (2006) is of the view that national leadership of DDR programs is important in that program sustainability is guaranteed because national leaders have the power and authority to create legal and institutional frameworks and can tailor the programming of DDR to country requirements. To facilitate effectiveness and efficiency, national leaders can utilise internationally established terminologies, models and mechanisms to the specific national and local conditions (SIDDR, 2006). Local leadership can also create a national regulatory body like the National DDR Commission. The AUC (2014) dwells at great length on what it believes could be some of the crucial priority areas for the NDDRC that may not be specified in detail in a peace agreement but could be dealt with comprehensively by a NDDRC. Some of the

issues noted by the AUC (2014) that a NDDRC can specify include the number of combatants targeted for demobilisation, size of national army, and eligibility criteria into DDR programs among other issues.

Notwithstanding the importance of local ownership and leadership in DDR programs, Banholzer (2014) points out that third party involvement is an integral part of DDR programs. He states that the involvement of a neutral and strong third party helps to ensure that there is adherence to the terms of the peace agreement if any and that there is minimal manipulation of the DDR process by one party at the expense of others. It is important to note that in doing so, third parties do not necessarily usurp the powers and obligations of the national governments in program design and implementation, but encourage participation and strengthen the commitment of local stakeholders to DDR and the peace process.

Third parties also help to patrol buffer zones that separate former warring factions. Not only do third parties enforce compliance, but also give security guarantees to the belligerents who are fearful to disarm and demobilise. Knight (2009) has noted that combatants are generally fearful to disarm and surrender their forces to the national government if there are no robust security guarantees. For an example, some ex-combatants confirmed in Liberia that they would not have voluntarily disarmed except to UN peace keepers (Banholzer, 2014).

The discussion on international literature mainly focussed on five critical issues that are pivotal in DDR programs. These are the prevalence of political will and trust among parties to the DDR process, the availability of effective and adequate funding, responsiveness of the DDR programs to the special needs of all the parties, the implementation mechanisms and modalities of the whole process as well as the question of ownership and leadership of DDR programs. A glaring gap is that of the subject of politicised ethnicity and its effects on the implementation of DDR programs within a background of mutual mistrusts, suspicions and outright hostility

between political formations on one hand and military units on the other that are critical stakeholders in the DDR and entire peace process. This thesis seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding in this regard. Precisely, it unpacks how differences created between different political and military formations by politicians based on ethnic identities affect the implementation of DDR processes.

The study interrogates how weapons are collected, armed forces demobilised and reintegrated into civil society, as well as the funding modalities, harnessing of political will and support, military integration of different armed forces in the context where both political and military formations are in competition for power and mutually antagonistic.

2.4 DDR Literature on Zimbabwe

Literature that is relevant to DDR issues starts from that which traces the history of unease relations between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups from before colonial conquest right into the colonial era. It does not directly speak to DDR issues *per se* but helps readers to understand ethnic dynamics which fragmented the nationalist movements into competing and hostile factions. The competing factions of ZAPU and ZANU led Zimbabwe into independence and continued their ethnic rivalry and hostility in the post-colonial state. As seen in chapter one, these ethnic rivalries also percolated into the DDR programs and had a negative and lasting legacy on unity and peace in the state.

The subject on the history of ethnic relations is fully treated in chapter three. Here, it is only important to mention that Beach (1980, 1986, and 1994) and Ranger (1969, 1985) are the leading scholars on Ndebele and Shona ethnic relations in the pre-colonial era. In short, they emphasise that although the relationships between the Ndebele and the Shona were at times hostile, in most cases, they were characterised by mutually beneficial interactions. Ndlovu-

Gatsheni (2009) argues that colonial authorities accentuated bifurcations based on ethnicity because they wanted to perpetually dominate the colonial subjects.

On ethnic dynamics during the war of independence, Sibanda (2005); Nkomo (1984); Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009, 2011); Sithole (1999) and Msindo (2012) are the leading scholars. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) argues that the colonial authorities accentuated African bifurcations based on ethnicity by politicising ethnicity so that they could easily dominate and exploit them. So, relations between the Whites and the Africans were characterised by exploitation which had the effect of uniting the exploited Africans across the ethnic divide to confront the colonial system during the early years of the nationalist movement.

Although finer issues will be explored in the following chapter, it is sufficient to state that Sibanda, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Nkomo and Day (2008) explain the 1963 split in the nationalist movement along ethnic lines whilst Sithole points to Joshua Nkomo's ineptitude and prevarication as the cause of the split. Msindo's (2012) view is that ethnic differences and rivalries were not the cause but a result of the split. The history and results of continued divisions and clashes between ZAPU and ZANU are well captured by Bhebe (1999) and Alexander et al (2000) who emphasize on competition for power, positions, influence and legitimacy based on ethnicity as the driving force for hatred and clashes between the military wings of the nationalist movements during the struggle to free blacks from colonial bondage.

The first category of literature which directly interrogates DDR issues consist of work that was written in the 1980s mainly by politicians-cum-historians. Most of it was written from the victor's perspective and eulogised ZANU-PF and ZANLA's heroic execution of the armed struggle whilst disparaging PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA as having done little towards the liberation of Zimbabwe. Celebratory literature or what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:3) aptly calls 'praise texts' projected and continue to propagate an official view which presents only ZANU-PF and

ZANLA as true liberators and genuine nationalists who were committed to build a united and prosperous Zimbabwe after independence.

The roles of PF-ZAPU as a political party and ZIPRA as a fighting force in the war of socio-political and economic emancipation were concealed and the two were viewed as bitter losers who carried out all sorts of reactionary and sabotage work to undermine ZANU-PF after independence. Instrumental in propagating that agenda are Martin and Johnson (1982). The views of the two authors were infused into History textbooks for all Secondary Schools in Zimbabwe and became part of the official history of Zimbabwe. Fay Chung (2006) believes that 'dissidents' were caused by purely political issues which had nothing to do with DDR issues.

She argues that some ex-ZIPRA cadres resorted to violence against ZANU-PF government from 1982 because they were convinced that their party (PF-ZAPU) lost the 1980 general elections due to manipulation by ZANU-PF that kept the majority of its veteran guerrilla fighters outside APs for campaign purposes. Sibanda (2005); Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) and Alexander et al (2000) locate the problem of 'dissidents' directly into the incomplete and partial DDR process, especially the persecution of ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA.

Alongside book articles that were written by key government and ZANU-PF officials in contributions to a book edited by Canaan Banana in 1989, Martin and Johnson viewed ZIPRA ex-combatants as saboteurs who cached arms and resorted to dissidence for purposes of toppling ZANU-PF from power. In fact, the Unity Accord of 1987 is celebrated as a historic achievement in Zimbabwe by authors like Mnangagwa and Mutasa who made contributions to Banana's edition in 1989. By then Mnangagwa and Mutasa were key cabinet Ministers in ZANU-PF government. For Mnangagwa and Mutasa, the Unity Accord helped to eliminate

dissidence that was sponsored by PF-ZAPU and executed by some of the ZIPRA ex-combatants.

Specifically, Mnangagwa (1989) argues that before weapons were found on farms owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants, there were revolts by ZIPRA cadres at Entumbane, Connemara and Silalabuhwa, which resulted in many deaths. He further asserts that the desertion of ZIPRA ex-combatants from the army seems to have been co-ordinated but ZANU-PF could not receive satisfactory explanation or responsibility from PF-ZAPU leaders and senior ZIPRA commanders on the arms caches and the actions of ZIPRA cadres who were deserting the army. Of particular significance is how Mnangagwa views ZIPRA ex-combatants in relation to clashes at APs. Mnangagwa believes that ZIPRA ex-combatants were revolting against the government or staging a mutiny (Mnangagwa, 1989).

Joshua Nkomo (1984) blamed ZANU-PF for all the political misfortunes of his party and the challenges that affected ZIPRA combatants during demobilisation, military integration and reintegration. Writing in 1984, Nkomo blamed what he termed political meddling by ZANLA guerrillas for his electoral losses and further alleges that demobilisation favoured ZANLA combatants over ZIPRA. Nkomo's narrative contradicts that of Mutasa and Mnangagwa accounts of DDR-related issues of the 1980s. Divergent views and blame game from top political leadership of PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF provided negative ingridients for the DDR process.

There appears to be a deliberate creation of politically sensational issues pertaining to DDR issues from both sides of the narrative. This could be because the stories were written by interested parties. Whilst the clashes at APs, the desertion of ZIPRA from the ZNA, the caching of arms, dissidence, and the collapse of the GNU are all blamed on PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA by ZANU-PF aligned writers, all those unfortunate developments that undermined the smooth

implementation of DDR programs are blamed on ZANU-PF and ZANLA by Joshua Nkomo. Nkomo's side of the story represents the opposition or specifically the PF-ZAPU version of the developments. These entrenched and hostile positions from both political divides needed to be controlled to avoid them undermining the government led DDR process.

The second category of literature was mainly written by academics in the 1990s to the post 2000 period. Many of the scholars took advantage of the improved security conditions and a reduction in political polarisations which came with the Unity Accord to use academic lenses in interrogating DDR issues. Before the Unity Accord, it was risky to propagate alternative views to the government. This is why Joshua Nkomo published his autobiography in exile in 1984 because it contained an alternative narrative about the arms caches, the clashes at APs, the desertion of ZIPRA from the ZNA as well as the 5th Brigade.

Even after its publication in London, Nkomo's autobiography remained banned in Zimbabwe for several years because it was deemed to be containing subversive information. Commenting on the dearth of scholarly literature on Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1987, especially on the violence that happened in Matabeleland and Midlands, Msindo (2012:167) interestingly said, 'speaking truth to power' in post-colonial Zimbabwe has been generally risky. DDR issues were linked to the violence that engulfed Matabeleland and Midlands and that also meant that discussing DDR issues in writing or verbally remained secretive and risky until the 1990s.

Academics like Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) note the shortcomings of both DDR programs of 1980-1984 and 1997 and conclude that 'two wrongs do not make a right.' The programs are referred to as two wrongs because the argument is that the first program was inadequate and incomplete as disarmament and demobilisation were shambolic and reintegration support did not extend beyond 1984, whilst the 1997 reintegration support was targeted at ensuring that ZANU-PF government was secure not in making sure that the challenges and needs of ex-

combatants were fully addressed (Rupiya and Mazarire, 2000; Dzinesa, 2005; Musemwa, 2011). In the same vein, Baines' (1995) interviews with four ex-combatants between September 1990 and January 1991 portray a picture of sad experiences in DDR by both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants.

In the second category of literature, there are scholars who are agreed that the DDR process in general was inadequate for all the ex-combatants as reintegration programs failed to economically empower ex-combatants (Dzinesa, 2005, 2008; Chitiyo, 2000; Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005; Rupiya and Mazarire, 2000). The other group of scholars within the second category of literature recognise the differences in the experiences of the ZANLA ex-combatants on one hand and ZIPRA on the other (Kriger, 2003; Msemwa; 1994, Alao, 2012; Sibanda 2005; Todd, 2007). ZIPRA ex-combatants are seen to have been marginalised in the DDR programs. Alao's detailed treatment of the integration process into the ZNA depicts preferential treatment of ZANLA over ZIPRA in high positions whilst Kriger's thesis reveals challenges experienced by ZIPRA ex-combatants in reintegration.

Whilst Kriger and Todd emphasize on the differential experiences between ZIPRA and ZANLA in DDR programs, Sadomba (2011) see it otherwise. Sadomba argues that Kriger and Todd view DDR issues from a partisan perspective and that viewpoint oversimplifies issues. What Sadomba (2011) sees is the deliberate attempt by the politicians to stir divisions amongst former liberation fighters to keep them perpetually divided and hostile to each other and therefore unable to speak with one voice against their marginalisation. For Sadomba, ZIPRA and ZANLA endured similar challenges in DDR programs and whatever differences were there were deliberately magnified so that ex-combatants fought each and left the government alone (2011). Sadomba's perspectives on DDR issues in Zimbabwe resonate with those of some of the ex-combatants since he is a ZANLA ex-combatant himself.

The post-independence animosities between ZANLA and ZIPRA are viewed as similar to those that transpired during the liberation struggle. Sadomba (2011) argues that in both instances, friction between ZIPRA and ZANLA was fanned by the politicians for their political convenience. However, Sadomba's analysis is not clear on which political side (PF-ZAPU or ZANU-PF) these politicians came from.

The works of Baines (1995), Alexander et al (2000) and Alexander (2008) provide the richest historical studies of DDR in Zimbabwe. The sources of information of these authors were the ZIPRA ex-combatants themselves. As indicated earlier, the post-1990 period made it possible for scholars to directly interact and interview ZIPRA ex-combatants without attracting reprisals from the government. Baines (1995) interviewed four ex-combatants pertaining to their hopes and aspirations in a post-independent Zimbabwe and what they actually experienced practically. Alexander (2008) interviewed twenty former 'dissidents'and their perspectives illuminate our understanding of the phenomenon of dissidence. During the height of PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF antagonisms (1982-1987), almost all ZIPRA ex-combatants were labelled 'dissidents.' However, in this case, Alexander interviewed ZIPRA ex-combatants who had eloped into the bush and decided to oppose the system through acts of sabotage and other undemocratic means.

She explains that 'dissidents' had legitimate grievances which centred on the demand to free some incarcerated PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA political and military leaders respectively from prison, ethnic tolerance and quest to bring back properties illegally confiscated by the government to their rightful owners (ZIPRA ex-combatants). Alexander (2008) also notes that 'dissidents' were embroiled in ethnic politics as they infiltrated Shona speaking areas like Belingwe in order to spread curfew to the Shona people. The dynamics of ethnicity are articulated by Alexander in the operations of the 'dissidents.' Alexander et al (2000) also

generated a lot of their data through primary sources hence they articulate the perspectives of the ex-combatants themselves who were at the epicentre of DDR processes.

Dzinesa (2005, 2008) and Sadomba (2011) also provide a detailed interrogation of the trials and tribulations of the entirety of the ex-combatant constituency after the Unity Accord, culminating into the formation of the ZNLWVA and the demonstrations by the ex-combatants which earned them the second reintegration support in 1997. Sadomba's (2011) explanation of the demonstrations by the ex-combatants is located within the intricacies of White monopoly capital. He argues that ZANU-PF government was working in cahoots with White capitalists and side lined the ex-combatants and workers in the sharing of the national cake hence that invigorated them to unite and fight hard until the government capitulated and awarded them gratuities and monthly life pensions in 1997.

In the post-2008 period a plethora of newspaper articles emerged mainly from the private press that articulated the grievances of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR programs. This constitutes the third category of literature on DDR in Zimbabwe. After the revival of ZAPU, in 2009, there was an upsurge in newspaper articles, especially from the private press that spoke directly to the issues that affected the ZIPRA ex-combatants in reintegration programs. The private press acts as the mouth piece of ZIPRA ex-combatants and is critical to the government of ZANU-PF.

These newspapers are the Financial gazette, the Newsday, the Southern Eye, the Standard, and the Zimbabwe Independent and to a minor extent, the Daily News. The Zimbabwe Independent in particular, published in parts in 2017 important literature from academics on the political dynamics in the early 1980s leading to the desertions of ZIPRA combatants from the ZNA. The private press gives ZIPRA ex-combatants, especially the leaders of the ZWVA and ZAPU of Dumiso Dabengwa, a platform to articulate their grievances. Key issues raised in these

newspapers centre around the return of ZIPRA properties, the reasons for the formation of the ZWVA and alleged preferential treatment of ZANLA over ZIPRA ex-combatants in post-military employment. What is important to note is that most of the newspaper articles from the private press present a one-sided perspective of the DDR experiences and need to be treated with caution.

However, information from academics that was published on a weekly basis in The Zimbabwe Independent in 2017 assists in the reinterpretation of the phenomenon of dissidence. Stuart Doran and Helen Cameron had access to official documents and communications between ZANU-PF and different embassies and government officials in Britain and America who were close to and interested in political and military developments in Zimbabwe then. The Newsday provides information on the meetings of ZWVA and official communication pertaining to the current status of the ZIPRA ex-combatants' properties. The private press has also afforded former 'dissidents' a platform to articulate the circumstances that forced them into dissidence.

Besides literature from politicians, academics and newspaper articles, the CCJP Report of 1997 and to some extent writings of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010) provide invaluable information which enhance our understanding of the 'dissident' activities and the operations of the 5th Brigade in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. Although the Report does not deal directly with DDR issues, it is a source of vital information that enables analysts to delve deeper into understanding the reasons behind the atrocities and these reasons tell a story about DDR processes. The Report narrates horrendous scenes and experiences by people who saw their homes being burnt and civilians killed by both 'dissidents' and members of the 5th Brigade.

This thesis adds on more literature on DDR issues through interrogating DDR processes in Zimbabwe, specifically in the context of government leadership of those processes within a

political landscape of ethnic divisions that are embedded in the political and military formations.

2.5 Conclusion

The literature on DDR at the international level suggests that there are varied and pertinent factors that affect the success of DDR processes. In the case of Zimbabwe, there are divergent perspectives on the DDR process and these perspectives are at times influenced by the same ethnic differences and interpretations that affected the implementation of the DDR process. The entrenched position of scholars pertaining to DDR issues in Zimbabwe mirror the entrenched positions of both political and military formations in the DDR processes. These divergent positions, it is argued, needed serious engagement across both the political and military divide to transform them into beneficial tools in the promotion of effective DDR.

CHAPTER 3: HISTORY OF ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ZIMBABWE

3.1 Introduction

The chapter deals briefly with the history of ethnic relations and dynamics before colonial conquest and during the years of colonial occupation, including during the liberation struggle. Ethnicity has profoundly influenced major facets of life in Zimbabwe, especially in socio-political and economic spheres. Contestations for power, influence and legitimacy among other things have to some extent been decided on ethnic lines. Ethnic divisions became pronounced after the 1963 split of ZANU from ZAPU. Ethnicity became politicised and manipulated by the nationalist leaders as a means of mobilising supporters.

It is pertinent for readers to understand some critical issues like the fragmentation of the liberation movement into competing and hostile factions because the DDR process was implemented in the context of ethnicised armed factions which had roots in the liberation struggle. The liberation movements of ZANU and ZAPU, together with their respective military wings which were the key stakeholders in the DDR process had assumed solid ethnic identities and orientations by 1979 and these ethnic identities have a traceable background. The thesis argues that these ethnic divisions and rivalries had profound implications on DDR and the general peace process.

The post-colonial government that led the DDR process was a by-product of ethnic configurations that developed during the struggle for self rule. The thesis argues that any intervention activities that are meant to induce positive change and lead to effective DDR should be implemented with a clear understanding of the broader context. Woodrow and Oatley (2013) articulate that a TOC takes cognisance of the broader contextual factors in which the intervention occurs. The assumptions about change should be based on relevant contextual information for them to produce the intended outputs. If not based on proper contextual factors,

proposed activities that are earmarked to transform attitudes and relationships and mitigate the problem would be baseless. This is the major reason why this chapter deals at length with background interactions between political and military formations of ZANU and ZAPU and ZANLA and ZIPRA respectively before the actual implementation of DDR processes in 1980. Change that is not contextualised is to a large extent meaningless and unsustainable.

As will be shown shortly, the post-colonial state that ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants were fighting for was largely imagined in Ndebele and Shona ethnic identities respectively. This chapter will mainly focus on the divisions, conflict and violence within and between the nationalist movements from an ethnic stand point especially after 1963 when ethnicity became a potent tool for political mobilisation in the nationalist movement. The chapter will commence with an analysis of the interconnections between ethnicity and conflict before delving into a short history of ethnic relations between the Shona and the Ndebele; the two major ethnic groups on the Zimbabwean plateau. This discussion is not meant to be a detailed history but an overview that allows us to place the issue of DDR in its proper context in line with the thrust of the study.

3.2 Ethnicity and Conflict

The aim is not to delve deeper into the theoretical underpinnings of ethnicity but to briefly explain the concept and analyse how it is connected to conflict generation since the thrust of the study is an interrogation of DDR processes within the context of ethnically based and conflictual political and military formations. Olayode (2016:244) explains ethnicity as one form of identity that is characterised by common symbols, culture and a shared ancestry among other issues. Due to common characteristics, a group feels different from other groups. Other determinats of ethnic identity are a common language, religion, ideology or geographical area.

Primordialists view ethnicity as a social association that is innate whilst to the constructivists; ethnicity is an identity that is socially and culturally constructed (Olayode, 2016). Put differently, ethnicity is not a fossilised determination but is produced and reproduced by material and historical forces. Msindo's (2012) view on ethnicity is that it is a social organisational category which disappears during one period and intensifies during another. Many academics are more agreed than ever that ethnicity is not natural and immutable but can be mobilised and manipulated to serve certain objectives.

According to Ake (1993), competition amongst ethnic groups is not always bad as assumed, but can promote human rights and democracy. The common assumption is that Africa is riddled with conflict because of perennial competition between and amongst ethnic groups. Of course, notions of in-group purity and other group vices can divide people into 'us' and 'them' thereby fracturing society and posing a threat of conflict. However, Ake (1993:5) argues that "people are not and cannot be a problem just by being what they are, even if part of what they are is ethnic consciousnesses." In simple terms, what Ake is highlighting is that most conflicts in Africa have been attributed to ethnicity, but that argument is not sustainable.

One lesson drawn from Ake's argument is that we must transcend our current understanding of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness and move beyond the temptation of always blaming people and their culture. The issue is that we must learn to problematise real issues that cause and sustain conflict in our communities. The issue(s) that caused divisions, intolerance, hostility and violence in Zimbabwe could not be simplistically reduced to ethnic differences between the Ndebele and Shona. It is possible that politicians exploited minor ethnic differences in language and ancestry to mobilise supporters and achieve their grand plans of attaining power and influence over others.

With specific reference to Africa, Olayode (2016) articulates that colonial administrators manipulated African ethnic groups by defining, classifying and numbering them in order to create administrative units that could facilitate easy political administration and economic exploitation of the colonised people. In this way, one should mention that colonialism divided ethnic groups through what seemed to be preferential treatment of different ethnic groups. It can be concluded that ethnicity was manipulated to achieve the colonialists' strategy of divide-and-rule. However, this should not be interpreted to mean that colonial administrators invented ethnicity in Africa. Rather, they intensified ethnic consciousness for their own selfish reasons. Msindo (2012) emphasises the fact that before colonialism, Africans sustained certain traditions and structures in place in the absence of written codes and laws by means of oral and spiritual mechanisms that helped to create and sustain new identities.

It was not only the colonialists who divided the Africans along ethnic lines. African political movements used the ethnic card to mobilise and recruit people into their respective political parties and liberation forces. Ake (1993) defines political ethnicity as the politicisation and changing of ethnic identity into major political divisions. Msindo (2012) prefers to call it political tribalism. Political ethnicity or political tribalism is at the centre of causing conflicts not ethnicity *per se*. In the period of nationalist movements, political leaders who knew that they could capitalise on ethnicity by virtue of coming from numerically large ethnic groups, did not hesitate to invoke the ethnic card to stir political ethnicity for purposes of mobilising followers (Ake, 1993). Leaders of the newly founded post-colonial states added the impetus to political ethnicity (Ake, 1993). In most instances, the nationalist leaders did not seek to transform the colonial states they inherited but perpetuated the exclusive and repressive policies of the colonialists to such an extent that Ake (1993) viewed most post-colonial states as drifting towards politically monolithic entities which accentuated political ethnicity. Any intervention measures targeted at achieving change should therefore focus on real issues that

cause divisions, intolerance and violence between political and military entities rather than focus on scapegoats.

It is not correct to conclude that ethnicity by itself causes conflict. One may prefer to work with his own kinsmen without necessarily being antagonistic to other ethnic groups. Ake (1993) believes that political ethnicity rather than just simple ethnicity is a source of different challenges in many states because it means that if ethnicity is politicised and politics is ethnicised, then ethnic groups are motivated to compete against each other and even to indulge into violent tactics and strategies in order to achieve their objectives. If that scenario develops, it then becomes easier to mobilise and manipulate members of the 'us' group against a common 'foe'. It is crucial to indicate that many political leaders, especially in Africa often manipulate ethnic identity for electoral purposes or to support a conflict. In most cases, ethnic thinking and mobilisation generally develop when people feel that they are marginalised in one way or the other. It also stems from real or imagined inequitable distribution of power, access to resources and political exclusion and not from an intrinsic hatred. In such a scenario, it is possible that inclusive political, economic and social activities could encourage and promote a spirit of oneness and inclusivity.

The issue of ethnic relations in Zimbabwe is discussed in this context rather than simply attributing conflict and antagonistic relations within the nationalist movement and in DDR programs to ethnicity. Through the manipulation of ethnicity for political and economic purposes, leaders are usually able to outcompete and ultimately subdue and defeat their rivals. Mindset transformation could be one of the critical steps in getting rid of exclusive and selfish thinking which breeds marginalisation and violence.

3.3 Pre-Colonial Ndebele-Shona Relations

The relationships between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups have long been portrayed as confrontational and bloody by White writers like Hole (1926), Willis and Collingride (1894) among a group of early writers on the history of the region (Cobbing, 1976). The blame is put squarely on the shoulders of the Ndebele who are accused of mercilessly killing the Shona, taking their wives, confiscating their livestock, heading their children into slavery and disrupting their normal social, political and economic activities. However, scholars like Cobbing (1976), Ranger (1985), Beach (1986) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2004) have attempted to debunk the mythologies and present an objective view about the nature of the relationships between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups. Before a detailed interrogation of the relations between these two ethnic groups, it would be prudent to discuss briefly who they are in terms of their origins and major political and economic systems. The discussion will start with the Shona and end with the Ndebele.

The Shona are believed to have originated from somewhere to the north of the Zambezi River and settled in present day Zimbabwe around A. D 1000 (Beach, 1980). They came in and displaced the Khoi-san who had inhabited the area for several centuries before (Beach, 1980). A detailed history of the Shona is not necessary here, save only that they were migrants who invaded the country earlier than the Ndebele and had a decentralised political system and diversified economy that was based on agriculture, trade and metal work. The Ndebele loosely used the term Shona in reference to the people of the north-east of the Zimbabwean plateau. Today, the Zezuru, Karanga, Kalanga, Korekore, Manyika, Nyanga, Ndau or Shanga among others are collectively called Shona people (Beach, 1980:227).

They are numerically the dominant ethnic group on the Zimbabwean plateau. Mazarire (2009) notes that what is collectively called Shona people today is an amalgam of the Vanyai, abe

Tshabi, Karanga or Hole. The mainstay of their economy was agriculture which was supplemented with a strong trading component. Shona communities used various strategies of state building which included violence, conquest, raiding and assimilation of other weaker groups (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) concludes that there were features of raiding and violence among the Shona because of the war-like names of the Later Iron Age Shona states. The word Mutapa means a pillager, whilst Rozvi means a destroyer or to destroy and Torwa means we will fight. Mudenge (1988) vividly illustrates the point that at the height of its power, the Mutapa state raided as far as the Indian Ocean and once forced many Portuguese to be subservient to their authority. This information is critical as it debunks the myth that the Shona were docile victims of external intruders, including the Ndebele.

Whilst the real geographical origins of the Shona remain a subject of speculation, that of the Ndebele is clear. The Ndebele originated from Nguniland in the early nineteenth century as a result of the Mfecane crises that were caused by overpopulation and other related factors. Unlike the Shona, the Ndebele had a centralised political system with the king at the apex (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Like the Shona, agriculture was the mainstay of their economy and was supplemented by trade and to some extent raiding. Overpopulation in Nguniland led to an acute shortage of essential resources, bred hostile competitions and the survival of the fittest syndrome (Omer Cooper, 1987). The finer details that compelled Mzilikazi and his group of about 200-300 Khumalo followers to migrate northwards until they settled in present day Zimbabwe are not relevant to this study. What is important is that during their northward migration, Mzilikazi and his Khumalo group raided, conquered and assimilated weaker groups they came across (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). However, other groups were assimilated through non-violent means. When Mzilkazi passed through the Sotho of Moshoeshoe, he and his

followers were given the name Matebele, which according to the Sotho meant strangers from the coastal area (Omer Cooper, 1987).

During their migration, the Ndebele assumed a multi-ethnic identity as they incorporated various ethnic groups into their ranks. The Ndebele were the last of the Nguni groups that entered the Changamire state in the late 1830s (Beach, 1986). Some of the Shona people were assimilated into the emerging Ndebele state that grew in the south-western parts of the Zimbabwean plateau. According to Beach (1986:32), people of Shona descent constituted about 60% of the total Ndebele population by 1890. Although numerically outnumbered by the local Shona, the Khumalo clan remained the core aristocratic group who made up the first social class known as Abezansi. Those who were captured along the way formed the second class known as Abenhla and the local Shona made the third social class that was called Amahole (Ranger, 1969). The Ndebele and the Shona could be viewed as two separate ethnic groups on the basis of different geographic and ancestral origins as well as minor cultural variations. These differences could not be sufficient to explain the high levels of division and intolerance that later developed between the two groups. However, they shared a lot in common such as economic systems and marriage practices.

As already alluded to, the history of Ndebel-Shoan relations have generated much debate among historians. Ranger (1985) points out that their relations were portrayed as hostile and bloody by White writers because they wanted to drive a wedge between these two ethnic groups so as to facilitate easy colonisation. Beach (1986) and Ranger (1985) have emphasised the fact that Ndebele-Shona relations were characterised by both cordial and hostile interactions at different stages of the evolution of the Ndebele state. It is a fact that when the Ndebele arrived on the Zimbabwean plateau, they found the Shona of the Changamire dynasty already weak, having been adversely affected by the raids of other Nguni groups that passed through their territory. It is also true that the Ndebele were not very strong by then, having experienced the

politically debilitating effects of a succession dispute that was sparked by the installation as king of one of Mzilikazi's sons, Nkulumane whilst Mzilikazi was still alive and strong (Beach, 1980). It is in this context that the early Shona-Ndebele relations should be analysed.

Contrary to claims that Ndebele and Shona relations were always hostile, evidence from Beach (1986), Ranger (1985), and Cobbing (1976), among others, have demonstrated that to a large extent the relations were cordial. Raiding could have been pronounced during the early phases of Ndebele settlement as they needed manpower to increase their numbers. However, as they developed into a more settled state, relationships between the two ethnic groups were characterised more by trade, intermarriages and religious intercourse than violence. The Ndebele traded cattle for grain and iron tools. The Ndebele also loaned some cattle to the Shona in what was known as Kuronzera or Ukusisa in the local Shona and Ndebele languages respectively (Beach, 1986).

The Shona people who resided around the Ndebele state were in a regulated relationship of tribute payment for immunity against raids (Beach, 1986). The Shona who paid tribute were subservient to Ndebele authority but maintained a sizeable level of political independence in their daily lives (Omer Cooper, 1987). It is difficult to understand why the two groups finally developed brazenly antagonistic relations from the 1963 split in the nationalist movement right into post-independence Zimbabwe. One can note that the contestations were not on factors like different language and origins *per se* but their manipulation by politicians to mobilise followers in the contest for political power.

The frequency and magnitude of raiding has been falsified for a couple of reasons. Missionaries fabricated the nature of relations, emphasizing on Ndebele violence on the Shona because they wanted to gain support from the British authorities to break up the Ndebele state since the Ndebele had resisted embracing Christianity (Ranger, 1985; Beach, 1986). Concession-seekers

exaggerated the destructive effects of Ndebele influence on the Shona because they wanted to use the Rudd Concession, they had signed with Lobengula of the Ndebele as a ticket to occupy the whole of Zimbabwe, including Mashonaland. Furthermore, both the Shona and Ndebele were complicit in the myth generation crusade pertaining to their relationships.

According to Ranger (1985), the Ndebele exaggerated the number of people they killed, as well as the number of cattle, women and young men they brought back from the Shona during their raiding expeditions. The reason for doing that was to portray their military image as very powerful (Beach, 1986). The Shona accepted and even perpetuated the mythology about their 'helplessness and vulnerability' in the hands of the 'marauding' Ndebele so as to gain 'sympathy and protection' from the British colonisers (Ranger, 1985:122). These perceptions were passed through generations through oral messages. Both the Ndebele and Shona played into the hands of the colonialists who wanted to keep them divided and hostile to each other. Mindset changes over a long period could facilitate positive engagement, tolerance and more peaceful co-existence between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups.

The sensationalisation of the effects of Ndebele raids on the Shona has a strong and long-lasting legacy as it is perpetuated through oral sources to this day. Some Shona people believe that their fore fathers suffered heavily in the hands of Ndebele raiders; losing cattle, women, young men and freedom. The post-independence period was therefore seen as an opportune time for revenge through the 5th Brigade on the Ndebele for their fore fathers' 19th century transgressions on Shona people (CCJP, 1997). In fact, Coltart (2016) and Munemo (2016) believe that heinous tactics of the 5th Brigade on unarmed Ndebele civilians in the early 1980s pointed more to a military unit that was on a revenge mission rather than bent on containing dissidence.

Munemo (2016) argues that the violence that always erupt between supporters of the mainly Shona-backed Dynamos football club and the Ndebele-supported Highlanders football club smacks of something more than mere football hooliganism. The violence between the supporters of the two football teams could be traced to politicised ethnic rivalries and hostilities between the Shona and Ndebele that manifested after the 1963 ZANU split from ZAPU. However, as Ake (1993) observes, the existence of different ethnic groups does not in itself cause conflict. The problem emanates from the politicisation of ethnicity to achieve either political or economic goals. It is argued that if inclusive programs could be utilised to build common understanding of national issues between the Shona and Ndebele, dissipate tensions and encourage them to reconcile and forgive, and harness their different experiences for the good of the country, then feelings of hate and revenge could be contained.

3.4 Ethnic Relations during the Colonial Era.

Not much has been written about inter-African ethnic relations during the colonial era. Most of the available literature focuses on the exploitative relationships between the Africans and the settler regime. The exploitation of both the Shona and Ndebele was mainly characterised by land expropriation, taxation and extraction of cheap labour. Whilst enduring exploitation, the Africans were made to feel more different from each other through the politicisation of ethnicity. Ake (1993) argues that colonialism decimated African culture, dismantled their will to resist, and kept them divided and weak. The strategy was used to entrench colonial domination.

The manipulation of ethnicity was thus meant to keep the colonised people divided and unable to mount any meaningful resistance for purposes of extricating themselves from colonial oppression. Msindo (2012) has noted that ethnic identities were not invented by missionaries and colonial rulers. What colonial administrators did was to accentuate ethnic identities through

politicising them. Even after independence, the Whites seemed bent on formenting divisions between Africans and encouraging them to fight so that they could continue to dominate them economically. The collaboration between the RSFs and ZANLA ex-combatants against ZIPRA ex-combatants after independence appear to have been targeted at keeping the two former liberation armies mutually antagonistic.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) explains how the colonial administrators fuelled division of Africans along ethnic lines and prevented them from coalescing into a single national identity. Africans were categorised into ethnic-based administrative and geographic units such as Mashonaland for Zezuru-speaking Shona; Matabeleland for Ndebele speaking people and other related groups like the Kalanga, Venda, Nambiya, Tonga and Sotho, Fort Victoria (Masvingo) for Karanga-speaking Shona and Manicaland for Manyikas (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). A national identity card system was used to code and classify Africans according to an assigned village of origin. Each 'native district' was coded using a numerical code which was written on each and every adult's identity card. The major aim of doing all this was to divide Africans into distinct groups for easy administration and domination.

Even though the 1929 factional fights in Bulawayo between the Shona and the Ndebele occurred during the period of the politicisation of ethnicity by the colonialists, they were far from being induced by ethnic hatred. Phimister and Onselen (1979) have located the violence outside ethnic rivalry but within the orbit of pure workers' competition for limited job opportunities. According to Msindo (2007), the Shona went to Bulawayo to look for jobs and they offered themselves as cheap labour thereby displacing the Ndebele. The Ndebele wanted better wages which the employers could not give due to the adverse effects of the economic depression. As a result, the Ndebele were squeezed out of the labour market hence the fight between them and the Shona. The Ndebele mobilised themselves along ethnic lines to achieve their socio-economic interests. Amongst a litany of accusations, the Shona were viewed as

overcrowding the Ndebele in Bulawayo, snatching their wives and jobs. Since the Shona and Ndebele were taught to develop strong regional and ethnic identities, in the same way, they could be taught to discard that mindset and develop national identity and stop to imagine independent Zimbabwe in Shona and Ndebele terms.

3.5 Mass Nationalism, the Liberation Struggle and Ethnic Relations

Different ethnic groups coalesced and formed a united nationalist identity during the formative years of the nationalist struggle. Msindo (2012) has observed that right from the birth of the first nationalist party in Zimbabwe, the African National Congress (ANC), in 1957, up to the ZAPU-ZANU split of 1963, ethnic groups made frantic efforts to complement rather than stall the growth of African nationalism. Nationalist parties that were formed were located within a multi-ethnic context. The ANC, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and ZAPU cut across the ethnic divide. However, the nationalist leaders were alive to the issue of ethnic balancing within the top leadership of the nationalist movement from the earliest times. When Joshua Nkomo, a Ndebele won the ticket to be the ANC President by defeating James Chikerema, who was Shona, by thirty-two votes to thirty-one, it was decided that James Chikerema should automatically deputise him to represent the Shona ethnic group (Interview with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017). If pursued throughout the liberation struggle and thereafter that spirit of inclusivity could have averted the politicisation of ethnicity and minimised divisions and violence that came with it.

Even though the spirit of nationalist identity overrode other forces of division, Gwakuba-Ndlovu remembers very well that some Shona speaking politicians did not hide their displeasure over the election of Nkomo as the President of the ANC. People like Edson Sithole, Leopold Takawira, and Henry Hamadziripi thought that the leadership of the nationalist movement could have gone to someone from the numerically dominant and 'indigenous' Shona

people (Interview with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017). The issue of who is 'indigenous' and 'alien' between the Shona and Ndebele is controversial. Historical evidence points to the fact that both ethnic groups originated from outside the Zimbabwean plateau but the Shona arrived much earlier than the Ndebele.

3.5.1 Split in the Liberation Movement

The issue of ethnic relations experienced no significant developments and challenges up until the split in the nationalist movement in 1963. For Msindo (2012), ethnicity morphed into political tribalism after the 1963 ZANU split from ZAPU. Msindo (2012) argues that ethnic differences were not central to the split, but its politicisation thereafter by political leaders to garner and mobilise party supporters meant that ethnic identity drove a political wedge between ethnic 'Others' thereby inspiring unbridled hatred. The possible causes of the split are critical in this study because after the split, ethnic relations between the Ndebele-dominated ZAPU and ZANU which was chiefly made of the Shona speaking leaders and supporters took a turn for the worst.

There are mainly three schools of thought that explain the causes of the 1963 split. One represents the ZANU perspective which is well captured by Shamuyarira (1965) and Sithole (1999). The opposite view is explained by Nkomo (1984) and is also captured by Sibanda (2005). The third version locates the causes of the split in wider political developments of the time and is articulated by Dabengwa (1995) and Msindo (2012). Both Sibanda and Nkomo represent the ZAPU perspective about the causes of the split. The first two perspectives are from interested parties, and suffer from a couple of limitations. Nonetheless, they provide some vital information that enable people to comprehend ethnic dynamics and reconfigurations of the nationalist movements and their effects on the prosecution of the liberation struggle and on post-colonial DDR processes. The first perspective emphasises the tactical and strategic

ineptitude and blunders made by Joshua Nkomo as President of ZAPU. ZANU's version as represented by Shamuyarira and Sithole alleges that Joshua Nkomo did not exhibit full commitment to the armed struggle, was vacillating, dictatorial, an indecisive coward who was always secretive on some fundamental issues that determined the course of the liberation struggle (Sithole, 1999:40-41).

The so-called ZANU 'rebels' who engineered the split are said to have been incensed by Nkomo's cowardice when he failed to return home and give leadership and direction to the grassroots when ZAPU was banned (Msindo, 2012). Instead of returning home, Nkomo is blamed for having misled ZAPU Executive members to travel toTanzania on the belief that they had been invited there by President Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) for purposes of constituting an alternative government-in-exile. ZAPU leaders are said to have been disappointed when they arrived in Tanzania since they were told that the other African governments had not sanctioned the move (Msindo, 2012). Shamuyarira (1965) is of the view that the rest of the ZAPU Executive were so disappointed by what they considered to be Nkomo's betrayal hence they decided to form another party.

Nkomo disputes the authenticity of ZANU's version of the story and lays the blame for the split squarely on political tribalism that was embraced by young political leaders who were power hungry and overwhelmed by greed. Nkomo (1984) alleges that some of his colleagues within ZAPU who were Shona-speaking like Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira and Morton Malianga always undermined his leadership and authority. In one incident, he says that they actually made it impossible for him to present a professional and sound speech at the Addis Ababa meeting, Ethiopia, in 1962 (Nkomo, 1984). The prepared speech was not availed to him and he had to speak off the cuff.

Nkomo (1984) believes that the Shona leadership within ZAPU had decided to sabotage him so that he could appear a weak leader at the international level. Nkomo also alleges that Joseph Msika, one of the ZAPU Executive members snatched a circular from Morton Malianga that fermented ethnic feelings by categorically urging the numerically superior Shona people to ditch Nkomo who was from the numerically inferior Ndebele ethnic group and then assume leadership of ZAPU. In the said circular, Nkomo is derogatorily referred to as 'Zvimundebere' which in Shona means an old and boring Ndebele man (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007).

Msindo's (2012) version of the split acknowledges the two opposite views expressed above, but doubts the centrality of ethnicity and Nkomo's political ineptitude in explaining the split. For Msindo, ethnicity became an issue after the split as warring factions politicised it to mobilise support for their parties. Msindo argues that the split needs to be taken within the wider political developments of the time. The political context is explained in the following way. First, the wind of decolonisation was sweeping across Africa in the early sixties. It was natural that the nationalists in Southern Africa also expected the wave of change to engulf their region and produce spectacular results in the political front (2012). However, the situation was not to be in Southern Rhodesia as successive political parties were banned and their leaders detained (Msindo, 2012:196). Under the prevailing politically-prohibitive conditions, younger politicians became disillusioned and blamed Joshua Nkomo for the setbacks (Msindo, 2012; Dabengwa, 1995).

The second scenario was where some nationalist leaders were under the false sense of optimism that majority rule was around the corner. The thinking was predicated on the belief that with the end of the Federation, the British policy of decolonisation would quicken and that would mean the achievement of independence for most of its colonies, including Southern Rhodesia (Msindo, 2012). Again, this was not to be with regards to Southern Rhodesia since the end of Federation was followed by increasing repression and the entrenchment of White minority rule.

However, some of the ZAPU executive members who were under the illusion that the end of Federation would concide with decolonisation began to position themselves to assume influential leadership positions, and thus caused leadership wrangles within ZAPU. Although plans to oust Nkomo could have developed earlier on, the euphoria for independence that was sparked by the thinking that the end of Federation would usher in independence could have triggered the split. Msindo (2012) argues that it was natural that ambitious elites in the ZAPU Executive who thought about power and positions started jostling and positioning themselves strategically for post-colonial leadership posts. Whatever weaknesses Nkomo was accused of came as a pretext rather than cause of the 1963 split. Msindo questions why Nkomo's weaknesses were spotted by only Shona speaking leaders save for one Ndebele, Enos Nkala.

It is therefore possible that ethnic differences could have played peripheral roles in causing the split in 1963, although these were being suppressed. The undercurrents of ethnic rivalry could not be underestimated as even as early as 1957 when the first nationalist political party, the ANC, was formed in Salisbury, there were some grumblings by some Shona politicians that the Presidency of the party should have gone to the majority and 'indigenous' Shona-speaking people. Gwakuba-Ndlovu remembers vividly how Edson Sithole displayed political and regional tribalism when he told him that, '…the Shona would not stand by and watch the country being led into independence by Joshua Nkomo, a reincarnation of King Lobengula of the Ndebele' (Interview with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017).

Lobengula was the son and successor to Mzilikazi, the founding king of the Ndebele state. After the 1963 split Nkomo was mocked and likened to Lobengula who some Shona blamed for 'selling' the country to the British imperialists through signing the Rudd Concession in October 1888. In fact, the NDP which succeeded the ANC did not escape the embryonic scourge of political tribalism as it once briefly split when some Shona politicians mainly from

the Karanga sub-ethnic group formed the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) under the leadership of Michael Mawema (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

Msindo's thesis on the causes of the ZAPU split in 1963 resonates with Dabengwa's (1995) assessment on what could have caused the split. Dabengwa locates the causes of the split in opportunism by some of the leaders, impatience and political greed but does not rule out the contribution of ethnic differences (1995:26). When closely looking at some of the accusations against Nkomo, one finds out that they contain some loopholes and could only have been used as a cover up for real issues which brought about the split. Sibanda (2005) and Chimhanda (2003) graphically illustrate how ZAPU executed the armed struggle in the early 1960s as opposed to what Martin and Phyllis (1982) present as the official commencement of the Second Chimurenga on 28 April 1966. Therefore, the argument that Nkomo was anti-armed struggle has some weakness. Sibanda (2005) argues that in terms of ideology, strategy and tactics, there was nothing where ZANU could claim to be different from ZAPU. Since they did not differ in the stated issues above, ZANU had to escalate its rhetoric about its unwavering commitment to the armed struggle and radicalism in order to appear different from ZAPU.

A few other things which show that some of the allegations against Nkomo were baseless was that immediately after the split, ZANU vigorously engaged the international community for purposes of securing military bases and logistical support. They later went on to establish rear bases in friendly countries like Tanzania and Mozambique (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). In the light of the above development, the argument that Nkomo was a coward who abandoned cadres at the home front in preference of a government-in-exile in Tanzania to prosecute the struggle through remote control is not very convincing. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:80) observes that, 'setting up an exile base in Tanzania was part of ZAPU's preparations for an armed struggle.' Nkomo's argument that the split was caused by purely ethnic differences also has a challenge in that Salisbury remained a bastion of ZAPU support even after the split. Salisbury, which is

present day Harare, is in the heart of Mashonaland and could have shifted allegiance quickly to the Shona-dominated ZANU rather than cling to ZAPU which was predominantly Ndebele constituted (Msindo, 2012).

It is true that the split was in the top political leadership of ZAPU not among the rank and file and it remained so for some few years until the gospel of political tribalism cascaded to them and up until ZANLA guerrillas went about uprooting ZAPU structures in Mashonaland in the 1970s, replacing them with ZANU ones (Bhebe, 1999; Interview with Mazinyane, former senior ZIPRA commander, 2017). From the evidence, the split was mainly precipitated by power struggles between Nkomo and some ZAPU executive members.

It was reduced to ethnic rivalry and Nkomo's political ineptitude and blunders by ZAPU and ZANU rival camps respectively in order to justify their separate existence. Msindo (2012) has alluded to the fact that many people in the 1960s began to view the ZAPU-ZANU split as a Ndebele-versus-Shona issue not a power struggle between Nkomo and his opponents. However, ethnic rivalry was not a dominant divisive factor by 1963 but its foundation as a centrifugal force was laid down then as will be shown in the following discussion. With hindsight, it can be argued that a government that emerged from such a polarised environment could not manage to be an impartial facilitator of peace building processes, especially DDR.

3.5.2 Ramifications of the Ethnic Split

Whilst the causes of the 1963 split are debatable, its repercussions are clear and incontestable. The split had a clear and long-lasting legacy of division and hostility between ZAPU and ZANU first as political parties and between ZANLA and ZIPRA as their military wings. The 1963 split led ZAPU and ZANU to execute the liberation struggle from the 1960s until 1979 as separate and to some extent hostile political entities. Relationships remained like that until 1987 when the two parties merged into a single political party. Between 1963 and 1987, ZAPU

and ZANU could hardly co-operate in the execution of national duties. The period after the split was however characterised by intermittent attempts at unifying the liberation movements but to no avail as the ghost of political tribalism kept on lingering.

Msindo (2012) notes that the moral ethnicity that had kept African peoples self-conscious, and at times divided, was translated into regional political 'tribalism' after the split as political elites used it to mobilise popular support. ZANU mobilised ethnicity into a Shona super tribe whose geographical extent not only encompassed Mashonaland but all other Shona-speaking areas including Masvingo, Manicaland and some parts of the Midlands (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). On its part, ZAPU mobilised the Ndebele and became a general regional political identity that also covered the areas inhabited by the Kalanga, Venda, Sotho, Tonga and other people closely associated with the Ndebele.

The period immediately after the split witnessed horrific scenes of bloody clashes between the supporters of the rival parties. Doran (2017) articulates that when ZANU was formed in 1963, its members immediately became victims of physical attack from ZAPU members. Interestingly, Doran (2017:15) states that:

> ZANU and ZAPU did not fight because they were different, but because they were the same. The nationalist mindset, already well established by the time of the schism, was that there could be only one liberation party, one authentic representative of the people. Those who formed or joined different organisations were—with their supporters; 'sell-outs', 'stooges' and 'agents' of imperialism. Violence was the inevitable off-spring of this zero-sum ideology, as those in the opposing camp were regarded not simply as competitors or misguided fellow travellors but as traitors.

Whilst Doran's analysis throws weight into the argument that the 1963 split was engineered by power-hungry individuals rather than any ideological, tactical and strategic differences, it also reveals that the two parties became fiercely intolerant towards each other. Besides physical fighting and upping rhetoric that portrayed its adversary as anti-revolutionary, there was nothing more these two parties could do to mobilise supporters and outdo one another because they were almost the same. However, before political tribalism had really percolated down to

the grassroots, the clashes were mainly between new ZANU recruits and hordes of ZAPU supporters who included both Shona and Ndebele speaking people. It is for this reason that Msindo (2012) articulates that Ndebele-Shona hostility was not clearly evident immediately after the split as ZAPU retained support in Salisbury and some parts of rural Mashonaland. In the late 1960s, ZANU used its publicity experience to fan political tribalism and it is during this period that the two political parties evolved into intolerant and strong regional and ethnic entities along Ndebele and Shona lines.

For Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009), the split set the stage for the imaginations of the post-colonial state along Ndebele and Shona ethnic lines. What had begun as 'sons of the soil' during the formative years of African nationalism turned into 'sons of segregation' after the split up to the end of the liberation struggle as both Ndebele and Shona nationalists tried to strategically position themselves in order to be leaders of the envisaged independent state (Staffer, 2009). That mentality was not only espoused by the nationalists but by the military as well. This meant that the military envisaged the structure and functions of the national armed forces after independence with the lens of political and regional ethnicity. Such a mentality was bound to present some challenges to any government that wanted to implement a DDR process, be it a ZAPU or ZANU-led government.

The presentation of the 1963 split in the public domain as an Ndebele-versus-Shona issue had the effect of amplifying the rivalry between the Shona and Ndebele whereby the latter was portrayed as a foreign and minority ethnic group. Ethnic emotions were also whipped up through the African Daily News, a Salisbury based African paper that was owned by ZANU and was effectively used to disseminate disparaging propaganda against ZAPU and its leadership, especially Nkomo (Staffer, 2009). The perceptions of differences between ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA were built carefully over some time, and to get rid of those

perceptions, it can be argued that quite a big investment in reconciliation and inclusive activities was a necessity.

Shona emotions and hatred against the Ndebele were raised by such publications as the one that likened Nkomo to Lobengula, the late Ndebele King who is accused in Shona traditions for having abused the Shona and for also 'selling the country' to the British (Msindo, 2012:197). Through its paper, ZANU also accused Nkomo of abandoning Shona men to languish in detention each and every time when nationalist parties were banned. By doing so, a wedge was gradually drawn between ZAPU and ZANU supporters to the extent that even some of the Shona-speaking people in Salisbury and other areas who had remained with ZAPU during the split decided to shift political allegiance to ZANU which claimed to be championing the cause of the Shona ethnic group that was 'deliberately undermined' by the Ndebele within ZAPU. Due to the gradual loss of Shona support, ZAPU's stronghold shifted from High fields in Harare to Bulawayo and Matabeleland region in general (Msindo, 2012).

It is crucial to notice that although ZAPU remained with an ethnically balanced leadership at the top as it retained quite a number of prominent Shona-speaking cadres, that ethnic balance did not cascade down to the rank and file. The ZAPU Executive Committee had such Shona leaders as Chikerema, Nyandoro and Msika, whilst ZANU had only one Ndebele, who according to Msindo (2012) had sharp personal differences with Nkomo on the grounds that he did not marry his sister whom he had an intimate relationship with. The Shona leadership within ZAPU did not alter the perception outside Matabeleland that ZAPU was basically for the Ndebele-speaking people (Msindo, 2012). As time went on, regional and ethnic loyalties started to be significant factors in the recruitment, training and operations of ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres. Since recruitment of cadres for training became regionalised and ethnicised, ZAPU largely constituted of the Ndebele people from the south-western parts of the country, whilst ZANU became Shona-dominated. Although recruitment was largely on regional and

ethnic lines, it did not cease to be characterised by competition for recruits between the political parties (Tungamirai, 1995).

Furthermore, when the trained guerrillas infiltrated the country to wage the armed struggle, they mainly operated among their kith and kin although there are some areas where they overlapped (Bhebe, 1999; ZAPU Department of Information and Publicity, 2012). To illustrate the effects of the politicisation of ethnicity on the composition and operations of the trained cadres, Sadomba (2011) states that some Shona-speaking guerrillas that had trained under the auspices of the ZAPU Department of Special Affairs before the formal constitution of ZIPRA as a military force defected and joined the newly formed ZANU as a result of the ethnic differences that were mainly emphasised by ZANU through its propaganda machinery. Robson Manyika and Rex Nhongo are among some of the senior Shona military leaders who defected from ZAPU and joined ZANU due to the amplification of ethnic differences and hatred (Brickhill, 1995).

The differences between ZIPRA and ZANLA were also magnified by the different training backgrounds of the two liberation armies. Many ZIPRA recruitees trained in the then Soviet Union, whilst Chinese instructors trained quite a number of ZANLA guerrillas. On their own, the differences in training backgrounds did not make the cadres different. However, each party was told that its sponsor's ideology and quality of training was superior to its rival's (Brickhill, 1995). As a result, guerrillas from the two rival groups undermined each other. Bhebe (1999:89) had this to say about the levels and nature of rivalry and hostility between ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres:

> These young men and women were trained to hate each other by their leaders, who wanted to justify the separate existence of their parties. Each party had its Commissariat Department, whose task was to teach recruits the history of the party, how the party was different from the other, who the leaders were and how they were different from the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. Thus, the cadres were brought up to hate.

The guerrillas were subjected to indoctrination by their respective political parties in which each political party portrayed the other as bad and harbouring evil intentions (Bhebe, 1999). These guerrillas could be easily indoctrinated because they had strong ethnic and regional biases. They were thus turned into 'political armies' and that naturally affected the DDR processes later on. As a result of the divisive and malicious teachings they got from their respective political parties, ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants also spread the gospel of ethnic hate into the hearts and minds of civilians wherever they operated. As they operated along ethnic and regional lines to a greater extent, this meant that the politicisation of ethnicity into rigid Ndebele and Shona political identities was reinforced even among the civilians. In this context, it is envisaged that dialogue with various stakeholders acknowledging multiple viewpoints and recognition of power relations and dynamics could bring about mutual trust and respect of each other (Vogel, 2015).

ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants also fought each other wherever they came side by side. There were bloody clashes which pitted guerrillas aligned to ZANU against those aligned to ZAPU in Mgagao and Morogoro in July 1976 in Tanzania where ZANLA and ZIPRA were undertaking joint training under the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) military outfit (Sithole, 1999; Alaxander et al, 2000). With hindsight, any future attempts of implementing DDR processes within such a conflictual and deeply polarised context without simultaneously implementing some change-oriented programs and activities to transform the exclusive and negative mindsets, perceptions and relationships of both political parties and military forces were bound to be ineffective.

They also clashed in Mozambican military camps as well as in the home front during the period of ZIPA as well as in Ethiopia and Libya where they were meant to conduct joint trainings (Bhebe, 1999 cited in Staffer 2009; Nkomo, 1984; Alexander et al, 2000). Unlike the 1960s inter-party violent skirmishes between ZAPU and ZANU supporters, the clashes between

ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas were couched in ethnic terms because the armies were to a large extent organised along ethnic lines although ZIPRA had a small percentage of Shona-speaking guerrillas.

Not only did ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants clash at the rear but at the home front as well. Clashes were always prevalent where operational zones overlapped like in Filabusi, Gwanda, Shurugwi, Zvishavane, Mberengwa, Mwenezi, and Beitbridge to name only a few of those areas (ZAPU Department of Information and Publicity, 2012). One of the ZIPRA ex-combatants who operated around the Beitbridge area recounts that they endured torrid times of having to contend with the RSFs on one hand and the ZANLA guerrillas on the other (Interview with Dumani, ZIPRA ex-combatant who operated around Beitbridge, 2017).

As the struggle for independence intensified in the 1970s, so were the slogans and political rhetoric that were targeted at fanning ethnic divisions among the Africans along Ndebele and Shona ethnic fault lines as a way of competition for legitimacy, supporters and political power. Opponents were always cast in the negative as sell-outs, counter-revolutionaries and divisive elements that were not committed to the full prosecution of the armed struggle. According to Kriger (1992:101), ZANLA guerrillas uttered divisive and disparaging slogans during their all-night mobilisation meetings called Pungwes that they held with the masses. In the Pungwes, the slogans were always:

Pasi na Smith	Down with Smith
Pasi na Muzorewa	Down with Muzorewa
Pasi na Nkomo	Down with Nkomo
Pasi na vanematumbu	Down with those with big stomachs
Pasi ne vatengesi	Down with sell-outs

Pasi ne varoyi	Down with witches
Pasi ne nhunzwatunza	Down with troublesome people
Pasi ne nharadada	Down with disobedient people

It is clear that not only was the Smith regime identified as the enemy of the 'revolution', but other African leaders as well. Much of the political tirade was directed against Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU as they referred to him derogatorily as Zvemutumbu, which meant someone with a big stomach. Physically, Nkomo had a big body and stomach. It is important to realise that ZANU and ZANLA did not only identify the Smith regime, Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC), witches, sell-outs, ZAPU, ZIPRA and Nkomo as enemies but also the Ndebele people in general. Gwakuba-Ndlovu states that in their training camps in Mozambique, ZANLA trainees were told to treat the Ndebele people in general with suspicion (Interview with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017). The slogan was always, 'Tamba wakachenjera. Mhandu yekutanga ndiyani?-Mabhunu. Mhandu yechipiri ndiyani?-MaNdevere'. In the English language this meant, 'Be very careful or play it safe. Who is our first enemy? They are the Whites.Who is our second enemy? They are the Ndebele' (Interview with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017). The feeling of enmity that divided the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups developed long back.

One has to note that the hate and divisive language did not emanate from the ZANLA side only. ZIPRA derogatorily labelled ZANLA guerrillas as 'oPasi' from their popular slogan, 'Down with….' They were also portrayed as poorly trained, poorly armed, undisciplined, fond of sleeping with women and forcing people to cook for them and responsible for making civilians vulnerable to mass killings through their Pungwes (Dabengwa, 1995; Interview with Dumani, 2017). Although ZANLA guerrillas were poorly trained and armed compared to ZIPRA, it could be an exaggeration by Dabengwa, calculated at despising ZANLA, that some

of the ZANLA recruits were trained using sticks and were only given a gun when they crossed into Rhodesia to fight (1995). On the issue of indiscipline, Mazarire (2011) is of the view that indeed there was gross indiscipline amongst the ZANLA guerrillas. He states that by 1978, acts of indiscipline among ZANLA guerrillas were on an increase as they engaged in brutal beatings and killing of masses that were accused of being witches and wizards, as well as raping women and girls at the same time.

ZIPRA also did not want ZANLA guerrillas to encroach into their operational zones. ZIPRA combatants believed that whilst they were busy fighting the RSFs, ZANLA guerrillas were busy forcing people to cook for them and violently uprooting ZAPU structures in Mashonaland (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). However, the fact that political tribalism had promoted narrow ethnic, regional and personal interests did not mean that people were unsupportive of the efforts of uniting beyond ethnic solidarities. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the notion of the nation and the main goals of the struggle were lost due to ethnic tensions and rivalries. The main goals of the struggle were never in doubt (Msindo, 2012).

Though the overall agenda of the liberation struggle was never compromised, the nationalist movement continued to fragment along ethnic lines and the following discussion will focus briefly on the second ZAPU split and its implications on ethnic reconfigurations. It is difficult to imagine how such antagonistic forces could be expected to work together in peace building processes like DDR programs, which at times meant competition for few positions and resources. It can be argued that politicians took advantage of some issues that helped to distinguish the Shona from the Ndebele like different ancestry, language and a few other minor cultural aspects to mobilise along ethnic and regional lines and to entrench hardline positions. Instead of emphasizing on a multiplicity of common practices between the Shona and Ndebele to foster unity and a common vision for nation and peace building, they deliberately picked on a few differences and magnified them. The net effect of this was that ZANLA and ZIPRA

combatants saw themselves as very different people who could not compromise, unite, share, and work together, but should compete and fight to subdue each other.

3.5.3 The Second ZAPU Split

The nitty-gritties on the causes of the split are not very relevant to this study save to say that there was a power struggle between J.Z.Moyo and James Chikerema for the control of ZAPU in exile and the allegations centred on preferential treatment of the Ndebele by J.Z.Moyo and strategic blunders by Chikerema on the military side (Dabengwa, 1995:29). What became more glaring were ethnic reconfigurations during and in the aftermath of the split. As indicated earlier, ZAPU had remained with a sizeable number of Shona politicians at its apex. Allegations of tribal factions resurfaced in ZAPU in 1967 between the Ndebele and Shona elements (Msindo, 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The allegations were that Shona members had formed 'Chaminuka ZAPU' whilst the Ndebele members had formed what they termed 'Mzilikazi ZAPU' and these factions were pulling in different directions and threatening the life of the party (Msindo, 2012).

Unlike the 1963 split where the factor of political tribalism was silent though present, the second ZAPU split witnessed loud and open tribal sentiments. The leader of ZAPU in exile, Chikerema complained that military recruitment was in favour of predominately Ndebele areas, but that accusation did not go down well with the triumvirate of J. Z, Moyo, Edward Ndlovu and George Silundika who seemed to be representing the Ndebele voice within ZAPU. They accused Chikerema and George Nyandoro of trying to usurp power within ZAPU and that they were also working with other Shona elements outside ZAPU (Sithole, 1999; Msindo, 2012). Precisely, Chikerema was accused of attempting to set up a structure of his own ethnic (Shona) group within ZAPU.

During the power struggle over the control of ZAPU, George Nyandoro was brazenly clear of his political tribalism when he declared that:

> I am finding it necessary to organise on proper lines the complete military structure of ZAPU, which will henceforth come under my direct control and l will be appointing new Secretaries of new departments. All the senior officers will be of the Mashona tribes, that is to say Vazezuru, Vamanyika, Vakaranga people only. The ZAPU organisation has been completely riddled by traitors from Matabeleland since we are compelled to leave Zimbabwe as refugees, and no progress at all has been made on the liberation of Zimbabwe, so we must constantly remember that our duty is now to the Mashona…Amandebele…are still showing themselves to be our pure enemies. I am appointing myself as Commander-in-Chief of ZAPU Military Council and we will forthwith be known as ZMC, a driving movement of militancy to liberate Zimbabwe from the illegal Smith regime without the help of the Amandebele. (Msindo, 2012:205).

Once news of the split reached ZANU, they were received with high enthusiasm and were used to further stoke the fires of division and hate between ZAPU and ZANU as well as between the largest ethnic groups that supported the two parties (Ndebele and Shona respectively). Its mouthpiece, the Zimbabwe News was used to publicise the disorder, blowing up the issue of tribalism to the level of inciting the Shona people in ZAPU to leave (Msindo, 2012). It was obvious that ZANU sympathies lay with Shona leaders within ZAPU. ZANU is also said to have been very pleased with the ZAPU split of 1971 because it helped more than the 1963 one to confine ZAPU to Matabeleland and to diminish its posture as a nationalist party (Interview with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017). This happened because Chikerema and Nyandoro alongside other many Shona speaking supporters of ZAPU left the party and formed the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). To this end, Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007) conclude that ethnic rivalries were an essential resource to the nationalist leaders in their battles for political power; hence they condemned them during the day and used them during the night. It is clear that politicians across the political divide took advantage of each and every political misfortune during the liberation struggle to entrench hardline positions which made prospects for reconciliation difficult.

3.6 Ethnic-related Rivalries and Clashes between ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA during the Liberation Struggle

There were several attempts at forging unity between ZANU and ZAPU in order to mount a united political and military front against the settler regime and the RSFs. However, all the efforts came to naught mainly because political leaders were scheming against each other and positioning themselves to assume the leadership of the post-colonial state. Msindo (2012) observe that the unhealthy relationship between nationalism, regionalism and ethnicity spilled into post-colonial Zimbabwe and had negative effects on the DDR process and the entire peace process. Between 1967 and 1979 there were four crucial political and military processes that were aimed at creating unity between ZANU and ZAPU on one hand and between ZANLA and ZIPRA on the other. On the military front, there was the Joint Military Command (JMC) of 1967 and ZIPA of 1975-76.

Politically, the African National Congress (ANC) initiative of 1972 and the Patriotic Front (PF) of 1976 to 1979 were the major initiatives at unity. Basically, all of the four initiatives were driven by external parties to the Zimbabwean conflict especially the Front Line States (FLS) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee (Sithole, 1999). These parties wanted to encourage the direct parties to the Zimbabwean conflict to unite so that they could prosecute the liberation struggle effectively. In this regard, they made unity the pre-condition for the release of logistical support to the liberation parties. The FLS were also wary of the negative repercussions of a divided and mutually antagonistic nationalist movement to the peace building efforts in a post-colonial Zimbabwe (Bhebe, 1999). The discussions will centre on the ethnic relations within the military circles since the study is on the military and how it experienced DDR processes in the post-colonial state.

3.6.1 The Joint Military Command (JMC), 1967

First and foremost, the JMC suffered a stillbirth because of jostling to control the military outfit. The JMC was the brainchild of the OAU Liberation Committee that pushed for joint military operations between ZAPU and ZANU combatants. Chimhanda (2003) observes that ZAPU and ZANU were pressured by parties who hoisted them to unite their military forces, but as individual parties, they neither had the will nor faith in the JMC. ZAPU attitude was the major stumbling block that rendered the JMC dysfunctional. According to Dabengwa (1995), ZAPU deliberately seconded very junior military officers to work with senior ZANU military cadres. That strategy was resisted by ZANU as it thought that ZAPU was not fully committed to the JMC. During this period, ZIPRA and ZANLA were not formally constituted hence the use of terms ZAPU military officers and ZANU military cadres.

By 1967 ZANU was still struggling to establish its feet on the ground in terms of recruiting military personnel hence Mazinyane underscores the fact that ZAPU felt that it was impossible for it 'to carry ZANU on its shoulders' (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). In fact, Dabengwa is clear that ZAPU was deliberately sabotaging the JMC and did not want it to see the light of the day as it thought that ZANU was a 'rebel' party that had to be forced to disband and re-join ZAPU (1995). It can be seen that suspicions, mistrusts and hostility bordering around ethnic politics and power struggles that generated the 1963 split and intensified thereafter were rife and militated against unification endeavours on the military side.

Attempts to revive the JMC in 1972 also faltered. This time around, ZANU was the stumbling block. ZANU thought that it could not share its strategic advantages with ZAPU which had been crippled by the 1971 split (Sithole, 1999). By 1972 ZANU enjoyed massive recruitment of cadres and was beginning to clandestinely infiltrate them into Zimbabwe to wage guerrilla warfare and could not bother itself uniting its forces with ZAPU which had not fully recovered

from the political turmoil that engulfed it in 1971. Chimhanda (2003) argues that the 1972 initiative at the revival of the JMC was the brainchild of ZAPU that wanted to use the JMC to thwart Shamuyarira and Chikerema's efforts of trying to hoodwink the OAU Liberation Committee into thinking that FROLIZI was the legitimate face of the liberation struggle.

A closer look at the factors that militated against efforts aimed at creating unity between ZAPU and ZANU reveals that the two parties remained rivals since the 1963 split and were not prepared to prop up each other during a period each one of them was experiencing crisis. Instead, each party capitalised on the weaknesses of the other by using ethnic differences to amplify hatred and suspicion. According to Chimhanda (2003), this strategy was mainly motivated by each party's desire to constitute the first government in independent Zimbabwe.

One important development that went with the fragmentation of political units along ethnic lines was the division of the military along the same lines. Many Shona military cadres left ZAPU during its turbulent political period and joined ZANU that was on a political upsurge. Shona recruits in Zambia left *en masse* during the period of political upheavals within ZAPU and headed towards Mozambique where their 'kith and kin' were based, leaving an almost entirely Ndebele-speaking army in the hands of ZAPU (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017).

The division of the military along ethnic identities had far reaching negative effects on post-liberation war DDR processes. Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2009) view on these developments is that the liberation struggle was by and large fought by 'tribalised' armed men of ZIPRA and ZANLA. This was a recipe for disaster in DDR processes as these 'tribalised' armed men were joined together at APs and in the ZNA after independence under the tutelage of a 'tribalised' political party turned into a ruling government (ZANU) that was superintending over the DDR process.

3.6.2 Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), 1975-76

The second attempt targeted at joint military training and operations between ZIPRA and ZANLA was through ZIPA. Like the JMC before it, ZIPA was the initiative of the FLS, the OAU Liberation Committee together with senior politicians from major liberation movements (ZAPU and ZANU). The initiative was aimed at rejuvenating active military engagement against the colonial system that had stagnated during the period of the détente that was pushing for negotiations at the expense of vigorous military action (Dabengwa, 1995; Sithole, 1999). ZIPA was initiated in November 1975 and became operational in January 1976.

ZIPA consisted of eighteen military leaders, nine from each of the two parties to organise the training and spearhead the operations in Zimbabwe (Alexander et al, 2000). Immediately after its formation, ZIPA fell into serious challenges, both at the rear and in the front. In the rear where ZIPRA and ZANLA recruits were undergoing joint military trainings at Mgagao and Morogoro, fierce physical clashes erupted between the two groups. The actual causes of the fighting are not clear since each side accused the other for inciting the fighting. The ZIPRA version is that the fighting was orchestrated by the ZANLA recruits with the aid of the Chinese instructors (Interview with Jack Mpofu, one of the nine ZIPA commanders from the ZIPRA side, 2017). Mpofu explains that the fighting was actually sparked by trivial issues like who controlled keys to the dining hall; suspicions over food poisoning by those who held the keys to the dining hall among other issues. In actual fact, Mpofu claims that the Ndebele speaking people were resented in ZIPA. In all, about one hundred and fifty ZIPRA recruits were killed (Interview, 2017).

The ZANLA version of the story contradicts that given by ZIPRA. John Netsiyawa who was one of the ZANLA recruits at Morogoro alleges that ZIPRA cadres who had received military training earlier in Russia attacked ZANLA recruits (Netsiyawa cited in the Daily News,

February 2018). He says that about 450 fully-trained ZIPRA forces had joined Morogoro training camp from Mgagao camp. Since they were fully trained, they undertook light drills and also volunteered to cook for the new recruits who were doing heavier training. Netsiyawa alleges that ZIPRA forces laced the food with poison with the intention of wiping all the ZANLA recruits but ZANLA refused to eat as they told ZIPRA forces that they were guided by the spirits who helped them to dictate the intended harm (Daily News, February 2018).

That development heightened tensions and suspicions according to Netsiyawa (Daily News, February 2018). What actually sparked the fighting according to Netsiyawa was one ZIPRA cadre called Sam who commanded his forces to advance and kill ZANLA recruits. Before that, ZIPRA forces are said to have taunted ZANLA saying that they would allow them to fight the Rhodesians and then come in to take the country from ZANLA through the gun. ZANLA recruits had access to the engineering armoury where they grabbed grenades and killed about one hundred and fifty-six ZIPRA cadres (Daily News, February 2018). What is questionable though is how a trained military force could provoke fighting without being armed as the ZIPRA forces did on the said fateful day. Ethnic rivalry and hatred could not be ruled out in these clashes over food sharing, allegations of food poisoning and provocation of ZANLA by ZIPRA forces.

Both versions of the story by Jack Mpofu and John Netsiyawa could have some biases but what is true is that fighting took place between ZIPRA and ZANLA, and more than one hundred ZIPRA cadres were killed (Nkomo, 1984; Alexander et al, 2000; Chung, 2006). Testimonies to this are ZIPRA graves at Morogoro. Besides the challenges faced in the rear, Sibanda (2005) notes that when ZIPRA combatants reached the ZANLA military camps in Mozambique from where the joint operations were supposed to be launched, they were dumbfounded because they were taken as if the purpose of travelling to Mozambique was to join ZANLA. Sibanda (2005) mentions that whilst in Mozambique, ZIPRA cadres were forced

to denounce ZAPU, its President Joshua Nkomo as well as the entire leadership of ZAPU. According to Jack Mpofu, ZIPRA combatants were forced to chant slogans like 'Pasi naDumbuguru' which meant down with Nkomo (Interview, 2017). Some Shona referred derogatorily to Nkomo as Dumbuguru because of his big stomach. ZIPRA cadres resisted to be made subservient to ZANLA. Their refusal contributed to clashes again where some of them were killed given the numerical superiority of ZANLA against ZIPRA in Mozambique (Sibanda, 2005).

ZIPRA combatants who survived in both Tanzania and Mozambique and managed to get into the front with ZANLA guerrillas under the banner of ZIPA faced another dangerous challenge. They could be shot by the numerically superior ZANLA in the front whilst executing joint operations. Jack Mpofu claims that one of the ZIPRA cadres by the name Tommy Sithole was gunned down by ZANLA in one of the ZIPA military campaigns in north-east Zimbabwe (Interview, 2017). Mazinyane points out that most of the ZIPRA cadres that were seconded to ZIPA by ZAPU 'disappeared' for ever and never came back and the reasons were not that they became causalities in contacts with the RSFs but were victims of ethnically-oriented fights with ZANLA combatants in ZIPA military outfit (Interview, 2017). As noted by Kriger (2003), it is true that liberation war guerrillas were complicit in inter-party feuding.

ZIPRA combatants who managed to flee back to Zambia through Botswana spread the news of their horrible experiences in Tanzania, Mozambique and in the front, and that; according to Alexander et al (2000:180), 'powerfully hardened the existing antagonism between ZANLA and ZIPRA.' The ZIPRA-ZANLA antagonisms were transferred from the rear bases to the battlefields at the front. As a result, wherever the two armies met within Zimbabwe, their interactions were not all that cordial. Although Moore (1995) and Sadomba (2011) view ZIPA as an independent and effective fighting force which developed its own strategies, Nkomo (1984) viewed it with suspicion from the onset as he thought its formation was a result of a

calculated strategy by ZANU and Nyerere of Tanzania to subordinate ZIPRA to ZANLA and ZANU and then collapse ZAPU.

The two military outfits of JMC and ZIPA indicate that rivalries for power, influence and legitimacy had also percolated ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants. That was made possible because the two armies were not just simple armies but were liberation forces that were fighting to achieve certain political ideologies. ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants were therefore used as instruments of propagating those ideologies to the masses by their parties. ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants were both a military and political force. Further to this, they were also ethnic instruments as their parent political parties were ethnicised by political elites vying for political office. With hindsight, it can be concluded that a government that evolved from any one of the two parties (ZANU and ZAPU) was likely to be intolerant and vindictive against the other party and to abuse the DDR process to settle old political scores. It was also not likely that the party in government would embrace inclusive and collaborative problem-solving strategies given the exclusive strategies and slogans around which ZAPU and ZANU built their parties and military wings. It is possible that a third party could help to bridge the wide chasm between political parties and their military wings.

3.7 Conclusion

All peace building processes and activities require collaborative efforts among all parties and stakeholders for them to succeed. Parties and stakeholders that work at cross purposes stifle the success of peace building processes. Discussions in this chapter indicate that conflictual and competitive developments between political and military formations during the liberation struggle laid a firm foundation for the birth of a fractured nation that was unable to come to terms with it self in building a united and peaceful state. Long term divisions between ZANU/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZIPRA were bound to haunt and undermine the DDR process.

With such entrenched divisions, robust interventions meant to cultivate mutual respect, co-operation, tolerance, and bridge polarisations at the political level could be a crucial prerequisite to encourage hitherto antagonistic parties to work together. In a polarised environment like the one that prevailed in Zimbabwe during the liberation struggle, behavioural and attitudinal changes could be critical to enable antagonistic parties to embrace and trust each other and work for the nation rather than for narrow and partisan interests. Effective DDR processes that are a foundation to sustainable peace building are predicated on inclusive political and military factions that are reconciled to each other and have one vision for the country. Divisions in the political and military front that developed over a long time needed concerted efforts to bridge for DDR processes to succeed.

Valters (2015:10) concludes that relationships can be changed from 'adversarial ones to partners in problem-solving, from different ethnicities to a common nationality, behaviour can be changed from hostile to a peaceful one, and disruptive behaviour can be transformed into co-operative one whilst intolerant attitudes can be transformed into greater tolerance of different perspectives and from fear of others to trust in others.' The polarised and antagonistic environment which characterised the relationship between ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA had a long background. Even though ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas had imagined independent Zimbabwe through Ndebele and Shona terms respectively, inclusive and transformative programs targeted at nation building and reconciliation like reconciliation workshops, it is envisaged, could change their behaviour and attitudes and develop a national outlook that could promote effective DDR. However, intervention activities can be implemented successfully if there is a clear understanding of the contextual background of the previous relationships, feelings, and perceptions between political and military formations, and this chapter has done exactly that.

As would be shown later, it was unfortunate that the post-independence government in Zimbabwe decided to promote reconciliation between Blacks and Whites and left inter-Black (between ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA) grudges and hostilities unresolved. The reason could be that the governing party itself was a by-product of ethnic-related antagonisms and reconfigurations of the liberation struggle.

CHAPTER 4: THE DDR PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE

4.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe rolled out two DDR processes within a period of eighteen years. The first DDR process was implemented between 1980 and 1984 after the achievement of independence. It ran alongside other peace building elements like the national election, the GNU, a national policy of reconciliation and the rehabilitation and restructuring of fundamental social services that were meant to reflect the will and character of a government of the black majority. The DDR process was preceded by an internationally brokered peace agreement that ended the conflict and brought together the major warring parties to the negotiating table as well as providing a general framework for the DDR process. The context under which the first DDR process was implemented was characterised by ethnic motivated rivalries, suspicions, mistrusts and hostilities between the two major former liberation forces that were inherited from the liberation struggle.

The second process took place in 1997 after about thirteen years after the end of the first one and only covered the process of reintegration since disarmament and demobilisation had been accomplished during the first phase of the process though with some challenges. The 1997 reintegration process was preceded by countrywide demonstrations by restless ex-combatants who were clamouring for an improvement in their welfare. In both phases, the processes were spearheaded and led by ZANU-PF which was now the legitimate governing party. This chapter focuses on policy and institutional issues that guided the DDR process. It starts by interrogating the peace agreement that preceded the DDR process and moves on to discuss the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes under specific contextual backgrounds. The chapter ends by articulating the second reintegration exercise of 1997.

4.2 The Peace Agreement and DDR

The liberation struggle in Zimbabwe ended through the signing of a peace agreement; the Lancaster House Agreement on 21 December 1979. No single party could claim outright military victory in the battlefield. As such, the peace agreement was a by-product of protracted negotiations and many compromises by the different parties involved (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005; Sithole, 1999). Without the involvement of another or other external parties to supervise and underwrite the DDR process, the government was in a difficult position to carryout DDR on its own. The parties to the negotiations were the Patriotic Front that represented both ZANU and ZAPU, the Muzorewa delegation that represented the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government that was a result of the internal settlement of 1978, and the Rhodesian delegation of the settler regime (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005).

The negotiations were chaired by Lord Carrington who represented the British government. All these parties were guided by specific interests. As for the Patriotic Front, a democratic election and black majority rule was top in their agenda whilst the settler regime wanted to protect its economic interests in the new post-colonial political dispensation (Kriger, 2003). Whilst the Patriotic Front was agreed that there should be majority rule as well as increased economic participation by the black majority, the vexing question remained as which political party should assume the reins of power. Herein lay a critical challenge that haunted the peace process, including DDR, that is, the continued divisions between ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA.

Agreements were reached on three fundamental issues that were on top of the agenda. These were the constitutional issues, an interim administration and a ceasefire (Nzombe, 1989:187; Kriger, 2003). One notable issue about the Lancaster House talks is that there was no prescription on the military question as DDR was to be decided by the incoming and new post-

colonial government that was to be decided through the ballot box (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005:336). The ceasefire agreement provided for the cantonment of the guerrilla forces into designated APs, a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) to monitor breaches to the ceasefire agreement, keep in contact with senior commanders of ZIPRA, ZANLA and the RSFs so as to allow for the conduct of credible elections. However, there were no means to avoid breaches to the peace agreement as well as the general DDR process as the CMF was numerically weak. This was a major loophole that militated against effective DDR given that the process took place within a context that was conflictual and characterised by competition and hostility and breaches were bound to occur.

Whilst the guerrilla forces were cantoned in APs, the RSFs were free to move around and to also monitor the guerrillas wherever they were assembled. The agreement was that the RSFs could no longer attack guerrilla camps in neighbouring countries and guerrillas in these countries could not enter the country during the transition period (Kriger, 2003). The country transitional authority was in the hands of Lord Soames who assumed the governorship roles in December 1979 pending the elections. Although the PF raised the issue of military integration at Lancaster, it was rebuffed by the Rhodesian delegation that did not want their military structures tampered with before the elections (Kriger, 2003).

Specifics on the military front were that there would be merging of unspecified numbers of the RSFs, ZIPRA and ZANLA forces into a single national army; that guerrilla forces would keep their personal weapons and would also be left subject to their command structures but responsible to the British governor whilst at APs and that the government of the day would assume overole control of all the key security sectors (police, army, intelligence, airforce and judiciary) (Chung, 2006). Muzorewa's auxiliaries and the Selous Scouts that were formed specifically to fight the PF were to be disbanded (Dzinesa, 2005). Besides that, there was nothing else on the technical aspects and *modus operandi* of the DDR process. The British only

volunteered to provide future training of the envisaged national army and to provide demobilisation assistance should the new government request (Kriger, 2003). Besides the fact that the peace agreement remained loose on some fundamental details pertaining to the DDR process, the restricted mandate of the CMF did not make things any better. The CMF was to monitor breaches to the ceasefire and nothing more whilst British support was voluntary. That was not the best approach towards DDR issues, especially in an environment that was highly polarised and conflictual.

There are two critical issues to note with regards to the peace agreement in relation to DDR processes. First, the three armies to be integrated were mutually antagonistic. They emerged from the war intact and undefeated and under different command structures which they strictly adhered to even after the war. Secondly, the agreement was not explicit on what the ex-combatants were supposed to receive as demobilisation and reinsertion assistance, pensions and reintegration support in general. Some analysts have concluded that it could have been part of the deliberate strategy by the British to ignore crucial DDR issues so that former guerrillas continue fighting each other in the post-colonial state whilst they entrenched their economic interests (Sadomba, 2011). How antagonistic forces could be expected, without the involvement of a neutral third party to integrate themselves into a single national army without some challenges is the major question that one should ask.

With hindsight, the skirting of fundamental issues that would directly affect the welfare of the ex-combatants after the war was likely to have negative results on the integration of the armies, reintegration and the general peace process. If the key elements of a DDR process are not specified in the peace agreement in an environment where the parties to the process are competing and fighting, the result can be disastrous. The UNDPKO (1999) advises that clear DDR specifications are very crucial in the context of antagonistic former warring parties like in Zimbabwe so as to avoid possible manipulation of the process by one of the parties to the

detriment of another or other parties. In the light of previous protracted divisions, competition and conflict between ZANU/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZIPRA, one would suggest that a lot could have been done during the Lancaster peace agreement to lay a solid foundation for collaborative processes and activities that would promote rather than undermine peace building. By and large, the Lancaster peace agreement was not DDR-specific.

4.3 Disarmament

The disarmament exercise was done at the sixteen APs dotted right across the country (Sibanda, 2005). However, it only applied to the guerrilla forces and not to the RSFs as all of the RSFs were allowed to join the security establishments on a voluntary basis. Many of the RSFs joined or rather chose to remain in the army, air force, police and intelligence services (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). They also voluntarily left in large numbers between 1980 and 1982 when the command of the security sectors was gradually brought into the hands of the Africans and when they witnessed the politicisation of these institutions (Kriger, 2003; Sadomba, 2011). As will be explained later, not all ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants got into APs.

Due to the fact that the war of independence ended without outright military victory by any of the parties, coupled with that there was no UN or any other body to implement disarmament coercively, the process became voluntary (http://www.un.org). However, according to UNOSAA (2005), the majority of the forces complied with the ceasefire stipulations and also voluntarily participated in the disarmament process. The reason was that they did not want to be seen to be contradicting the commands of their political and military superiors whom they respected and had confidence in. The disarmament process was in the hands of a Joint Operations Command (JOC). The JOC was made up of representatives from the three parties to the DDR process. On the other hand, military integration was supervised by a Joint High Command (JHC) (http://www.un.org). The weapons that were surrendered were re-utilised in

the ZNA. However, a lot of weapons were not collected. UNOSAA (2005) indicates that the disarmament process stretched as long as the ex-guerrillas remained at APs. As a result, and as guerrillas moved in and out of the APs, they took with them some weapons which were in most cases unaccounted for. Undoubtedly, some of the weapons were hidden in the process (Interview with Gatsheni, 2017). The voluntary nature of the disarmament process undertaken within a context of suspicion, rivalry and hostility between military factions proved to be problematic. Omach's (2013) observation is that voluntary disarmament's success depends on the goodwill of the stakeholders to the DDR process and their general commitment to the larger peace process.

As already indicated, parties to the DDR process in Zimbabwe lacked mutual trust and confidence. Furthermore, there were no efforts by the government to develop mutual trust and confidence in them after independence. What the government did was to put rival and antagonistic military factions together and just expect things to be normal. They (guerrillas) could not be expected to smoothly execute total disarmament on a voluntary basis except with the assistance of implementing partners who could act as impartial referees. The same was true of the MPLA and UNITA of Angola. Due to mistrust, UNITA surrendered only obsolete weapons (Omach, 2013). However, disarmament and demobilisation of various military forces was successful in Namibia because the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) was able to carryout measures where they exerted pressure on ex-combatants and escorted them to APs to facilitate swift and efficient weapons surrender (Dzinesa, 2013:279).

One has to hasten to mention that the disarmament process was undertaken in the context of political competition that was induced by campaigning for the 1980 general election (Kriger, 2003). The other issue to note is that thousands of ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas and their weapons were still in Zambia and Mozambique respectively during the transition period. The coming in of the ZIPRA heavy weapons after independence especially, heightened the mistrust

and fears as ZANU-PF believed that PF-ZAPU wanted to use the weapons to sabotage the new government. Dabengwa indicate that ZIPRA told ZANU-PF that the heavy weapons supplied by the Soviet Union after the war would be passed on to the new Zimbabwe army. Although ZANU-PF suspected that the weapons would be used against it, Dabengwa points out that the issue was handled transparently where Russian officials were also present when they were transferred to the government (Interview with Dabengwa, 2017).

Contrary to what Dabengwa said about the handover of arms to the government, Doran (2017) indicates that both ZIPRA and ZANLA were stockpiling weapons. He noted that quite a huge consignment of armaments from Zambia was not handed over to the government but hidden by ZIPRA (https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/. Pertaining to the arms from Russia, Dabengwa later testified that they could not actually hand over all of them to the government and remain empty-handed. In case of any fighting, they needed something to defend themselves with (https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/). ZIPRA was not an innocent victim of ZANLA machinations. They were also preparing for any eventuality. Given the levels of mistrust between the former liberation movements, Dabengwa's information that all arms from Russia were handed over to the government cannot be wholly trusted.

Doran does not doubt that both ZIPRA and ZANLA stockpiled weapons. He also concludes that Joshua Nkomo once weighed options of physically fighting against ZANU-PF on several occasions (2017). Nkomo is said to have clandestinely met the South Africans in June 1980 so as to have assurances on their neutrality in case of physical fighting that pitted ZANLA against ZIPRA. He found out that his idea could not succeed and stopped it. In all this, Doran believes that ZANU-PF bore primary responsibility for the 'Security Dilemma' that ensued and indicates that much of what PF-ZAPU did, which made ZANU-PF insecure, was a direct response to ZANU-PF's actions (2017). In the midst of this entire imbroglio, effective disarmament could not be accomplished.

Without any prescribed framework for disarmament, the process was undertaken by the GNU that was formed after the elections. Before that, any guerrillas who wanted to surrender their weapons and go into civilian life were allowed to do so during the assembly phase although they were later called back to various designated places so that they could provide the Demobilisation Directorate personnel with their personal details to facilitate registration so that they could be eligible to receive demobilisation assistance (Interview with I.G, one of the ZIPRA ex-combatants, 2017). Mashike (2000) notes that the assembly phase is crucial in any disarmament process because it helps authorities to account for all soldiers and their weapons and in a conflict where there is no outright winner, to build confidence in the warring parties so that each party remains committed to the peace agreement. Since the assembly phase was chaotic in Zimbabwe, so too was the disarmament process.

The head of government, who was then Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Robert Mugabe, stipulated that Zimbabwe's national army would be made up of about 35 000 men and women out of a total estimated 80 000-100 000 guerrilla forces plus the RSFs who were automatically assured of positions in the security sectors of the country (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). The surplus guerrillas were disarmed and let into civilian life. Peter Walls headed the army and was deputised by three commanders of ZIPRA, RSFs and ZANLA.

Although Sadomba (2011) asserts that the disarmament of liberation forces was quick and effective, it is crucial to note that it was not without its challenges. First, it is usually difficult in general to ascertain the exact number of guerrillas and their weapons as they at times conceal or exaggerate their numbers for political and strategic reasons (Mashike, 2000). Secondly, there were a number of security concerns by ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants during the transition period which motivated them to hold back some of their weapons and personnel. All this made effective disarmament problematic. Furthermore, there were no processes aimed at dissipating the security concerns and fears of the combatants.

Some guerrilla forces believed that the nationalist leaders sold out at Lancaster and they felt not bound by the ceasefire regulations (Alexander et al, 2000). Guerrillas with that mentality did not surrender themselves to the APs and it was difficult or impossible to disarm such elements (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). Guerrillas that refused to get into APs remained in the countryside, committed ceasefire violations, also engaged in criminal activities against civilians and forced civilians to vote for their respective parties during the 1980 elections. In the process of doing that, they cached some of their weapons (Nkomo, 1984; Todd, 2007).

Another issue which made disarmament difficult was that there were no physical security guarantees for guerrilla forces that congregated at various APs. Many guerrillas thought that they were now easy targets for the RSFs who were allowed to move around with their weapons. As a result, guerrillas had the tendency of moving in and out of APs doing reconnaissance work willy-nilly (Alexander et al, 2000). It is possible that some of the weapons could have been cached during this period. In fact, the fears of the guerrillas were not misplaced. Nyathi and Hoffman (1990) cited in Mashike (2000) articulate that one of the ZIPRA units was surrounded by the RSFs and seven of them were shot dead on 29 December 1979. It is in this context that both ZIPRA and ZANLA military commanders instructed their cadres to cache weapons (Nyathi and Hoffman (1990) cited in Mashike (2000)). According to Kriger (2003), both ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres hid arms as an insurance measure not only in case of the collapse of the ceasefire but also to be ready for whatever new political dispensation emerged from the election.

In actual fact, some ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres resisted demobilisation as they did not accept the authority of the Demobilisation Directorate officials from the opposing army (Kriger, 2003). For example, in March 1981, three ZNA soldiers trying to enforce disarmament were killed by two ZIPRA members at Mashumbi Pools AP (Kriger, 2003:95). Due to lack of processes and activities that engaged ex-combatants in attitude, perception and relationship

changes, they contined to perceive and treat each other as enemies rather than partners in the peace building endeavour.

Nkomo (1984) points out that thousands of seasoned ZANLA guerrillas did not get into APs but instead, were hidden in villages amongst the civilians. The majority of the people who were sent into APs by ZANLA were war collaborators (Mjibhas) who were unarmed. The duty of the veteran ZANLA guerrillas who remained in the villages was to campaign for ZANU-PF and possibly resume the war if it lost the elections (Nkomo, 1984). In the same vein, several ZIPRA combatants remained with their weapons up to the election time because they did not trust ZANU-PF and ZANLA (Alexander et al, 2000). The security concerns that militated against successful disarmament were compounded by the fact that the PF decided to contest the elections separately hence political rivalry for political leadership intensified and the liberation forces were not left out as they played pivotal roles in political feuding between their political parties. The issue of mutual mistrust stemming partly from ethnic rivalries between ZIPRA and ZANLA was to some extent a stumbling block in the disarmament program.

Kriger (2003) notes that the Soviet Union escalated its provision of arms to ZIPRA during the transition period and continued to do so even after the election and these arms remained in Zambia right up to the mid-1980s, whilst part of them were transported into the country and as noted earlier, partly contributed in heightening security concerns and suspicions within the government which believed that PF-ZAPU was bent on sabotaging it. Kriger (2003) reported that weapons worth US$ 60 million were actually handed over by the Soviet government to ZIPRA during the ceasefire period. However, nearly 400 disobedient ZIPRA guerrillas were rounded up between May and June 1980 and taken to Khami Maximum Prison near Bulawayo where they were disarmed and detained (Alexander et al 2000; Alexander, 2008). Kriger (2003) notes that ZANLA clandestinely infiltrated about two thirds of their approximately 30 000 guerrillas that were still in Mozambique during the ceasefire period and these cadres

retained their weapons unlawfully. The disarmament process was therefore not quick and effective and could have contributed to the hiding of weapons.

Disarmament was chaotic because both ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres kept their weapons throughout the period they were at APs. The government was unable to regulate and collect all the weapons, a situation that could have been averted only if there was a strong organisation with enforcement powers like the United Nations to forcibly collect weapons. Due to the protracted period spent by ex-guerrilla fighters at APs coupled with security concerns held by both former liberation armies, first against the RSFs, and secondly, against each other, the exact number of weapons collected in Zimbabwe through the disarmament process remains a matter of speculation. It also became difficult to ascertain the actual number of ex-guerrillas who were disarmed. A lot of weapons were cached. The disarmament challenge was also compounded by the bizzare arrangement that APs be guarded by the RSFs. Ex-guerrilla armies could not be at ease seeing their former adversaries in the liberation struggle assuming the role of monitoring them and exercising a superior position over them (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). It was natural that they would be tempted to hide some of their weapons for security reasons.

The Zimbabwean case indicates the perils in a disarmament process that is implemented by the government in the face of divisions and mistrust between parties to the DDR process. Notwithstanding the fact that allowing ex-combatants to keep their personal weapons over a protracted period was dictated by security concerns, delays in disarming ex-combatants proved catastrophic. Tensions fuelled by both political and ethnic factors exploded into physical clashes at APs between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-guerrillas thereby undermining the whole DDR process. There was lack of transparency, accountability, and commitment in the disarmament program in Zimbabwe. The reasons were that the ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants were affected by security fears as well as strategic and political considerations in their decisions to

disarm. The Lancaster House peace agreement did not help the situation because it did not emphatically deal with DDR issues.

4.4 The Military Integration Exercise

The merging of ZANLA, ZIPRA and RSFs elements into the ZNA was a sensitive and delicate exercise. The integration process coincided with the campaign period for the February and August 1980 general and local government elections respectively. The election periods were characterised by campaigning along political party lines with heightened inflammatory speeches which agitated the military. As already seen, the military was in various stages of the election period part of the campaign teams for their respective political parties. The other issue to note is that the elections were held whilst quite a lot of ex-combatants were at APs awaiting either demobilisation or integration into the army. What made the whole exercise dangerous was that the ex-combatants were armed whilst at APs. There third issue that made the integration exercise delicate and dangerous was that the armies that had fought and competed against each other for a long time had now to come closer to each other and work together under a single command structure.

Not only was the environment characterised by hostility but there was also a general mood of high expectations from ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. The two former liberation forces expected privileges for their roles in liberating Zimbabwe. Their expectations were likely to generate further competition for positions within the new army. Due to the fact that they were fighting for the emancipation of their motherland, they also expected to form the core of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) while hoping that their erstwhile enemies (RSFs) would be disbanded altogether (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006).

On the opposite side, the RSFs viewed ZANLA and ZIPRA as ill-trained and unprofessional forces that needed to be re-trained and professionalised. The other issue to note was that ZIPRA

forces were agitated that their party had lost elections whilst ZANLA were very happy that theirs had won the elections in 1980 and expected more privileges than ZIPRA (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). Basically, these were the conditions under which the integration of the military unfolded.

According to Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005), the integration of ZANLA, ZIPRA and the RSFs was undertaken by both foreigners and locals, that is, by the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) and the JHC respectively. Very senior military leaders from all the three military units made up the JHC. Evans (2011) views BMATT as an 'impartial broker' between three military forces whose relations were characterised by intense feelings of animosity, distrust and hostility for a period of fifteen years of civil war. According to Lamb (2013), the duty of BMATT was to make sure that issues of transparency, integrity, fairness, inclusivity and professionalism were not compromised in setting up the new defence forces of the country. BMATT also provided the needed technical assistance in building up a professional national army. The creation of the ZNA was to be guided by the spirit of national reconciliation hence the Mugabe administration made a number of concessions to its former 'enemies' (the RSFs) and its former 'rivals' (ZIPRA) (Alao, 2012:38). Peter Walls' position in the army confirmed earlier attempts to cultivate a spirit of forgiveness in the military. The World Bank (1993) cited in Lamb (2013:15) underlines the centrality of working with a neutral and strong party during the implementation stages of DDR programs by stating that:

> In politically tense situations, a neutral monitor has been instrumental in verifying the numbers of combatants demobilised from each force (often a subject of contention by each side), in enforcing disarmament in camps, and in assuring the equitable distribution of benefits. Without a neutral party, the demobilisation and reintegration programme can succumb to factional disputes on these issues.

A neutral party was more needed in Zimbabwe given the context of factional hostility that has been outlined. After surrendering their weapons, eligible and willing cadres at APs were called upon to constitute the new army. At the beginning, the JHC tried to balance up numbers from

the three armies that participated in integration although ZIPRA had few combatants during the war when compared to ZANLA. The formula of balancing numbers was used to ensure ethnic representation and parity and avoid complaints of favouritism from any of the three armies. In order to actualise the issue of parity, both former commanders of ZANLA and ZIPRA that is Solomon Mujuru and Lookout Masuku respectively were promoted to the ranks of lieutenant generals whilst their deputies were promoted to major generals (Alao, 2012). The idea of demonstrating unity at the top echelons of the military hierarchy was to facilitate balance and inclusivity at all levels of the army (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005).

The new army was divided into Commissioned Officers (COs), Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and the general soldiers or Privates (Alao, 2012). Aptitude tests were written to select the command element of the various military units. Due to the high levels of military training by ZIPRA cadres plus the numerous professional courses they did during the liberation struggle, most of them excelled in the selection tests (Interview with retired Lieutenant Colonel Dube, ex-ZIPRA cadre and Chairperson of the ZIPRA Veterans Trust, 2017). If aptitude tests were allowed to be the only criterion to select commanders of different units, ZIPRA ex-combatants could have dominated the command element (Alao, 2012). It was then decided to balance the command element between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. If the commander in one unit was a ZIPRA ex-combatant, his deputy would come from ZANLA and vice versa.

However, the integration exercise did not go smoothly as envisaged. As it was carried out during the period of elections, there were inflammatory speeches by politicians which sparked factional fighting at APs and within some already integrated units thereby adversely impacting the DDR and peace building processes. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) points out that during the initial stages of military integration, ZANLA and ZIPRA forces co-existed. However, the peaceful co-existence was short-lived as ZANLA started to behave as if they were superior to ZIPRA. This could be understood on the grounds that ZANLA believed that they had won

since ZANU-PF was the party in power. The DDR process in Zimbabwe should be analysed together with what was taking place in the ZNA because of its direct and indirect linkages.

Due to the tense and polarised political atmosphere, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants clashed in different APs. Fierce fighting broke out in APs of Entumbane, Chitungwiza, Connemara, Glenville and Ntabazinduna (Stiff, 2000). Fighting also broke out between ZIPRA and ZANLA within the already integrated units. As integration was taking place, politicians across the political divide were busy trying to outdo each other and, in the process, ZANU-PF in particular was involved in disparaging ZIPRA through its slogans and speeches. ZANU-PF was on an overdrive in their strategy to undermine PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA. Slogans like 'Pasi ne Machuwachuwa' (Down with ZIPRA) and inflammatory speeches like those uttered by Enos Nkala, one of the high ranking ZANU-PF politicians at a White City rally in Bulawayo helped to intensify ethnic rivalry because, among other things, he underplayed the roles of PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA cadres in the war of liberation and directly incited ZANLA cadres and ZANU-PF supporters in general to mete out violence against ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU (Todd, 2007). These developments demonstrate the flaws in a government implemented DDR process if that government supports one of the military factions against another and if there are no regulatory mechanisms from external implementing partners to ensure fairness.

The net effect of all this was the desertion of some of the ZIPRA cadres from both APs and the ZNA and the caching of weapons. Although the issue of ZIPRA desertions from the ZNA would be fully covered in the following chapter, at this juncture, one should just point out that continued rivalry and hostility between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces undermined the integration process. Problematic integration impacted negatively on disarmament and demobilisation as the next chapter will show. The other issue worth mentioning is that there seemed to be no will by ZANU-PF government to plan and implement a non-partisan, fair, and inclusive military integration process.

The other security sectors did not experience noticeable challenges like those in the ZNA even though the Air Force of Zimbabwe was built on the foundation of the Rhodesian air force. The same applied to the Central Intelligence Organisation that was built on the foundation of the Rhodesian Special Branch of the settler regime (Alao, 2012). During the early days, ZANU-PF relied on intelligence reports from the Special Branch (Alexander et al, 2000; Alao, 2012). This was in spite of the fact that ZIPRA had a developed intelligence unit and a functioning air force by the end of the liberation struggle (Nkomo, 1984).

4.5 Demobilisation and Reintegration

Like disarmament, the two processes were carried out alongside other peace building processes and reintegration was done twice. The demobilisation process was undertaken as from 5 October 1981 and officially ended with the dissolution of the Demobilisation Directorate in 1983, although some of the programs proceeded until 1984 (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). The second reintegration process started in 1997 and progressed into the early 2000s (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). In both periods, the processes did not succeed as the country remained marred by political, economic and military challenges that did not reinforce other peace building processes, but instead, undermined them. First, demobilisation was on a voluntary basis whereby combatants were asked to choose to demobilise and join civilian life or to remain under the military (Alao, 2012). Many combatants opted to remain in the military and the number surpassed the target figure of the envisaged army hence demobilisation ceased to be voluntary.

There were four categories of combatants who were asked to demobilise. There were some people who were below eighteen years in 1980. These were too young to be part of the national army. Others were in their thirties and forties in 1980 and were deemed too old to carry on with military duties. The third category consisted of ex-combatants who were maimed and

incapacitated during the war. The last group included those who wanted to explore opportunities outside the military structures. The last category decided to demobilise on its own (Dzinesa, 2005:85). The size of the army still remained too high. The authorities decided to use academic qualifications as a criterion to screen people who would remain in the army. The academic qualifications required for someone to join the ZNA were not very high as those with Grade Seven and lower Secondary school qualifications were eligible (Alao, 2012).

Since demobilisation and reintegration exercises were taking place in the context of competing interests of the former guerrilla armies of ZIPRA and ZANLA, there were bound to be accusations of partiality in the handling of sensitive issues like the numbers that qualified for integration from each former guerrilla army. From the onset there were accussations that more ZIPRA cadres than ZANLA were coerced to demobilise (Nkomo, 1984; Alao, 2012). One thing for sure is that guerrilla armies have a tendency of concealing or exaggerating their numbers and as a result, it usually becomes difficult to know their exact numbers. This is usually done for security and strategic reasons. However, Tapfumaneyi (1996:44) points out that ZANLA had 21 500 guerrillas eligible for demobilisation, whilst ZIPRA had 15 000, and the RSFs had 23 000.

Zimbabwe's demobilisation strategy revolved around persuading and to some extent supporting ex-combatants who wished to continue with their education after the war, technical and vocational skills training, and encashment of demobilisation funds (Bangidza, 2016:89). The first step that was taken to facilitate demobilisation of excess numbers that remained to be included in the ZNA was to encourage combatants to engage in agricultural activities as groups. In pursuit of this objective, Operation Soldiers Employed in Economic Development (SEED) was rolled out with the intention of keeping demobilised soldiers busy in spearheading economic development through engaging in agricultural activities.

The ex-combatants were roughly organised into manageable groups of about 700 soldiers per unit. ZANLA, ZIPRA and the RSFs cadres were represented in each agricultural unit. The government then gave agricultural equipment and some other inputs to various units that were created (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). The government also committed itself towards facilitating the marketing of the products to the local government departments and parastatals at the same time paying a basic salary to each soldier (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). The government thought of perpetuating the mind set of being soldiers in those who were involved in Operation SEED as they would keep their weapons whilst working in their allotments. As the name indicates, they were soldiers who engaged in economic development.

Operation SEED was not successful. Political tensions which went along with the campaigning for the local government elections of August-September 1980 divided the soldiers involved in Operation SEED along factional camps of ZIPRA and ZANLA (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). Instead of working together harmoniously, the soldiers rushed to the armouries to get weapons to destroy each other. Many soldiers abandoned Operation SEED and went to the urban areas. Rupiya and Chitiyo conclude that what destroyed Operation SEED was the lingering legacy of mistrust and hostility between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants emanating from their conflictual wartime relationships. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) also state that since ex-combatants had not peacefully mingled before, lack of confidence and mistrust overwhelmed them, thereby forcing them to finally resort to physical fighting along factional lines instead of working together with confidence to advance the government-supported agricultural scheme.

After the collapse of Operation SEED, the government moved on in the direction of assisting ex-combatants and disbursed financial rewards to facilitate smooth transition into productive civilian life. A Demobilisation Directorate was specifically established to deal with dispersing government support to the ex-combatants. Sadomba (2011) states that the Directorate was headed by John Shoniwa, a ZANLA ex-combatant and his deputy was Phelekezela Mphoko, a

ZIPRA ex-combatant. In the absence of external funding for the DDR process and bearing in mind the economic challenges of a state emerging from conflict, the Directorate could not fully accomplish that which it was mandated to do due to a lean budget of Z$116 million aimed at catering for the welfare of several thousands of ex-combatants (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). The money given to the Directorate was meant to complement the other small amount of Z$43 million that had been disbursed by the government earlier on in 1980 to facilitate demobilisation.

According to Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005), there were three options that were followed by the Demobilisation Directorate in its endeavours to achieve demobilisation and reintegration. The first one was not to renew RSFs contracts that lapsed. The second option included a two-year monthly stipend of Z$185 to each ex-combatant. Each ex-combatant was asked to open an account with the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) so as to access his or her money. Ex-combatants who benefitted from this scheme were urged to invest their money in co-operative schemes so as to avoid sinking into poverty after the end of the payments (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). The third option was the establishment of a rehabilitation centre for special cases. When looking at the constrained funding modalities for the ex-combatants, Sadomba (2011) concludes that the aim of the Demobilisation Directorate was not to genuinely demobilise, rehabilitate and reintegrate the ex-combatants but to get rid of them.

Due to meagre support facilities, a majority of demobilised ex-combatants failed to economically reintegrate into civil life and ended up in deplorable living conditions. Apart from the severance package of Z$400 that each ex-combatant was given at APs, there were no further support schemes until 1981 when demobilised ex-combatants started to receive Z$185 each per month. According to Dzinesa (2008), the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) in Zimbabwe around the 1980s was about Z$128 per month. Even though Z$185 per month was above the PDL, in practical terms, it was too little considering the fact that some ex-combatants had to

start from scratch; building homes, buying food and clothes for themselves and their families (Dzinesa, 2008). The African Development Bank Group (2011) observes that demobilised ex-combatants are unlikely to lead decent lives as civilians if funding is inadequate.

Some of the ex-combatants with parents and relatives who were killed during the war overstretched the Z$185 through supporting vulnerable extended families. Mashike (2000) argues that besides the fact that the monetary benefits were insufficient to facilitate effective economic reintegration; lack of measures targeted at ensuring that communities were given enough capacity to cope with needs of returning ex-combatants compounded the challenges of the demobilised ex-combatants. In short, the demobilisation and reintegration programs in Zimbabwe failed to facilitate effective peace building as the ex-combatants' human security was not met. Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005) conclude that the demobilisation exercise promised too much but practically delivered too little thereby leaving ex-combatants in an expectation crisis. Even though it would appear that ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants had universal experiences in demobilisation, discussions in the next chapter will negate this.

Although some ex-combatants heeded the call to pool resources into co-operatives, the scheme did not ensure positive peace amongst the ex-combatants as many of them did not get adequate food and money from their co-operatives. Severe drought negatively affected the emerging agricultural co-operatives, whilst others were affected by poor management skills (Msemwa, 1994). Quite a number of co-operative schemes that were spearheaded and run by ex-combatants survived up to the early 1990s but could not withstand the debilitating economic effects of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) prescribed by the International Monetary Fund.

During ESAP programs, businesses experienced high lending rates, job layouts, liquidity crunch, freeze in government subsidies and high inflation rates among other challenges that

affected the business fraternity in general. In fact, Sadomba (2011) concludes that many agricultural co-operatives were a result of coercion from government so that members received their demobilisation money in bulk to fulfil government policy of model B resettlement. As will be seen in the next chapter, co-operative schemes owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants experienced other challenges that were not witnessed by the other members of the co-operative scheme who were not ZIPRA and that was directly linked to the challenges of a government led DDR in the context of competing and hostile ethnic based military and political formations. The government that was born from one of the liberation parties did not transform its mindset from that which it had during the liberation struggle. It continued to compete with PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA after independence although it was now expected to spearhead impartial and inclusive peace building and nation building programs.

Besides investing in co-operatives, ZIPRA ex-combatants bought a variety of movable and immovable properties through their severance packages. Each ZIPRA ex-combatant contributed Z$50 towards the purchase of farms, motels, garages, a fleet of vehicles, cattle and agricultural equipment (Interviews with Ndebele, Bhebhe, Berry, I.G and Ngxongo, all of whom contributed towards the purchase of ZIPRA properties, 2017). The aim of purchasing the properties was to contribute towards positive peace for its demobilised and disabled ex-combatants (Nkomo, 1984). The properties were spread right across the country to benefit ZIPRA ex-combatants in different regions. Like their co-operatives, the ZIPRA ex-combatants' properties also fell victim to ethnic politics of competing political parties. The story of ZIPRA ex-combatants' properties would be presented fully in chapter five.

Attempts to ensure that ex-combatants enjoyed positive peace did not end with Operation SEED and the monetary demobilisation assistance that was spread over a period of 24 months, but also extended to other sectors. There was an affirmative program that prioritised the employment of ex-combatants in various fields like the civil service and other sectors of the

government (Kriger, 2003). This was in recognition of lost educational and employment opportunities as they had interrupted their education through joining the struggle and had to be assisted to find employment in a competitive job market. What remains to be seen is whether or not these empowerment programs were not tainted by the ethnic rivalries, that is to say, whether they were impartial or not.

Musemwa (1994) observes that many private companies did not want to employ ex-combatants. To encourage an increased uptake of ex-combatants in the private companies and parastatals, the government availed a special subsidy to all those organisations that employed more than 5% ex-combatants. However, in spite of government efforts to cushion the ex-combatants through assisting them to get employment, ex-combatants well in excess of 25 000 were unemployed and lived in destitution by 1993 (Musemwa (1995:45).

Many ex-combatants could not secure sustainable employment because they lacked necessary educational qualifications. The minimum educational qualifications of five ordinary level passes and above including a C or better pass symbol in English Language for employment in the Civil Service was too high for most ex-combatants who ended learning at Primary School level. Many of the ex-combatants did not have these qualifications. Mass education after independence produced thousands of well-educated young people who made competition very stiff in the job market for uneducated or semi-educated former combatants (Musemwa, 1995).

The empowerment of the ex-combatants through targeted education was another sector that caught the attention of the government in its efforts towards empowering them. Ex-combatants who were willing to learn were encouraged to do so. Quite a number of schools that specialised in entreprenueral development skills were built. These schools emphasized more on vocational training and apprenticeships than on formal education (Lamb, 2013; Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). Examples of such schools included J.Z. Moyo, George Silundika and Danhiko Schools.

There was also the establishment of Ruwa rehabilitation centre east of Harare to cater for the physically and psychologically challenged ex-combatants. However, the maimed ex-combatants that were at Ruwa Rehabilitation Centre were soon evicted and left to look for their own transport to their homes (Sadomba, 2011). The challenge could have been lack of adequate resources for the upkeep of the disabled ex-combatants.

The major stumbling block towards the education of the ex-combatants was that they had meagre resources to fund their education. To augment government efforts of assisting ex-combatants in the education sector, the Canadian government availed over 3 400 scholarships to cater for their needs (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). However, government corruption in the selection and allocation of scholarships meant that the program failed to benefit the targeted population (ex-combatants) but ended benefitting the children of government Ministers and well-connected party officials (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000).

Although ex-combatants had some challenges in securing employment and going back to school, it would be an exaggeration not to note that there are some ex-combatants who were not affected by these challenges. This was the case with those who came from rich families. Besides, a sizeable number of ex-combatants got land through the resettlement programme of 1980-1984 (Sadomba, 2011). The discussions above reveal that in some instances, both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants suffered the same predicament. However, rivalries that were hidden behind ethnic differences meant that even where it appeared as if both ex-guerrilla fighter groups experienced similar challenges, there were peculiar challenges that affected ZIPRA ex-combatants differently from their ZANLA counterparts. What is crucial to note is that in all the instances where ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants were supposed to work together before 1987, they ended up clashing; an indication that they were not reconciled and did not embrace each other.

4.6 The Second Reintegration Program, 1997

Several pitfalls in the first DDR process (1980-1984) left many ex-combatants economically vulnerable and bitter. It failed to guarantee positive peace to a lot of the ex-combatants. By the early 1990s, many of them were in extreme poverty, having last received government support in 1983-84 after the termination of the Z$185 monthly payments. Their miseries were exacerbated by the negative economic effects of ESAP. Whilst they were wallowing in abject poverty, the governing elite seemed to have forgotten about their plight hence their despair and heightened anger. Ex-combatants organised themselves into a strong force and formed the ZNLWVA in 1989. The association was inclusive as it brought almost all the ex-combatants together under one umbrella association. The ZNLWVA sought to attend to deplorable economic conditions faced by a majority of ex-combatants.

The promulgation of the War Veterans Act in 1992 brought issues pertaining to the welfare of the ex-combatants to the limelight. Before then, there was no specific legislation which spoke directly to the challenges faced by former freedom fighters. The War Victims (Compensation) Act of 1980 just provided a loose framework for disability pensions for people injured during the liberation war as well as pensions for their widows (Kriger, 2000). Unlike the War Victims (Compensation) Act which provided for the compensation of those injured during the war, the War Veterans Act (1992) provided for the compensation of all genuine ex-combatants who were involved in the war of liberation (Dzinesa, 2005).

Due to improved and solid organisation under the ZNLWVA, ex-combatants were able to engage in focussed negotiations with the government leading to the promulgation of yet another piece of legislation; the second War Victims Compensation Act of 1993 which laid ground for the strengthening of an already existing fund for the compensation of all war injured ex-combatants. The fund was known as the War Victims Compensation Fund (WVCF). The 1993

Act stipulated that compensation would only be paid to genuine ex-combatants who were maimed during the course of the war of independence (Chitiyo (2000). The level of compensation was supposed to match the degree of injuries sustained. One can realise that other categories of vulnerable and disempowered ex-combatants were not covered by this Act. For example, ZIPRA ex-combatants who got injured in the hands of the 5th Brigade after independence were not covered by the Act.

However, one positive thing to note is that ex-combatants got a legal instrument through the War Veterans Act which for the first time since independence clarified the legal status of ex-combatants and accorded them the status of War Veterans. A War Veteran is:

> Any person who underwent military training and participated, consistently and persistently, in the liberation struggle which occurred in Zimbabwe and neighbouring countries between 01 January 1962, and 29 February 1980, in connection with the bringing about Zimbabwe's independence on 18 April 1980 (War Veterans Act, 1992).

The War Veteran identity became very strong in the 1990s and was instrumental in the remobilisation of the former guerrillas of the war of independence into a united force never seen before (Sadomba, 2011). Through the ZNLWVA, and armed with an Act of parliament which directly spoke to their issues, the War Veterans were able to influence the government to pay attention to their plight. What incited the War Veterans to confront the government was the suspension of the WVCF after serious scandals bordering around its corrupt administration and looting were unearthed.

The WVCF had become an escape route from poverty for thousands of economically vulnerable ex-combatants. Although the fund was established long back, it was only known to the majority of the ex-combatants around the mid-1990s when it was already badly looted (Dzinesa, 2005). Chenjerai Hunzwi, who was Chairperson of the ZNLWVA in the mid-1990s made many ex-combatants aware of the existence of the WVCF and called upon them to come to Harare where the fund was administered for medical check-ups to ascertain the degrees of

injuries since the rate of compensation was proportional to the percentage of injuries sustained (Sadomba, 2011).

Right from its inception up to its closure in March 1997, the administration of the WVCF was chaotic. First and foremost, the people who benefitted were those who had knowledge about the existence of the fund. Secondly, the fund benefitted mostly undeserving, comfortably employed government Ministers, serving police and military officers (Dzinesa, 2005). Thirdly, the administration of the fund was centralised in Harare and that meant that it benefitted mainly those who resided in and around the capital (Harare). Fourthly, doctors were bribed so that they could exaggerate the degrees of injury for would-be-beneficiaries. Fifthly, there were incidents of multiple claims by connected individuals who were nowhere near the battlefronts during the liberation struggle (Mashike, 2000). As a result of these scandals, a large amount of Z$450 million dollars that was injected into the WVCF by the government in the last 8 months of 1996 to benefit injured ex-combatants was looted by criminals (Dzinesa, 2005).

According to Dzinesa (2005), it was possible for the fund to be looted due to a couple of loopholes in its administration. First, there were no clear-cut guidelines that directed doctors when examining the degree of injuries on potential beneficiaries. The situation was even worse when assessing claimants with invisible and non-physical injuries such as psychological disorders. Due to massive abuse, the WVCF was suspended by the government in March 1997 and this was to curb further abuse and to properly re-vet potential benefifiaries (Dzinesa, 2005). The suspension of the fund took place when many ex-combatants had already submitted claims and were awaiting payments. This was a recipe for disaster as infuriated War Veterans embarked on nationwide demonstrations against the government in 1997.

The demonstrations shook ZANU-PF to its foundations as ex-combatants directed their wrath to the President of the country whom they booed on Heroes Day commemorations in August

1997 and forced him to abandon his speech (Dzinesa, 2005). What made their demonstrations successful and dangerous at the same time was that they were not blocked by law enforcement agents. This was for the simple reason that the top leadership of the police, who were themselves war veterans, were sympathetic to the War Veterans' cause. Through a Presidential decree, the government announced a once-off Z$50 000 financial grant to each and every successfully vetted War Veteran.

This was accompanied by a revisable monthly life pension of Z$2 000 (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). The payments were paid to all ex-combatants who were successfully vetted irrespective of whether they were employed or unemployed. Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) put the total national figure of all War Veterans at about 52 000 by 1997. All this was done by the President with little or no consultation at all with the tax payers or the officials who were supposed to implement the program (Coltart, 2016). The whole process was not budgeted for since it was forced on the government by restless War Veterans. Funding obviously became a problem.

The first strategy was an attempt to introduce a special tax before the end of 1997 to fund the gratuities. This proposal was vehemently resisted by the workers. With no other option, the government resorted to the printing of money to finance the exercise. The total cost of the grants gobbled over Z$4, 5 billion (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000; Coltart, 2016). The aim to improve the welfare of the ex-combatants was not only expressed in financial terms. A quota of 20% was reserved for ex-combatants in all farms designated for distribution (Zulu, 2009). Other privileges extended to the ex-combatants under the second reintegration phase were the payment of school fees for their children by the government at government-run educational institutions, free health services for them and their children at government hospitals as well as funeral assistance (Zulu, 2009).

Msemwa (2011:115) notes that the gratuities were not simply an altruistic measure by the government but they came after a series of protests by the ex-combatants. In the same vein, Dzinesa (2005:135) observes that the gratuities to the ex-combatants in 1997 were diplomatically targeted at pacifying them since they had grown restless.

In short, the second reintegration program also undermined peace building efforts as the general society was economically destabilised by the effects of the gratuities to the ex-combatants. It is crucial to briefly outline the effects of the unbudgeted gratuities to the economy. The printing of money had calamitous repercussions on the already fragile economy. The rate of inflation rose to unprecedented levels. The Zimbabwean dollar shed almost 73% of its value on 14 November 1997: a day that has been remembered as the 'Black Friday' due to a multiplicity of economic challenges associated with it (Coltart, 2016:248).

From then onwards, the economy plummeted and left the ordinary people as well as ex-combatants who had no sound economic base in dire economic conditions. By January of 1998, the prices of basic commodities were sky-rocketing thereby leading to serious rioting by a disgruntled citizenry in almost all the major urban centres of Zimbabwe. The riots were only suppressed at the cost of eight civilian lives (Coltart, 2016). Many of the ex-combatants who were in unstable economic conditions could not buy anything meaningful as the value of their money was quickly eroded by inflation.

In the light of the failure of both the first and second reintegration processes, Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) conclude that 'two wrongs do not make a right'. There are two important issues that persuaded Mazarire and Rupiya to make that conclusion. First, the same levels of grants and pensions were extended to ex-combatants that had been unemployed since 1980 and cabinet Ministers as well as top government officials who were living in luxury. Secondly, the 'windfall' was given to people who had been languishing in abject poverty without preparing

them for such 'large amounts of money.' Many of the jobless ex-combatants simply squandered the proceeds (2000:77). Rich ex-combatants quickly pooled together their resources and established income generating projects whilst poor ex-combatants who were in the majority for that matter tried to feed, clothe themselves, and pay school fees and secure accommodation with the dollar that was on a downward spiral on a daily basis.

Even though the economic conditions of the majority of ex-combatants did not improve after the second reintegration program, the government had succeeded in one of its objectives. It was able to pacify and then forge an alliance of convenience with the hitherto restless ex-combatants. Musemwa (2011:124) has analysed the predicament of the ex-combatants in the following way:

> They were (War Veterans) first demobilised, then neglected and eventually remobilised again but this time to wage a different kind of war to keep the same establishment, which largely marginalised them from enjoying the 'fruits' of independence in power.

When viewed from Musemwa's perspective, one notes that the major aim of the government in conceding to the demands of the ex-combatants in 1997 was predicated on its desire to ensure regime rather than human security. In their poverty, ex-combatants could be manipulated by ZANU-PF during campaigns for votes in elections. In fact, ex-combatants acted as ZANU-PF's storm troopers as they coerced people to vote for it. Chitiyo (2000:86) succinctly summarises his thoughts about why ex-combatants entered into an alliance with the government that had neglected them for a long period. He states that:

> The War Veterans already owe the government a favour (because of the pay outs); but government is dangling another carrot and stick before them (i.e. increases to War Veterans monthly pensions and the threat that if any government comes to power, the War Veterans could lose this largesse).

One thing that is apparent about the second reintegration program of 1997 is that it was heavily politicised by the ruling ZANU-PF party so that even though many ex-combatants remained in abject poverty they were kept in a state of perpetual anticipation that their deplorable plight

would be alleviated. Dzinesa (2005) explains that the ex-combatants could easily be manipulated to do 'dirty' activities by ZANU-PF due to their continued destitution in spite of the 1997 pay outs. The net effect of the ex-combatants' indulgence into these 'dirty' activities did not promote effective social reintegration into civil society as they were viewed as enemies of the people and became isolated from the communities they were supposed to reintegrate into.

To date, the majority of ex-combatants still look up to the government for their subsistence. The 1997 reintegration program failed to positively and significantly transform the lives of many ex-combatants. The government was again unable to implement successful reintegration in 1997 because it had vested political interests in the exercise. The implementation of the second reintegration process indicated that the government had learnt nothing from the failure of the first process of 1980-1984.

4.7 Conclusion

The DDR process in Zimbabwe was atypical because the peace agreement which terminated the conflict skirted fundamental DDR issues and left them to the incoming government despite the prevalence of a polarised and conflictual post-conflict environment. There were no specifics on how disarmament and demobilisation would be done. Entitlements to ex-combatants in the form of reintegration support were not mentioned. Without any experience and support, the government blundered. In the context of mutual fear, suspicion, mistrust, and hostility between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants, the government decided to make disarmament and demobilisation voluntary and the results were not impressive. The movement of combatants into APs was not strictly supervised. ZIPRA cadres trained in conventional warfare, for example, were asked to hunt down their colleagues who were refusing to get into APs, not a normal DDR practice. No external funding was availed to support reintegration and the

outcome was that there was abuse of reintegration programs by ZANU-PF to settle old political scores with its rival, PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants.

It is mind boggling to imagine how a government that was part and parcel of ethnic-based rivalries and hostilities was expected to design and implement fair, impartial, and effective DDR programs alone. To expect fairness, impartiality, and effectiveness was to expect too much from a government that was under-resourced and in support of one military faction against another. In other cases with a context almost similar to that of Zimbabwe, the UN has been heavily involved to give the much needed political and technical support as well as supervisory role to guard against partiality and abuse of the DDR process by any one of the parties. In Zimbabwe, there was no UN to enforce disarmament and also provide funds for reintegration programs. In short, the government was left alone to experiment with a sensitive and delicate process as DDR in a context that was conflictual.

The DDR process was attempted twice and both attempts were a failure. It can be concluded that the government was motivated more by political self interest than by national interests aimed at achieving both state and human security and bringing finality to the DDR issue. In both processes, the design and implementation mechanisms were not inclusive and change-oriented. To date, Zimbabwe is still affected by problems brought about by failed DDR processes, and as will be seen in the next two chapters, ZIPRA ex-combatants are the most affected. The ZANU-PF government resciscitates DDR issues during election times to encourage ex-combatants to support it and this has not helped the situation.

CHAPTER 5: NATURE OF ZIPRA EX-COMBATANTS' EXPERIENCES IN DDR

5.1 Introduction

This chapter critically interrogates the specific experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in various DDR programs. It argues that ZIPRA ex-combatants had peculiar experiences in the DDR process that were a result of power struggles for political supremacy embedded in historical and ethnic dynamics that were at play during the struggle for emancipation from colonial bondage and spilled over into the post-colonial state. A context-specific approach is adopted in articulating the unique experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants. Most of the evidence is generated from primary sources (ZIPRA ex-combatants) and to some extent from secondary sources.

Although the focus of the study is on DDR issues, the integration process into the army which is mainly a SSR issue would be discussed in greater detail because an analysis of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR processes would be incomplete without a clear interrogation of military issues. In fact, what happened within military circles directly fed into DDR programs and processes, hardened perceptions, feelings and relationships throughout the entire ex-combatant constituency and made it difficult for them to reconcile and embrace each other where ever and when ever they met. For instance, some ZIPRA ex-combatants who were victimised within the ZNA left the army with their weapons, leading to difficulties in disarmament. Others (ZIPRA ex-combatants) demobilised in large numbers after realising that they were not welcome in the army. The continuous politicisation and ethnicisation of the army also pushed many ZIPRA ex-combatants out of the military and made it difficult for them to reconcile with ZANLA ex-combatants. Both those who deserted the army with weapons and

the ones who ‘demobilised’ due to unpleasant treatment within the ZNA could not effectively reintegrate into civilian society.

5.2 Political Context

The first DDR process was launched in the midst of political jostling among the major political players due to campaigning for the 1980 general elections. During campaigning, political tensions heightened as parties sought to outdo each other. What made the situation particularly volatile was that the Patriotic Front that had helped the two parties to present a united front in the diplomatic front during negotiations collapsed. As noted in chapter one, ZANU decided to run for elections independently as ZANU-PF not as a Patriotic Front with ZAPU. ZAPU belatedly registered itself for elections as PF-ZAPU. The split in the Patriotic Front did not help the situation in any way as it compounded political tensions.

In fact, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants became active players in political power games as each political party tried to use its former military wing in building a power base in society. However, it was ZANU-PF that had gained the levers of power that vigorously used its former guerrilla army to build its influence in critical sectors of government (Kriger, 2003). It can be seen that the post-independence environment was not conducive to foster collaborative peace building endeavours.

The hotly contested 1980 elections gave emphatic victory to ZANU-PF which garnered 57 seats. PF-ZAPU got 20 seats, the UANC of Abel Muzorewa managed a paltry 3 seats whilst all the 20 reserved seats went to Smith’s party (Sithole, 1999:179). What is interesting to note is that the ethnic factor was strong in determining the results of these elections. ZANLA guerrillas had penetrated deep into ZAPU traditional strongholds of Matabeleland around the Beitbridge, Gwanda and Kezi areas for about three years before the 1980 elections. However, when voting came, the Matabeleland South electorate preferred PF-ZAPU candidates

regardless of the three-year period of politicisation and indoctrination by ZANLA guerrillas in favour of ZANU through Pungwes (Sithole, 1999). Similarly, ZANU-PF won almost all the seats in former ZIPRA operational zones of Mashonaland West. Sithole (1999) concludes that the ethnic factors were dominant in influencing the voting trends during the 1980 elections.

After its electoral victory, and in the spirit of national reconciliation, ZANU-PF formed a GNU with PF-ZAPU and the Rhodesian Front of Ian Smith. The Prime Minister also asked the parties to avoid dwelling on past injustices and to forgive each other in order to build a united and peaceful nation. The aim was to avoid retributive justice and to also facilitate the washing away of liberation war grudges. These developments on the political front were supposed to impact positively on the military sector, especially the integration exercise and bring unity, inclusivity and reconciliation. Even though PF-ZAPU was invited into the GNU, it was always treated as a junior partner (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). ZANU-PF's political rhetoric continued to disparage PF-ZAPU, ZIPRA and Joshua Nkomo as losers. Music, songs, symbols and slogans only depicted ZANU-PF and ZANLA's triumphant history at the expense of PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

5.3 ZIPRA Experience during the Transition Period

The disarmament process was problematic due to a couple of security concerns on the side of the guerrilla forces that were briefly outlined in the previous chapter. Many combatants cooperated with the JHC and voluntarily handed in their weapons. However, a sizeable number of both ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas were reserved outside the APs by their respective political parties. Other guerrillas took their weapons and ran out of the APs on their own. These constituted what ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU variously termed 'outlaws', 'bandits', 'renegades' or 'unruly elements' (Alexander et al, 2000). These loose elements were a menace and security risk as they terrorised both civilians and police officers wherever they found them (Todd,

2007). However, after the election period, armed men who did not abide by the cease fire regulations in Matabeleland were called ‘dissidents’ by ZANU-PF and their motives were increasingly located in political rather than security and strategic terms (Alexander et al, 2000).

After the election, there was silence on the ZANLA ‘dissidents’ in Mashonaland (Todd, 2007). It can be observed that the presentation of ‘dissidents’ by ZANU-PF was deliberately meant to soil the image of ZIPRA ex-combatants whilst exonerating ZANLA from any acts of lawlessness. What motivated ‘renegades’ from both ZANLA and ZIPRA were security challenges of the transition period plus political motives mainly on the part of ZANLA, many of whom were stashed within the civilian population for purposes of campaigning for ZANU-PF (Nkomo, 1984; Todd, 2007). The notion of ‘dissidents’ assumed both political and ethnic meanings. On the political front, ‘renegades’ in Matabeleland were conflated into one and projected as representatives of bad losers who did not want to concede defeat in elections. The ‘renegades’ were also ethnicised.

In this context, PF-ZAPU was deliberately viewed as a party that worked in cahoots with ‘dissidents.’ Its President was not spared in this smear campaign. Joshua Nkomo was accused of being the mastermind behind the whole ‘dissidents’ issue. To make matters worse, the whole population of Matabeleland was viewed as ‘dissidents’ sympathisers. In the same vein, the label of ‘dissident’ was also given to all ZIPRA ex-combatants, including those serving in the ZNA. In general terms, the whole population of Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands where there were Ndebele speaking people constituted a ‘dissident’ community (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:14). Since ZIPRA ex-combatants were portrayed as ‘dissidents’ as early as 1980, they were deemed enemies rather than partners of ZANU-PF and ZANLA ex-combatants in the peace building process. PF-ZAPU’s alleged role in sponsoring ‘dissidents’ was to be ended through violent means. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) points out that ZIPRA ex-combatants

at APs, within the ZNA and those who had demobilised panicked and became restless when they discovered that they were perceived as 'dissidents' who were anti-peace building.

Through the creation of 'dissidents' from lawless ZIPRA guerrillas who were roaming the countryside in 1980, a stage had already been set for further confrontational relationships between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. Efforts taken by ZIPRA commanders and PF-ZAPU leaders in rounding up the 'renegades' and bringing them to book illustrated that they were in fact not abetting lawlessness among its military ranks. As seen before, 400 unruly ZIPRA cadres were rounded up and thrown into Khami Prison. The co-operation of the ZIPRA leaders was despite the fact that the RSFs were fuelling security fears from guerrillas at APs by displaying their power through patrols in military jeeps with mounted machine guns and by also flying lowly above APs (Alexander et al, 2000). Worse still, the RSFs had shot at a bus load of ZIPRA ex-combatants at Lupane Business Centre that was heading towards St. Paul AP and injured many on board (Alexander et al, 2000).

According to Coltart (2016), the emphasis by the government was on rounding up ZIPRA ex-combatants who were on the loose whilst ZANLA ex-combatants who were engaged in the same unruly behaviour went scot-free. This could be interpreted as part of smear campaign meant to discredit both ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU so as to justify their elimination. Lookout Masuku, the former ZIPRA commander was quite incensed by what he viewed as a partisan and discriminatory application of justice to ZIPRA and ZANLA 'renegades.'

Masuku went into meticulous details on acts of indiscipline by ZANLA ex-combatants that were concealed by the governing party whilst it concentrated on ZIPRA transgressions. For example, ZANLA destroyed Sgt Major Gava's vehicle in Zvimba Police Post on 22 June 1980. They also assaulted police officers at Chipinge, shot at Kachuta TTL, and threatened farmers in Maranke and Fort Victoria area on 22 June 1980 (Todd, 2007:150). Indiscipline by ZIPRA

ex-combatants at Sanyati, Zvimba and Hurungwe was exaggerated, condemned and portrayed as organised acts of rebellion by the government (Todd, 2007:151). It has to be pointed out that ZIPRA bandits attacked government agents and projects in Matabeleland and Midlands. Besides being on the loose due to security fears, the attack on government agents and projects could be an indication that to some extent, some ZIPRA elements also resented a ZANU-PF government.

The selective application of justice against ZIPRA ex-combatants in dealing with military indiscipline during the early days of DDR implementation flew in the face of concerted efforts by the JHC to eradicate military indiscipline. Even after independence, it seems ZANU-PF, even though it was the government continued to behave as if it was still a liberation movement rivalling PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA for the leadership of the post-colonial state.

5.4 ZIPRA Experience in Disarmament

After the ceasefire of December 1979, both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants were supposed to congregate at various designated APs for disarmament, demobilisation and integration. The exercise of entering APs started on 26 December 1979 and was to end on 04 January 1980 (Interview with Ndebele, 2017). However, the period was extended to accommodate guerrillas who were coming in from training bases in other countries in Africa as well as from overseas. It was only when one was integrated into the ZNA or demobilised that weapons were surrenderd to the commanders for onward transmission to the national armoury (Kriger, 2003). During the APs phase, guerrillas were provided with rations, pay, housing, and perfomed some light drills for fitness purposes (Kriger, 2003:89).

ZANLA had a total of 16 000 guerrillas at APs, whilst ZIPRA assembled around 5 000 cadres. About 20 000 ZANLA and 8 000-10 000 ZIPRA guerrillas remained outside APs (Kriger, 2003:45). As for ZIPRA, the majority of their guerrillas who remained outside APs were still

in Zambia and Angola. However, for ZANLA, many of their guerrillas who did not get into APs were in the home front and were hidden among villagers, either campaigning for ZANU-PF or ready to resume the war if election results did not go in favour of their party (Nkomo, 1984).

Nyathi testifies that in Mashonaland where ZANLA guerrillas were encamped, a majority of them were roaming outside APs with their weapons, urging and threatening people to vote for ZANU-PF instead of PF-ZAPU. They actively did that even in areas like Mashonaland West Province where ZIPRA guerrillas had operated throughout the liberation struggle hence ZANU-PF was able to win overwhelmingly in that province. Whilst ZANLA guerrillas were doing that, Nkomo and PF-ZAPU were restricting ZIPRA guerrillas into APs and enforcing disarmament in accordance with the Lancaster peace agreement requirements (Interview, 2017). Nyathi's version of the story viz-a-viz the disarmament process and the issue of APs reinforces that of Nkomo (1984), and indicates that ZANLA was not sincere in carrying out disarmament whilst to a large extent, ZIPRA was.

Since most of the ZIPRA guerrillas who were at home entered APs, they went through the formal disarmament processes than ZANLA guerrillas, who most of them were loose elements amongst villagers. The government of Zimbabwe had little capacity and political will to execute effective disarmament and demobilisation. These two critical processes were made voluntary in the midst of mistrust and hostility between ZANLA and ZIPRA hence the limited level of success.

Nkomo (1984:223) observed that three months after the demobilisation of ZIPRA guerrillas who were not absorbed into the ZNA, brigade strength ZANLA guerrillas had been kept intact and hidden around the eastern parts of the country near the border with Mozambique. It would appear ZANU-PF had to some extent not kept its own side of the bargain in terms of asking its

excess guerrillas (those who could not be absorbed into the ZNA) to disarm and demobilise. ZANLA was not transparent to ZIPRA with regards to disarmament (Interview with Dabengwa, 2017). It appears ZANU-PF wanted PF-ZAPU politicians and ZIPRA senior commanders to assist them in disarming ZIPRA guerrillas. Once ZIPRA guerrillas were disarmed, PF-ZAPU politicians and ZIPRA commanders' usefulness to ZANU-PF ended. Nkomo (1984:223) had this to say about disarmament: 'Once ZIPRA was disbanded, my usefulness to Robert Mugabe's government was at the end.' Although traces of discrimination against ZIPRA in disarmament programs were visible, they were not pronounced. The reason was that they (ZIPRA) had to be persuaded to disarm as they were a formidable army which could not be coerced through violent means by the government without external assistance. It was only after they had disarmed that they endured manifest discrimination and marginalisation.

5.5 ZIPRA Experience in Demobilisation

The demobilisation process stretched from 1980 to around 1985. Officially, it ended with the closure of the Demobilisation Directorate in 1983, but members of the ZNA who wished to demobilise were allowed to leave the army up until 1985 (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). Tapfumaneyi (1996:44) reveals that ZANLA had 21 500 guerrillas eligible for demobilisation, whilst ZIPRA had 15 000, and RSFs had 23 000. Like disarmament, the demobilisation process was voluntary. However, very few ex-guerrillas were willing to leave the military voluntarily. This meant that demobilisation had to be enforced through other strategies to shed off excess manpower that could not be accommodated within the security services. As alluded to in the previous chapter, the demobilisation package consisted of four elements. These were technical training, further education, business advice and a demobilisation allowance (Alao, 2012:52).

As the above demobilisation programs were implemented during a period of heightened tensions between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants, compounded by clashes at APs, some ZIPRA ex-combatants forfeited their demobilisation stipends as they feared to be taken as 'dissidents' and be caught by government agents. The argument by ZIPRA ex-combatants was that more of them compared to ZANLA were involuntarily demobilised. This was done indirectly through disparaging Joshua Nkomo their former commander-in-chief, their political party PF-ZAPU as well as their former military commanders (Interview with Ndebele, 2017). Many ZIPRA ex-combatants could not bear that humiliation. As a result, they left APs and the ZNA.

In direct terms, many of the ZIPRA specialists like doctors, engineers, pilots, technicians, and teachers could not be accommodated into the ZNA and were forced to demobilise. This was not because their qualifications and experiences were irrelevant, but they were discriminated against (Interview with Gatsheni, 2017). Ngxongo had trained in artillery in Yugoslavia and in engineering in Romania but ended up working in a construction company in Bulawayo because he could not be made part and parcel of the new army (Interview, 2017). ZIPRA airforce and intelligence units were disbanded and ZANU-PF government built its airforce and central intelligence organisation around the nucleus of the Rhodesian airforce and Rhodesian Special Branch respectively (Nkomo, 1984; Interview with Gatsheni, 2017).

The preference of the RSFs over ZIPRA in the military circles was almost similar to the scenario explained in chapter one where ZIPRA collaborated with Umkhonto We Sizwe guerrillas of the ANC of South Africa and ZANLA with FRELIMO of Mozambique in the execution of joint military campaigns in Rhodesia during the liberation struggle but fought against each other during the same time. The collaboration between ZANLA and the RSFs against ZIPRA was even worse. This was because the RSFs had decimated thousands of Africans including ZANLA guerrillas during the liberation struggle. This point is deliberately

made to illustrate the magnitude of mistrust and hostility between ZIPRA and ZANLA. As noted by Kriger (2003:44), ZANU-PF used its ex-guerrilla base to dominate the security sector and the economy in general.

Political factors also contributed to the demobilisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants in large numbers. They were frustrated because they had firmly believed that PF-ZAPU would win the 1980 elections. Ndebele explains that ZIPRA cadres only expected PF-ZAPU and no other party to win the elections and when ZANU-PF won, they were demoralised. They also thought that ZANU-PF won through fraudulent means. Within the ZNA, it was announced that 'those who were not willing or unable to work with the government were free to leave' (Interview with Ndebele, 2017). Due to mistrust in ZANU-PF government that was fuelled by the perceptions that the 1980 elections were rigged, many ZIPRA ex-combatants demobilised from the ZNA.

5.6 Clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA at APs

Guerrillas who could not join the security forces remained at APs from the end of 1979 up to 1981. The long periods which the ex-combatants spent at APs doing nothing was a recipe for disaster. The situation was particularly volatile at Entumbane and Chitungwiza APs where ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres with a well-documented history of ethnic-driven rivalry and hostility were juxtaposed in council houses in Bulawayo and Harare respectively (Alao, 2012). The cantonment of former warring ex-combatants side by side is recommended by the UNDPKO (1999). According to the UNDPKO, former warring parties should mingle at APs and share whatever facilities are available so as to facilitate early reconciliation. Whilst this could be a good idea, in a context where there are high levels of mutual fear, mistrust, suspicion, rivalry, and tensions, it can be dangerous to put former warring military factions together. Instead of promoting reconciliation, such an arrangement can ignite or re-ignite violence.

The case of ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants at Entumbane and Chitungwiza illustrate the reality of the above fears. Instead of facilitating reconciliation, the unease interaction of ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres in these two APs heightened feelings of fear, mistrust and hostility within the two groups of former guerrillas and led to physical confrontation. The major issue to note is that reconciliation is not a hollow process. It has a number of critical processes like acknowledgement of the wrong done, truth telling, confession, contrition/remorse, mercy, repentence, apologies, asking for forgiveness, compensation and then finally reconciliation among others. In the case of Zimbabwe, ex-combatants were expected to reconcile without the implementation of any of these processes.

What compounded the risk of the situation sliding back into violence was the fact that both factions were armed. As indicated earlier, ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants kept their personal weapons whilst at APs. Since final official demobilisation took place in mid-1981, this means that other ex-combatants still held up to their weapons outside the regulation of the ZNA up to that time. Gleichmann et al (2004) suggest that the active involvement of neutral international monitors can be a critical stabilising factor especially in a situation of mistrust between former belligerents. Neutral monitors may help to create buffer zones that separate former warring factions.

Clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres at Entumbane AP in November 1980 are said to have been sparked by reckless and inflammatory political speeches by ZANU-PF politicians at a rally at White City Stadium where they denigrated ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU. Enos Nkala played a key role in inciting violence. He did that through openly disparaging ZIPRA, PF-ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo and the Ndebele people in general in front of Ndebele crowds in Bulawayo (Todd, 2007). According to Todd (2007:36) Nkala declared that:

> …the party's task (ZANU-PF) from now on is to crush Joshua Nkomo and forget about him. I want to declare that Joshua Nkomo and his group are in government

> by the grace of ZANU-PF. They contributed in their small way and we have given them a share proportional to their contribution. If they now want more than their small share then we shall have to tell them that they will not have any share at all.

These utterances were bellicose and provocative. One important issue to note is that such a language (inflammatory and anti-unity) was used at a time when efforts were underway to perform the delicate business of integrating hitherto antagonistic military factions. Retired Sergeant Major Sibanda recalls that ZANLA cadres who were emboldened by what they heard from the speech at White City Stadium passed through the ZIPRA camp at Entumbane singing and chanting provocative slogans that were denigrating PF-ZAPU, ZIPRA and Joshua Nkomo. The ex-combatants did not attend the rally but heard the speeches from their radios. Sibanda further states that in the evening of that day, ZANLA soldiers started shelling the ZIPRA camp with mortar 60s and ZIPRA fought back (Interview with Sibanda who was part of the ZIPRA cadres that fought with ZANLA at Entumbane in November 1980).

As ZIPRA cadres retaliated, a two-day pitched battle ensued between the two rival guerrilla forces. The fighting spilled out and engulfed most of the low-income residential suburbs of Bulawayo and many civilians became victims of the fighting (Interview with Sibanda, 2017). What became apparent was that ZIPRA forces also beat and killed Shona-speaking civilians they came across. They also destroyed their houses. Nyathi who was part of the Rhodesian forces that were deployed to deal with the violence testifies that they actually met a lot of Shona speaking people along the Bulawayo-Harare road with their luggage waiting for transport to take them to Mashonaland (Interview with Nyathi, 2017).

ZIPRA regular forces with their tanks started moving from Essexvelle in Esigodini, Matebeleland South whilst some were moving from Gwaai AP in Matabeleland North towards Bulawayo to reinforce their colleagues at Entumbane (Interview with Jack Mpofu, one of the senior ZIPRA commanders, 2017). If nothing urgent and decisive was implemented, the ZANLA-ZIPRA clashes at Entumbane could have sparked a full-scale war. Both forces from

Esigodini and Gwaai did not reach Bulawayo as the convoy from Esigodini was pulverised by the Rhodesian air force at Ascot Shopping centre just at the door steps of Bulawayo. The Gwaai convoy was also stopped along the way (Interview with Jack Mpofu, 2017). So, the speedy intervention of former RSFs on the side of ZANLA and the use of their sophisticated air force and mechanised infantry became instrumental in the defeat of ZIPRA forces who had initially overpowered their ZANLA rivals (Evans, 1991). It also took the intervention of senior military commanders from both ZIPRA and ZANLA to quell the violence.

Sadomba (2011) notes that ZANU-PF was able to reconcile with the Whites but failed to achieve Black-to-Black reconciliation and that was worse between the armed forces that failed to tolerate each other. Mutual hate and fear ran high within both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. Munemo (2016) suggests that if only the inter-Black differences were attended to at Lancaster, perhaps the contradictions and violence at APs could have been averted.

ZIPRA also fought against ZANLA cadres in February 1981 at Entumbane in what is generally known as the second Entumbane skirmishes. The precise causes of the clash are not clear. However, what is clear is that factional fighting spread to other APs like Ntabazinduna, Chitungwiza, and Glenville and to Connemara in the Midlands (Jackson, 2011). What was more disastrous is that factional fighting also percolated the integrated units. Specifically, three out of the nine integrated battalions were embroiled in fighting between ZIPRA and ZANLA former guerrillas (Jackson, 2011). BMATT advised that the three battalions be disbanded. As noted by Jackson (2011), the parties to the conflict were now Blacks against Blacks unlike during the liberation struggle where it was mainly Blacks against Whites. The factional fighting not only intensified mistrust and hostility between ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers but also negatively affected inter-party relationships within the GNU.

Due to a heightened sense of fear and insecurity, many ZIPRA ex-combatants deserted the APs and the ZNA and returned to their homelands. Put differently, several ZIPRA ex-combatants 'demobilised' from the ZNA as they felt unwanted and insecure (Interview with Leornad Ndlovu who left the ZNA during the period of clashes at APs, 2017). In order to stabilise the security situation, ZANU-PF decided to disarm thousands of ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres at APs without consulting the JHC (Kriger, 2003). Some of the ZIPRA soldiers thought that they had been betrayed by their military leaders who urged them to stop fighting during clashes at APs whilst they had thought that they would urge them to fight to the bitter end. Nyathi noted that ZIPRA soldiers actually tried to shoot the helicopter that was used by the ZIPRA commanders to urge restraint between the fighting forces (Interview with Nyathi, 2017). According to Nyathi, when the former RSFs arrived in Bulawayo, they positioned themselves between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces and started to fight ZIPRA soldiers who were refusing to ceasefire (Interview with Nyathi, 2017). ZIPRA forces thought that the Rhodesian forces were assisting ZANLA against them and that accentuated the feelings of being unwanted and perceptions that their liberation war sacrifices were all in vain (Interview with Leornard, 2017).

Sibanda states that there were about two major results of the clashes at the APs to the ZIPRA ex-combatants. First, their morale plummeted to the lowest ebbs and a feeling of being unwanted crept in. They also felt they had been betrayed by their former commanders (Interview, 2017). The fissures between the top ZIPRA commanders and PF-ZAPU political leadership and between ZIPRA commanders who helped to contain the clashes and ZIPRA rank and file was to the benefit of an insecure and suspicious ZANU-PF government (Evans, 1991).

ZANU-PF was insecure over ZIPRA cadres because they had sophisticated military hardware as well as an air force which the new government assumed PF-ZAPU would use to launch a counter revolution supposedly to make up for the 1980 electoral defeat (Munemo, 2016).

ZANU-PF fears and mistrust of PF-ZAPU were also intensified by the fact that Soviet support for PF-ZAPU dramatically increased during the transition period and continued even after the election period. According to Munemo (2016), the increase in Soviet support fuelled speculation that the Soviets were planning to back Nkomo in a military campaign against ZANU-PF, a party that capitalist powers saw as a lesser threat than PF-ZAPU.

ZANU-PF also thought that PF-ZAPU had deliberately held back some of its best trained forces in Zambia in preparation for a conventional onslaught against a ZANU-PF government (Kriger, 2003). It is possible that the government thought that Joshua Nkomo and his party were up to sabotage it. Ngwenya (2014) believes that the former Rhodesian Special Branch intelligence unit could have also exaggerated these issues in order to further accentuate the levels of antagonism between the former liberation parties.

The blame for the fighting was entirely put on ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU by the government. What made the accusations against ZIPRA unbelievable is that the findings of a commission that was set up to investigate the causes of the clashes were never made public (Msipa, 2015). Whilst all this was happening on the military front, there were concerted efforts by ZANU-PF to downplay or even discredit the roles that PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA forces played to liberate Zimbabwe. Songs, dance, music and slogans that were played on national radio and television were exclusively ZANLA (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). For example, ZANU-PF ran a radio programme every Sunday morning which it called Dzimbo dzeChimurenga Dzakasunungura Zimbabwe (Chimurenga Songs that liberated Zimbabwe). These were songs used by ZANLA guerrillas to mobilise and motivate supporters during the war (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants resented such partisan portrayal of the liberation struggle which undermined their contribitions and sacrifices during the war. ZANU-PF strategies against ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU in general undermined reconciliation, inclusivity and unity in the country.

5.7 The Arms Cache 'Discovery' and the Collapse of the GNU, 1982

The 'discovery' of arms caches on two ZIPRA farms was a result of a botched disarmament process and also bordered around political malice by ZANU-PF. The 'discovery' of arms caches had adverse effects on the DDR and peace processes in Zimbabwe in general and specifically, on ZIPRA ex-combatants with regards to how they were treated in the ZNA and in civilian life. Whilst the issue of the arms caches before and after independence was real, what have not been fully investigated are the motives behind the caching. The lack of government commitment to fully interrogate the arms caches as well as their 'discovery' led Nkomo (1984) to conclude that ZANU-PF deliberately fabricated the issue and blew it out of proportion in order to get a pretext to annihilate ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU and then establish a one-party state.

5.7.1 The History of Arms Caches in Zimbabwe

According to Mnangagwa who was Minister of State Security by then, different weapons were 'discovered' on ZIPRA farms in 1982. According to ZANU-PF, these weapons had been cached by the ZIPRA ex-combatants with the full knowledge and concurrence from their former senior military commanders and PF-ZAPU politicians, including Joshua Nkomo. The alleged aim of caching arms was to topple ZANU-PF government and then install PF-ZAPU into political power (Mnangagwa, 1989). To ZANU-PF, PF-ZAPU wanted to get into power through the back door by using a military coup (Mnangagwa, 1989).

Armed with the arms cache 'discovery' story which it presented as an act of treason by ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU, ZANU-PF went on to sack four PF-ZAPU cabinet Ministers from the GNU on 17 February 1982 (Sibanda, 2005). Alongside the sacking of PF-ZAPU cabinet Ministers was the arrest and detention of senior former ZIPRA military commanders. The list of detained commanders included Dumiso Dabengwa, Lookout Masuku, Nicholas Nkomo, Tshaka Moyo,

Masala Sibanda, Misheck Velaphi, Isaac Nyathi and Jack Mpofu. They were arrested and detained on allegations of treason (Sibanda, 2005; Interview with Jack Mpofu, 2017). Although these military leaders were acquitted by the courts, Dabengwa and Masuku remained in detention for unclear reasons up until the end of 1986.

The third effect of the arms cache 'discovery' was the confiscation of all ZIPRA properties. Given the well-documented history of ZANU-ZAPU rivalry and ZIPRA-ZANLA clashes before independence and thereafter at APs, it is possible that ZANU-PF could have genuinely believed that arms caches were earmarked to topple the government. However, what became questionable and suspicious was that even though the suspected culprits behind the caching of arms were acquitted by the courts, they remained under unexplained detention for quite a long time.

All these developments made the demobilisation and reintegration of ZIPRA ex-combatants difficult to achieve. UNOSAA (2005) prescribes that trust and confidence should be built in DDR programs through the participation of senior commanders of all the military factions. This can happen if there is no competition among and between parties to the DDR process. Where there are mutual suspicions and hostilities, this could be difficult to achieve. The dissolution of the GNU and the arrest of senior ZIPRA personnel contradicted the prescriptions of UNOSAA and helped to intensify inter-party rivalries and hostilities. During the period of heightened inter-party animosities, the levels of trust and confidence between the stakeholders to the DDR process subsided to the lowest ebbs as open and frank dialogue was muzzled. Vindictive measures replaced whatever little co-operative activities had earlier on prevailed in the GNU and that helped to further harden positions. The DDR process in Zimbabwe was atypical because, instead of promoting inclusivity, the government that was leading the process promoted exclusive activities.

As the thin veneer of unity and reconciliation within the GNU crumbled, the DDR process was also adversely affected. Open confrontations came to characterise and shape PF-ZAPU-ZANU-PF and ZIPRA-ZANLA relationships. The dismissal of Joshua Nkomo and his colleagues from the GNU as well as the arrest of ZIPRA senior commanders left the ZIPRA ex-combatants within and without the ZNA with deep feelings of being politically and militarily leaderless (Interview with Mazinyane and SaSidudla, 2017). It became difficult for them to trust and respect institutions where they were not represented at leadership levels.

Although they had new leaders under a ZANU-PF government, what has to be noted is that ZIPRA ex-combatants had unflinching respect and admiration for their former commander-in-chief, Joshua Nkomo and to a large extent, their former senior military commanders, Dabengwa and Masuku in particular (Interview with Mazinyane, Sibanda and Jack Mpofu). Although Sibanda remained in the ZNA until his retirement in 2006, he recalls that the sacking of cabinet Ministers aligned to PF-ZAPU from government and the unlawful detention of senior ZIPRA commanders sparked an exodus of ZIPRA ex-fighters from the army. According to Sibanda, many ZIPRA ex-combatants quit the army as they felt they no longer had any representation in government and in the military circles (Interview, 2017). A closer scrutiny of the case of the arms caches, especially the circumstances surrounding their 'discovery' indicate that to a large extent, the issue was politicised and also stage managed in order for ZANU-PF to get a pretext to eliminate PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants.

The motivation for the caching of arms during the transition period was both political and security-oriented (Sibanda, 2005; Hoffman and Nyathi (1990) in Mashike, 2000). Lot revealed that they cached quite a lot of weapons around Mashumbi Pools AP in Mashonaland West in 1980 just in case they were attacked by ZANLA after the election results (Interview with Lot who was a driver and responsible for supplying ZIPRA cadres with weapons during the liberation struggle, 2017). However, some of the arms were cached for use against a ZANU-

PF government should PF-ZAPU lose the election. There were some hard core ZIPRA cadres who did not want to think of any prospects of a ZANU-PF government (Interview with Mr X, 2017). The fact that the cached weapons were not used to destabilise a ZANU-PF government on a larger scale was due to the fact that PF-ZAPU leaders did not support any planned violent manoeuvres by ZIPRA against ZANU-PF government.

Since PF-ZAPU political leaders did not support any moves to topple the government through unconstitutional means, it can be noted that the caching of arms had no blessings from them and it could not be true that they were planning a coup against ZANU-PF. To a large extent, the caching of arms was common security guarantee that had the blessings of some senior military commanders from both ZANLA and ZIPRA. The late General Vitalis Zvinavashe (former commander of Zimbabwe Defence Forces) made it clear to Dzinesa that indeed ZANLA cached arms and that was mainly done for security reasons (Dzinesa, 2005:89). In one of the interviews that Dzinesa had with him in 2004, Zvinavashe stated that:

> Fighting groups surrendered their weapons to the national armoury and these were registered with their serial numbers. However, not every weapon was surrendered. Some fighters were uncertain of the ceasefire and feared the worst should the war restart. So, some hid weapons. This partly explains the presence of arms caches. In every (armed) revolution it is difficult to account for every weapon (Dzinesa, 2005:89).

Zvinavashe's point is corroborated by what the former President, Robert Mugabe told mourners during the burial of Murozvi, who was declared a national hero and buried in Harare at the national shrine on 12 April 2017. Mugabe told the mourners that James Murozvi was one among thousands of ZANLA guerrillas that ZANU-PF kept outside APs in readiness for any eventuality (Live television broadcast on 12 April 2017). It is obvious that these guerrillas that ZANU-PF kept outside APs could have cached their weapons. One therefore is persuaded to agree with Hoffman and Nyathi (1990) cited in Mashike (2000) in their assertion that both

ZANLA and ZIPRA military leaders instructed their guerrillas to hide arms for security reasons.

The reason for focussing on the arms caches by ZANLA guerrillas is simple. It is meant to debunk the myth that ZIPRA guerrillas cached arms with the sole intention of toppling a ZANU-PF government. Both guerrilla forces cached weapons and military leaders from both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU knew about that. Although the idea of fighting against a ZANU-PF government could have been initially part of the ZIPRA motives in caching arms, the idea dissipated when Joshua Nkomo told them to support the new government.

The arms cache 'discovery' was more likely part of the political ploy by ZANU-PF to capitalise on the traditional rivalry between ZIPRA and ZANLA and then to eliminate the former. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) argues that the government happily capitalised on the so-called arms cache 'discovery' on ZIPRA farms to pick up a fight with PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants. The story was manipulated and then used as one of the clearest examples and exhibits that indicated ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU were counter-revolutionaries and bitter losers who were scheming to violently depose a democratically elected government (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006).

Further adding on to the impossibility of having cached arms with the motive of staging a coup is Comrade Cecil Banda's revelations. Banda was Brigade Chief of Logistics for ZIPRA at Gwaai River Mine AP in 1980. Banda argued that:

> If the motive for caching arms was to topple ZANU-PF government, then we could all (ZIPRA) have rushed to all the places where we had cached the arms immediately after we heard about ZANU-PF electoral victory; took up arms and rendered the country ungovernable through physical violence if we so wished. We hid arms for security reasons. It is for this reason that l prefer to call the so-called 'arms cache discovery' an 'arms cache scandal'. It was a scandal not an arms discovery because ZANU-PF knew very well that arms were hidden all over the country by both ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas, but decided to blame only ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU in order to get an excuse to eliminate us. In fact, you cannot discover

> something which you have prior knowledge of its existence (Interview with Banda, 2017).

Banda's version of the reasons behind the caching of the weapons could be true for some not all of the ZIPRA combatants. As would be seen later, some ZIPRA ex-combatants were against any propects of a ZANU-PF government such that they could have cached weapons with the intention of opposing and destabilising it.

Alao (2012) believes that some of the arms could have been cached for use by the UMkhonto WeSizwe guerrillas of the South African National Congress. An interview with A. Mpofu pointed to the fact that the Umkhonto WeSizwe story in relation to the arms caches is true although not all arms which were hidden were earmarked for the South African guerrillas. Mpofu highlighted that ZIPRA commanders told them that it was better if they gave their heavy weapons to UMkhonto WeSizwe guerrillas for use in their struggle against Apartheid than to donate them to a ZANU-PF government (Interview with Mpofu who was one of the ZIPRA cadres involved in caching weapons, 2017). This further indicates the high levels of mistrust and rivalry between ZANLA and ZIPRA.

The line of thinking by ZIPRA commanders regarding helping UMkhonto WeSizwe rather than ZANU-PF gives ample evidence that ZIPRA ex-combatants did not like a ZANU-PF government. It would be an exaggeration therefore to suggest that ZIPRA ex-combatants were mere innocent victims of ZANLA harassment. The relationships between the two were mutually antagonistic. It is possible that a PF-ZAPU constituted government could have also persecuted and marginalised ZANU-PF and ZANLA ex-combatants. What made PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants to be at the losing end is that ZANU-PF had political power and controlled the state media through which it disseminated anti-ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU propaganda.

Nkomo (1984) is of the view that the hiding of arms could have intensified during the period of fighting between ZIPRA and ZANLA former guerrillas at APs. Nkomo substantiates his view by stating that the locations of the arms cache sites were close to APs where factional fighting once took place and it is possible that arms could have been hidden during the course of fighting. Arms caches were discovered at Hampton Ranch near Connemara Barracks and also at Ascot Farm which is about less than eleven kilometres from the then Entumbane AP (Nkomo, 1984).

5.7.2 Circumstances Surrounding the Arms Cache 'Discovery'

The timing of the arms cache 'discovery' was well calculated. It coincided with the period when ZIPRA cadres had been completely disarmed following the second clash between them and ZANLA at Entumbane in February 1981 (Alao, 2012). The timing of the arms cache 'discovery' was strategically convenient for ZANU-PF to offload PF-ZAPU from the coalition government since the latter had assisted in ensuring that ZIPRA was disarmed. Alao (2012:81) opines that:

> When they were first discovered (arms caches), the government believed that Nkomo had not outlived his usefulness; integration was still going on and Mugabe did not know what the reaction of the ZIPRA guerrillas would be if Nkomo were to be punished. Thus, the government waited for a more favourable time to deal with the arms cache issue, and February 1982 was considered perfect. The integration of the armed forces was almost over, and the Entumbane experience had given Mugabe the confidence he needed to deal with the issue. He could also count on the former Rhodesian African Rifles and the white-piloted air force to deal with any problem that could emerge.

Sibanda (2005) supports Alao's view by arguing that the arms caches had to be 'discovered' after ZIPRA was completely disarmed and scattered around. The 'discovery' was supposed to be at a time when ZIPRA forces were already incapacitated since the Prime Minister was unsure how they would respond to the victimisation of their former superiors, both in the political and military fields. The case of the identification of the location of arms caches at Gwaai in May 1981 by Soneni Sando serves to corroborate the above argument. This was long

before the 'official' arms cache 'discovery' by the government in February 1982 but was kept a secret (Doran, 2017).

Nkomo (1984) also believes that although weapons were 'discovered' in and around ZIPRA-owned farms, ZANU-PF investigators could have ferried some weapons from other places at night and dumped them on ZIPRA farms to swell the number of the 'discovered' weapons in order to build a big case against ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU and justify their suppression. From the above analysis, one can deduce that ZANU-PF was guided by the spirit of eliminating PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA in DDR processes not that of accommodating them. In Doran's (2017:15) words:

> The focus of Mugabe's attention during the first year of Zimbabwe's independence was to eliminate ZIPRA because ZAPU had to be disarmed before it could be taken apart politically.

Nkomo's suspicion that ZANU-PF could have clandestinely swelled the quantity of weapons on ZIPRA properties is based on the fact that although he travelled together with Mnangagwa from Harare to Bulawayo in February 1982, he (Mnangagwa) did not hint to him that the purpose of his journey was to investigate arms caches on ZIPRA-owned farms. Nkomo reveals that he was shocked in the evening of that day when Mnangagwa reported on national television that stock piles of weapons had been 'discovered' on two ZIPRA farms (Nkomo, 1984). These developments were a testimony that political and military rivals in Zimbabwe could not effectively conduct DDR processes alone without assistance from external players who would help them to reconcile and develop trust and confidence in each other. They could not do that on their own. In South Africa, political and military rivals were able to work together in DDR programs because they immediately developed trust and confidence in each other after independence. Reconciliation and inclusivity initiatives in South Africa were made practical. However, in Zimbabwe, parties to the DDR process were not open and genuine to each other

and they failed to forgive and reconcile. In fact, reconciliation was never fully implemented, especially between rival African political and military formations.

Dzinesa (2005) concludes that the lingering legacy of mistrust and hostility between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU and between ZANLA and ZIPRA, continued to impede the DDR process. Furthermore, mutual mistrust, suspicion, rivalry and hostility immensely led to a partisan DDR process that was characterised by the blame and counter blame game between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. Even though there was no conclusive proof that linked ZIPRA ex-combatants to the arms caches besides the fact that they were found on two of their many properties, Alexander et al (2000:188) noted that:

> Mugabe treated the caches as definitive proof that PF-ZAPU had always been planning a coup; that it had held back forces and cached weapons in a final struggle to overthrow a ZANU-PF government.

In other words, through the arms caches, it can be argued that Mugabe had finally got a strong scapegoat that would enable him to destroy both ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU. Doran (2017:15) reveals that South African Intelligence indicate that Mugabe wanted to physically confront ZIPRA and nothing could stop him from pursuing and fulfilling that objective. Given the fear that ZANU-PF had on the superiority of ZIPRA, Doran argues that Mugabe wanted to show Joshua Nkomo that he was now on top of the situation through provoking a fight where he would convincingly trounce him militarily. A two-day rally held in Bulawayo that was addressed by Enos Nkala together with other prominent ZANU-PF politicians seems to have been meant to spark violent conflict and achieve Mugabe's dream. According to Doran (2017), ZANU-PF got what it wanted as fighting between ZIPRA and ZANLA exploded at Entumbane cantonment site on the second day of the rally.

It is also believed that the Rhodesian intelligence network could have been behind the identification of the location of the arms caches as part of their plan to keep the former

liberation movements and their former military wings divided and antagonistic to each other (Ngwenya, 2014; Doran, 2017). For example, intelligence supplied to ZANU-PF implicated ZIPRA ex-combatants in a series of bombings of strategic installations and assassination attempts on the Prime Minister. The strategy could have been meant to strengthen the evidence that indeed ZIPRA had cached arms with the intention of bringing down a ZANU-PF led government. In other words, the former Rhodesian Special Branch operatives wanted to make the accusations levelled by ZANU-PF against ZIPRA ex-combatants for caching arms appear real. The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (2005) documents these bombings in greater detail and they are worth noting due to their significance in contributing towards straining relations and in making ZANU-PF more suspicious of ZIPRA intentions.

On 25 July 1981, the Freedom Arch near Harare International Airport was damaged by an explosion. In December of the same year, the ZANU-PF headquarters were rocked by another massive explosion. As if that was not enough, there was an attempt on the Prime Minister's life on 26 June 1982. On the military side, powerful explosives pulverised the Inkomo Barracks armoury on 16 August 1981 whilst incendiary devices destroyed Thornhill Air Base in Gweru on 25 July 1982 (Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa, 2005:39-40). Although ZANU-PF pretended to be in a quandary pertaining to the source of all these subversive activities, it enthusiastically listened to sources that laid blame squarely on ZIPRA ex-combatants' shoulders.

Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005) state that it is very possible that South African-backed elements clandestinely got into Thornhill Air Base and planted explosive devices in the planes and also went to Cranborne military site in Harare and stole some weapons. The saboteurs could have capitalised on the well-known history of ZANLA-ZIPRA mistrust and fears to further stoke the fires of animosity. Alexander et al (2000) actually point out that ZANU-PF knew that these

subversive activities were sponsored by South Africa but ignored that as it wanted a pretext to decisively deal with ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU and subdue them.

The discussions on the arms caches and their 'discovery' point to the fact that the mistrusts and suspicions that existed between ZIPRA and ZANLA since the liberation struggle did not subside after independence. Instead their hostile relationships characterised the whole process of DDR. It is possible that ZANU-PF felt that it could not accomplish its political objectives when its rival was still intact. In order to weaken it, its military backbone had to be destroyed first. This meant that ZIPRA had to be marginalised in DDR processes. Measures that were taken by ZANU-PF in response to the arms cache 'discovery' provoked a trail of other developments which further compromised the DDR process as the chasm between ZANU-PF-PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA-ZANLA became very wide and dangerous. A 'Security Dilemma' intensified and prospects for reconciliation became dim.

5.8 ZIPRA Experiences within the ZNA

After the resignation of General Peter Walls in June 1980 and the ascendancy of former ZANLA commander Solomon Mujuru as the commander of the ZNA, the politicisation and ethnicisation of the army to serve ZANU-PF interests took centre stage. Kriger (2003:43) points out that right from the beginning of the integration process, Mujuru had envisaged an exclusively ZANLA constituted ZNA. Mujuru's thinking was predicated on the assumption that ZANLA guerrillas contributed more than ZIPRA towards the liberation of Zimbabwe. His perception was also shared by a majority of ZANU-PF politicians (Kriger, 2003).

5.8.1 Promotions

Due to the arms cache 'discovery', two key ZIPRA leaders were removed from the JHC. These were Dabengwa and Masuku. Many ZIPRA commanders were also removed from the ZNA on

grounds that they were complicit in the treasonous actions of their senior leaders. With the removal of the top ZIPRA leaders from the ZNA, the ground was open for the ZANLA ex-combatants to fill all the top leadership positions that were left vacant by the purged ZIPRA cadres (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). The merit-based criterion for promotions was discarded in favour of a politically-based criterion. Many ZIPRA cadres could not qualify for promotions in the latter criterion (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). These developments removed many ZIPRA ex-combatants from formal and paid employment and made their economic reintegration a challenge.

The case of Mazinyane and Dube illustrate the above situation clearly. Mazinyane was integrated into the ZNA in 1980 as a Captain. He was demoted to a lower rank during the period of friction between ZIPRA and ZANLA in the early 1980s, only to be re-promoted later but slowly after 1987. Mazinyane retired with the rank of Brigadier General whilst some ZANLA ex-combatants who were integrated into the ZNA with ranks below his had risen to ranks above Brigadier Generals by the time of his retirement (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017).

As for Dube, his rank at the time of integration was that of Major. However, when he retired from the ZNA in 2001, he had risen to a rank of Lieutenant Colonel. This meant that throughout a period of 21 years of service in the army, he maintained one rank and was only promoted once on the eve of his retirement (Interview with Dube, 2017). Dube has argued that the scenario that prevailed in the ZNA was interesting yet ridiculous in terms of promotions. He noted that some of the ZANLA cadres whom they re-trained after independence ended up commanding most senior ZIPRA cadres.

The consequence of the prevalence of ethnically-skewed promotions in the army that favoured ZANLA over ZIPRA caused the frustrations of many ZIPRA cadres who left the army before they reached their retirement ages. Once one left the army before reaching the pensionable age,

he or she lost all the benefits and went home empty-handed. More ZIPRA senior cadres continued to be dismissed from the ZNA under dubious charges. Examples of ex-ZIPRA fighters who were unfairly dismissed from the army included Charles Grey, Kindness Ndlovu, Tshili Nleya, Eddie Sigoge among others. These were dismissed, arrested and detained in 1985 on allegations that they were planning a coup against ZANU-PF (Alexander, et al, 2000). Once arrested and removed from the army, one not only lost his benefits, but also became vulnerable to unbridled physical harassment. To some extent, the harassment of former ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA could be regulated as opposed to that which took place outside. Due to fear, many ZIPRA ex-combatants left the army and went into hiding only to resurface after the Unity Accord in 1987. Whilst in hiding, they could not carryout any meaningful socio-political and economic activities which could facilitate their reintegration.

The strategy of arresting well experienced and senior ZIPRA ex-combatants seemed to be well calculated to diminish their influence within the ZNA and to pave way for ZANLA ex-combatants to assume leadership positions of the army. Except for Dabengwa, Masuku and a few others who were arrested and detained together with them, the other ZIPRA ex-combatants who were arrested in the mid-1980s were never brought before the courts to prove their innocence or guilt. That act proved that ZANU-PF knew that the accused ZIPRA cadres had no case to answer but were only targeted for victimisation as a strategy of removing them from the national army, especially senior ones.

It is not true that all ZIPRA ex-combatants were not promoted within the ZNA. Some of them were promoted. However, what was common in those few promotions is that the majority of the ZIPRA ex-combatants never went beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (Interview with Dube, 2017). Many ZIPRA cadres who held very senior positions during the liberation struggle like Eddie Sigoge, Swazini Ndlovu and Stanley Gagisa Nleya amongst others were dismissed from the army when they had risen to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. According to Gatsheni,

the strategy of not promoting ZIPRA ex-combatants beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel was deliberate as ZANU-PF did not want them to be full Colonels. The rank of full Colonel goes along with quite a number of benefits that are given by the state (Interview, 2017). By 1977, Sigoge and Gagisa were camp commanders and chief of staff respectively at the ZIPRA CGT camp in Zambia, and if it were not for the partisan promotions, they could have risen to the top echelons of the ZNA after independence (Sunday News, 16-22 July 2017).

One problem noted by Kriger (2003) pertaining to the status of the few ZIPRA officers within the ZNA between 1982 and 1987 is that these officers had no real power over junior ZANLA officers as they refused to recognise ZIPRA promotions. Sigoge revealed his disappointment over his harassment by ZANU-PF when he preferred to be cremated rather than buried in any of the heroes' acres as is the norm when ex-combatants die. Sigoge died on 25 June 2017, and as per his wish, he was cremated on 3 July 2017 and his remains were thrown into the Zambezi River (Sunday News, 2-8 July 2017). Sigoge's case shows the level of frustration in some of ZIPRA ex-combatants over a partisan DDR process in Zimbabwe. What happened within the army directly affected demobilisation and reintegration. Whilst outside the army, some ZIPRA former guerrillas lived as outcasts for the better part of the 1980s, only to resurface after the Unity Accord of 1987. Socially and economically, they were unable to reintegrate.

Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) posit that it is prudent to give ex-combatants a stake in the post-conflict political and military structures so that they can feel respected and honoured. This could be achieved through making sure that the integration process incorporates representatives of all the armed forces from competing factions into a national army. The second strategy to achieve that is to appoint key military officers from all the military factions into strategic positions in the national army. However, what Humphreys and Weinstein suggest is difficult to achieve where formerly adversarial political and military groups have deeply entrenched hardline positions, bordering to some extent on ethnic and regional differences.

5.8.2 The Experience of the Ordinary ZIPRA Soldier in the ZNA

The experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were not on the command structure were almost similar, though they differed slightly depending on the unit one was attached to. A few ZIPRA ex-combatants who were integrated into specialist units like the Signals department, Maintenance, Health, Social Services, Intelligence Corps, Engineering, Pay Corps as well as those who became instructors, or were in the armoured cars division among other departments of the army fared better than their colleagues who were integrated into the infantry battalions dotted all around the country (Interview with Mpande; Ndazi and Sibanda who were in the Pay Corps, armoured cars division and training depot respectively, 2017).The administration of the Infantry Battalions was different from that of the specialist departments. Infantry Battalions accommodated the majority of the soldiers, and in most cases, they are located in the rural areas or on the outskirts of urban centres.

The level of professionalism and discipline was compromised in most of the Infantry Battalions. The reason could have been that the ruling party was meddling in the running of military affairs in a bid to create a 'politically correct' army. It was even worse for those ZIPRA ex-combatants who were posted to 2 Brigade, 3 Brigade, 4 Brigade and 5 Brigade. These Brigades are in Mashonaland, Manicaland, Masvingo and Midlands Provinces respectively (Interview with Sebata, a ZIPRA ex-combatant who was integrated into 3 Brigade in Manicaland, 2017). Sebata reveals that caricatures of Joshua Nkomo were usually found on dining hall, toilet, and canteen walls in different army barracks. In retaliation, ZIPRA ex-combatants also caricatured Robert Mugabe the former commander-in-chief of ZANLA during the liberation struggle (Interview, 2017). As a result of such minor issues, fist fights always ensued between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants which at times produced nasty results as dangerous weapons could be used at the end leading to deaths.

Stories that were told to the researcher by a couple of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were in the ZNA between 1982 and 1987 point to the fact that they had horrible experiences. A focus group discussion with Bhebhe, Mpofu, Ndebele, Moyo, and Mleya, all of whom were part of the integrated infantry battalions outside Matabeleland indicated that the survival of the ordinary ZIPRA ex-combatant in the ZNA in the early to mid-1980s was difficult. First, the five participants concurred that one of the survival strategies in the ZNA was to quickly learn the Shona language as a way of disguising oneself and to also identify with the system that was led by a predominantly Shona administration (Focus group discussion, 2017).

In fact, after the departure of many White instructors from the ZNA in mid-1980 to 1981, the Shona language became the 'official' medium of instruction in the army. Even after learning the Shona language for survival purposes, it is said that many ZIPRA ex-combatants were 'sold-out' by their Ndebele names and surnames which were used to link them to PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA (Focus group discussion, 2017). It can be noticed that mistrust and hostility continued to prevail between rival ex-combatant groups even within the national army. Due to continued victimisation, some ex-ZIPRA cadres deserted the army with their weapons, further adding to the stockpile of unofficial weapons that were outside the control of the government.

In one focus group discussion, Bhebhe articulated that routine roll calls every morning exposed ZIPRA ex-combatants to both physical and verbal abuse on a daily basis. ZIPRA ex-combatants who were Shona-speaking and had Shona names and surnames fared better as they were able to successfully disguise themselves as former ZANLA cadres and became exempt from physical harassment and from being labelled as 'dissidents' or 'dissident sympathisers.' It became a 'crime' for ZIPRA ex-combatants to be seen discussing in groups of about five or more within the ZNA (Focus group discussion, 2017). It was alleged that they would be discussing about deserting and joining their colleagues who were 'dissidents.' Ndebele remembers very well that one day the commander of 4.1 Brigade in Masvingo called him and

said ‘Iwe mudissident! Huya pano.’ In the English language it means, ‘You dissident! Come here.’

When Ndebele went to him, he was smacked first and asked about Joshua Nkomo and the whereabouts of other ‘dissidents’ (Interview, 2017). This could be viewed as one of the strategies meant to frustrate ZIPRA ex-combatants so that they could leave the army. What is interesting is that although ZIPRA was a multi-ethnic army; the full brunt of verbal and physical abuse fell on the shoulders of Ndebele-speaking ZIPRA ex-combatants only. This speaks volumes about the negative effects of the politicisation of ethnicity in nation building as well in the creation of a national army. The use of Shona language as a medium of communication in a multi-ethnic army unambiguously depicted disregard for the ZIPRA ex-combatants. The majority of ZIPRA ex-combatants were Ndebele speaking. In fact, the winner-loser relationship that was prevalent on the political front cascaded into the army and ZIPRA ex-combatants who were viewed as ‘losers’ had to quickly learn the Shona language in order to survive in the army. One indicator of successful DDR is the security of ex-combatants, both physical and human security. ZIPRA ex-combatants could not be said to have gone through successful DDR processes whilst quite a number of them were vulnerable to physical persecution.

The victimisation was not only confined to being accused of being ‘dissidents’ and forced to learn the Shona language. ZIPRA ex-combatants who were granted official leave by the army faced some daunting challenges on the way to their destinations. Before their departure, names and villages of origin were always noted down. When they left the barracks *en route* to their destinations they encountered police roadblocks from all the routes leading out of the barracks. They were always searched, tortured, beaten and/or arrested and detained despite having official leave passes. Some of them were shot in cold blood during altercations with security agents in those roadblocks (Interview with Ndebele and Bhebhe, 2017). For Ndebele and

Bhebhe, the roadblocks were specifically mounted for purposes of dealing with ZIPRA ex-combatants who were released from the barracks.

It can be noticed that life for ZIPRA ex-combatants was not only tough within the barracks, but also outside as well. Some of those who managed to reach their destinations were always followed up using the personal contact details they left behind. They were always accused of sympathising with the 'dissidents' or of having hidden arms in their houses and homesteads. Such accusations usually resulted in severe beatings, torture and even death (Interview with Bhebhe and Ndebele, 2017). Due to the security challenges of the period, especially in relation to the ZIPRA ex-combatants, those who were injured during the course of beatings and torture could not seek treatment in government-run health institutions because government institutions would require police reports detailing the circumstances surrounding the injury before attending to the patient. Ndebele said that in most cases, the police officers could not write reports on the injuries sustained by ZIPRA ex-combatants at the hands of security agents because they either worked in cahoots with the system or feared to be labelled as 'dissident sympathisers' as well (Interview, 2017).

Most of the injured ZIPRA ex-combatants therefore sought medical attention at Private Hospitals where fees were exorbitant (Interview with Ndebele, 2017). ZIPRA ex-combatants who were arrested at police roadblocks and then later detained sometimes failed to report back for duty on time. When they finally reported for duty, they were accused of having taken advantage of their leave days to feed vital security information to the 'dissidents.' They were also punished for their 'transgressions.' Quite a number of ZIPRA ex-combatants were physically and verbally abused in the 1980s. Some of the ZIPRA ex-combatants were killed at night by their ZANLA counterparts in the barracks. Mleya revealed that he was saved from being killed at Connemara barracks by one ex-combatant called Mbedzi, a ZANLA ex-combatant who was Venda like Mleya. Mleya explained that:

> Mbedzi heard ZANLA ex-combatants plotting to assassinate me at night. Although Mbedzi was a ZANLA ex-combatant he sympathised with me since we were both Venda from Beitbridge. Mbedzi revealed the plot to me. At night l placed my pillow under my blankets to appear as if there was someone sleeping and then l left to sleep with a friend. When l checked my room in the morning, l found out that my bed was completely burnt from a grenade that had been thrown in through the window at night (Interview with Mleya, 2017).

Mleya's attempted murder case illustrate that there was physical elimination of ZIPRA ex-combatants in the ZNA. The fears of ZIPRA ex-combatants were exacerbated by the mysterious 'disappearances' of some of their colleagues in broad daylight. Mleya pointed out that he actually witnessed the 'disappearance' of five ZIPRA ex-combatants from Connemara barracks. These ex-combatants were called aside during one morning parade, bundled into a small vehicle and whisked away after being beaten and accused of being 'dissidents.' They never came back and Mleya concludes that it is obvious that they were clandestinely killed since he personally knew two of them as well as their villages of origin, but have never seen them to date (Interview, 2017). Nilsson (2005) states that physical security guarantees to ex-combatants are essential to prevent them from rearming. Some of the ZIPRA ex-combatants who could not bear the brunt of victimisation in the ZNA deserted with their weapons and became a security threat to the government.

Bhebe (2004b) cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) explains that it was only those who were at the periphery of the liberation struggle who misunderstood the post-colonial conflict in Zimbabwe because of their failure to grasp and appreciate the level of rivalry between ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA. Bhebe's argument is that it is possible to imagine that even if it was PF-ZAPU that could have won the elections and formed the government, it is likely that it could have also used its military force to build a solid political power base and would have purged its rivals in the process.

Tensions between ex-ZIPRA and ex-ZANLA elements within the ZNA also ran high during the campaigns for the 1985 elections (Sithole, 1999). Although members of the national army

are supposed to be apolitical, the origins of both ZIPRA and ZANLA within the political context of the liberation struggle made it difficult for them to stay aloof from political contests that involved their respective political parties. However, ZIPRA ex-combatants could not openly express their support for PF-ZAPU as ZANLA ex-combatants did for ZANU-PF (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). ZIPRA ex-combatants feared to be harassed or killed because by 1985, the top leadership of the ZNA was solidly behind ZANU-PF.

When ZIPRA ex-combatants in the army told some of their colleagues who had disarmed and demobilised some terrifying stories about their victimisation, some of them became frightened and went back to their former operational zones and unearthed weapons they had hidden during the liberation struggle (Interview with X, 2017). This was done for self-defence but they could not go around villages wielding them which meant that they automatically became 'dissidents' (Interview with SaSidudla, 2017). As long as ZANLA ex-combatants and the government had a perception and feeling that all ZIPRA ex-combatants were 'dissidents' they could not tolerate and work with them smoothly and that mentality affected all DDR programs negatively and ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered the most.

The unfortunate development in Zimbabwe is that critical decisions and powers to do with military integration were made by ZANU-PF Central Committee that usurped the authority and powers of the JHC after the collapse of the GNU in 1982 (Kriger, 2003). What could be expected was nothing less than the politicisation of the integration process at the expense of ZIPRA ex-combatants who had no political clout in the post-colonial dispensation. The case of Zimbabwe concerning the military is a spectacular one because, instead of being a safe haven for various people with different backgrounds as the army is expected to be an apolitical and professional institution, the ZNA was vulnerable to partisan interests that were fuelled by inter-party tension, suspicion, and hostility.

5.9 The Plight of Demobilised ZIPRA Ex-Combatants

Demobilised ZIPRA cadres were not safe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) points out that many of the demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants were always picked up, beaten, interrogated, tortured or even killed by members of the 5th Brigade. As from 1982, ZIPRA ex-combatants who had been formally demobilised were increasingly subjected to arrests and harassment (CCJP, 1997). Detention camps were specifically set up at St. Paul in Lupane; in Tsholotsho, in Plumtree air strip and at Bhalagwe in Kezi where the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) interrogated and tortured ZIPRA ex-combatants (CCJP, 1997). If ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants developed the spirit of brotherhood while they were at APs, they would have mitigated the types of antagonisms that characterised their relationships in post-independence.

The CIO and members of the 5th Brigade used a couple of strategies to identify whether one was an ex-combatant or not. According to Ncube, they usually asked men who were about twenty years and above where they were between 1976 and 1979. Furthermore, they conducted thorough searches in homesteads where paraphernalia like belts, caps, jackets, photos and knives which the guerrillas brought from the countries where they trained were found and were used as evidence that one was involved in the armed struggle. Besides that, the Post Office Savings books which were used to receive demobilisation allowances 'sold-out' many ZIPRA ex-combatants to the CIO and 5th Brigade (Interview with Ncube who survived in the hands of the CIO in Tsholotsho, 2017). Ncube pointed out that once one was identified as a ZIPRA ex-combatant; he was tortured and, in some cases, finally shot. By shooting ZIPRA ex-combatants, the members of the 5th Brigade were saying they wanted to show the civilian population how a 'dissident' was treated (Interview, 2017).

Mazinyane made it clear that the main targets of the 5th Brigade were demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants although the general civilian population in Matatbeleland was also targeted and

terrorised. In explaining the predicament of the demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants in the hands of the 5th Brigade, Mazinyane (Interview, 2017) said:

> When confronted by the 5th Brigade, PF-ZAPU officials could discard their party cards and buy ZANU-PF cards and become ZANU-PF members. The same applied to PF-ZAPU supporters in general. They could buy ZANU-PF cards and chant its slogans in order to buy their freedom and save their lives. With regards to ZIPRA ex-combatants, there was no way they could rub off their ZIPRA status and become ZANLA. If one was ZIPRA or ZANLA there was no way that status could be changed.

To make matters worse, ZIPRA ex-combatants who got injured in the hands of the 5th Brigade feared to seek medical treatment at government hospitals as they could be identified that they were ZIPRA ex-combatants which could have led to even more harassment. Injured ZIPRA ex-combatants therefore sought treatment from traditional healers who were not effectively equipped to deal with physical injuries (Interview with SaSidudla, 2017). SaSidudla made it clear that when he came from the liberation war, he had no physical scars but sustained life-threatening injuries at home when he was tortured by the 5th Brigade.

The evidence on the harsh experiences that were endured by the ZIPRA ex-combatants is corroborated by Brickhill (1995:166) who writes that:

> ZAPU's ex-combatants in particular, suffered greatly during the period of inter-party conflict. They were excluded from many job opportunities within the state sector and were singled out in the hunt for 'dissidents' during the deployment of the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland. Many were killed, several hundred ZAPU ex-combatants were detained, and many more were harassed during this period.

Those who could not be caught disguised their liberation war credentials whilst many flocked to the safety of the urban areas where the 5th Brigade was not deployed. Quite many eloped to neighbouring South Africa and Botswana (Interview with Dumani, 2017). ZANU-PF government's partiality in the implementation of the DDR process made it difficult for demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants to report the abuse they endured in the hands of the state security agents. The abuse of the demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants continued up to the end of 1987 when ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU merged through a unity accord. It can be concluded

that the aim of ZANU-PF was to break up the base of PF-ZAPU support and establish a one-party state. Political leaders could not therefore leave such a situation unattended and think that it would resolve itself. They were supposed to adjust their thinking in the light of the prevailing or changing circumstances and engage into active consensus, trust, tolerance, and confidence building mechanisms to avoid discrimination and fighting between ex-combatants.

5.10 ZIPRA Ex-Combatants' Experiences in the Reintegration Programs

One critical argument raised in chapter one was that it was within the interests of ZANU-PF to disarm ZIPRA guerrillas, but it was not in their same interests to ensure that they were empowered through viable reintegration programs. However, some of the challenges that affected ZIPRA ex-combatants in reintegration programs also affected ZANLA ex-combatants but in varying degrees of intensity. Differential reintegration experiences between ZIPRA and ZANLA were manifest from the earliest years due to security challenges that mainly inhibited the former from smoothly carrying out their day to day activities as free civilians.

5.10.1 Monetary Benefits

It is a fact that the monetary benefits to the ex-combatants that were distributed through the Demobilisation Directorate were inadequate to facilitate effective economic reintegration. However, security-related challenges compounded the predicament of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in relation to accessing the demobilisation payments of Z$185 per month over a period of two years. Kriger (2005:252) aptly put across the predicament of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in this way:

> Demobilised ZIPRA cadres often forsook collecting their two-year monthly payments from Post Offices rather than risk being identified and victimised.

There are a number of ZIPRA ex-combatants who ran away to seek sanctuary in South Africa after the arms cache 'discovery' in 1982 and lost the opportunity to benefit from the two-year

demobilisation payments. Mathwasa left Zimbabwe to South Africa at the end of 1981 after a short stint in the ZNA and came back into the country after 1987 (Interview with Mathwasa, a ZIPRA ex-combatant who left the ZNA and went to South Africa, 2017). Although the small amount of the demobilisation stipends negatively affected both ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants it was better for those ex-combatants who got their money as a lump sum. Those who got lump sums of Z$4 440 could at least invest in immovable properties. Sadomba (2011) cites the case of a Mr Mhaka who had become a destitute after the liberation struggle but was assisted by Mudzingwa who was once a member of the ZIPA High Command to receive his lump sum of Z$4 440 at once instead of the monthly Z$185. Michael (2006) supports the idea of giving ex-combatants lump sum payments in that lump sums give them the opportunity to make investments, which may be difficult to achieve through smaller instalment payments. Mhaka was able to buy himself a house in the low-density suburb of Waterfalls in Harare (Sadomba, 2011). The situation was different with ZIPRA ex-combatants. They lacked influential people in the corridors of political and military institutions who could support and help them.

Todd (2007) states that in the early to mid-1980s; most of the ZIPRA ex-combatants were physically insecure and kept on running away from state security agents. In areas that were hard hit by the 5th Brigade like Tsholotsho in Matabeleland North and Kezi in Matabeleland South, some ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised in 1981 burnt their Post Office Savings Bank books because these books were used by the 5th Brigade to identify former ZIPRA fighters. Ndatshi who hails from Kezi says that he destroyed his Savings book together with some of his colleagues and forfeited their demobilisation allowances which they used to collect from Plumtree town (Interview with Ndatshi, a ZIPRA ex-combatant who demobilised in 1981, 2017). Kriger (2003) also mentions that some ZIPRA ex-combatants did not collect their demobilisation allowances because the directorate staff often reported suspected ZIPRA

army deserters to the security forces who were then arrested whilst queueing up for their pay. In fact, due to these challenges, three quarters of ZIPRA ex-combatants in the Bango area of Kezi in Matabeleland South eloped to South Africa and left all their pension payments behind (Kriger, 2003:139).

After the official termination of the demobilisation allowances at the end of 1983, the other monetary benefits which the ex-combatants received were channelled through the WVCF. This was mainly in the 1990s. As alluded to earlier, the fund was susceptible to massive looting. As a result, it failed to a large extent to benefit those who urgently needed government support. What has to be clarified is that since the fund was administered from Harare, even some ZIPRA ex-combatants who heard about the fund could not access it. There were varied reasons for this.

According to I.G, fear of being caught and arrested by ZANU-PF was the major reason why ZIPRA ex-combatants could not dare go to Harare to process their compensation (Interview, 2017). Even those who conquered fear and wished to travel to Harare, there were twin problems of lack of bus fares and accommodation. By the early 1990s, many ZIPRA ex-combatants were in dire poverty to such an extent that they could not raise adequate bus fares to and from Harare. The processing of compensation forms including medical check-ups took several days or even weeks. This presented another challenge for many ZIPRA ex-combatants who had neither friends nor relatives in Harare. Harare is in the heart of Mashonaland which is around 500-600 kilometres from Matabeleland where most of the ZIPRA ex-combatants reside. Other ZIPRA ex-combatants were very angry against the government to such an extent that they turned their backs on anything that was associated with ZANU-PF. That was due to the harassment and marginalisation they had endured in the hands of ZANU-PF in the 1980s (Interview, 2017). Hardline positions by some ZIPRA ex-combatants who had opportunities to benefit from the WVCF did not help since they left themselves out.

From the list of people who were identified as the major fraudsters in the WVCF, there is no single name of people linked to ZIPRA or PF-ZAPU. All the culprits who siphoned the WVCF are linked to the former ZANLA or to ZANU-PF. According to the Anti-corruption Trust of Southern Africa (2012), the former Vice President of Zimbabwe, Joyce Mujuru was declared 55% disabled and was awarded Z$389 474 compensation; the former commander of the air force of Zimbabwe, Perence Shiri was declared 50% disabled and was given Z$90 249, Augustine Chihuri, the former Commissioner General of the Police had a disability percentage of 20% and benefitted Z$138 664 from the WVCF and Edgar Tekere, the former Secretary General of ZANU-PF was found with a disability percentage of 90% and siphoned a whopping Z$262 162 from the fund. The same kind of corruption undermined DDR in Afghanistan where the distribution of DDR support was regionally-biased. Cash handed out to the ex-combatants ended in the pockets of their commanders in Afghanistan (Simonetta and Antonio, 2006).

All the examples of beneficiaries of the WVCF cited above were in one time or another in high positions in ZANU-PF or were in command positions in ZANLA during the liberation struggle. The point that is made here is that there were differential experiences between ex-combatants from ZANLA and ZIPRA sides in terms of access to monetary benefits given by the government to cater for their welfare. It does not matter whether the access was through legal or fraudulent means. Besides monetary benefits, the other areas which were meant to facilitate the ex-combatants' reintegration were in the government's prioritisation of their needs in the education sector; employment sector, land distribution, and co-operative schemes. ZIPRA ex-combatants had a separate project where they bought properties to cater for their demobilised as well as disabled cadres. The following section will briefly focus on ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in each one of the above-mentioned sectors.

5.10.2 Schooling and Educational Opportunities

As noted earlier, the government encouraged ex-combatants to continue with their education after the liberation struggle. The aim was to enhance their opportunities in the job market considering the fact that other people remained learning whilst they lost educational opportunities whilst in the struggle. However, resources to support the education of the ex-combatants were always inadequate. Lack of school fees and qualified teachers as well as walking long distances to and from rural schools were part of the general problems that confronted both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants who decided to go back to school after the war (Barnes, 1995).

Added to the above problems, ZIPRA ex-combatants who went back to school faced another challenge that was security-related. ZIPRA ex-combatants who were learning at rural day Secondary Schools and Boarding Schools in the countryside were always harassed by the 5th Brigade on allegations that they were 'dissidents.' It was always a common occurrence in the 1980s that 5th Brigade members harassed and beat ZIPRA ex-combatants who were learning during assembly periods in front of other pupils (Interviews with Berry, I.G, and Leornard, 2017). As a result of harassment in schools that were situated in the rural areas, many ZIPRA ex-combatants 'chose' to relocate to expensive boarding schools in and around urban areas as these schools provided better security than the rural ones. However, learning at boarding schools economically suffocated them because of expensive fees which could not be covered by the meagre Z$185 demobilisation allowance they got per month.

Berry left Matshinke Secondary Schoool in rural Plumtree district and continued his education at Tennyson Hlabangana High School in Bulawayo due to security risks that he suffered at the hands of both the 5th Brigade and 'dissidents.' The 5th Brigade accused him of being a 'dissident' whilst the 'dissidents' accused him of being a saboteur who was supporting a

government that was victimising them (Interview with Berry, one of the ZIPRA ex-combatants who demobilised and decided to go back to school, 2017). Mleya also left schools that he could afford in rural Beitbridge district to Solusi High School on the outskirts of Bulawayo due to harassment by the 5th Brigade (Interview, 2017). In a separate incident, Leonard Ndlovu was taken by members of the 5th Brigade from Manama High School in Gwanda in 1983 to Guyu Police Camp where he was beaten and detained for several days (Interview, 2017). ZIPRA ex-combatants could not effectively concentrate on their studies whilst the threat of physical abuse was hovering above their heads.

Not only was 5th Brigade wrath directed against ZIPRA ex-combatants who were at schools learning, but also against the teaching staff that could be linked to ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU. Moses Mzila-Ndlovu went to the struggle after acquiring a teaching qualification. He re-joined the teaching profession after the war but was forced to leave his profession in Matabeleland North in the early 1980s due to harassment by state security agents who accused him of being a 'dissident' (Interview, 2017). On the contrary, ZANLA ex-combatants who went back to school did not meet security risks of being beaten by state security agents. TM who was one of Barnes' participants in his research proves this point. TM dropped from Rimbi Secondary School in 1981 due to lack of school fees (Barnes, 1995).

Besides the issue of physical harassment of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were attending school, it was also difficult for them to access most of the government support. Of course, some of them benefitted from scholarships that came through the government. However, quite a number of them were fearful to come forward and volunteer their personal details because they could be traced and harassed using those details. Mleya confided that even though he heard about the 3 400 scholarships that were availed by the government of Canada, he could not utilise them as he feared to come forward and complete the forms because of what had almost happened to him at Connemara barracks when he survived an assassination attempt (Interview with Mleya,

2017). No doubt, ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants had differential experiences in the education sector after independence.

5.10.3 The Co-operative Scheme

The co-operative scheme is one of the strategies that ensure that ex-combatants become self-sustaining by providing them with employment (ILO, 2010). Ex-combatants who are productively employed stop to look up to the government for economic support. The general performance of the ex-combatants' co-operatives in Zimbabwe was not pleasing owing to a couple of difficulties. These difficulties included insufficient funding, lack of business skills amongst ex-combatants as well as drought for those co-operatives with an inclination towards agriculture. One problem that was peculiar to co-operatives that were owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants was meddling by government security agents. The meddling disturbed the operations of the co-operatives. The meddling was politically-motivated and contributed partly to the folding up of some of the co-operatives.

According to Musemwa (1994), ZANU-PF alleged that ZIPRA-owned co-operatives were used for generating money and caching weapons in order to support the 'dissidents.' The perception was particularly pronounced after the alleged arms cache 'discovery' on ZIPRA-owned farms. A case of Mbuso and his colleagues is cited by Musemwa (1994) as a clear example of how ZANU-PF meddling in the co-operatives owned and operated by ZIPRA ex-combatants disrupted viable and normal activities thereby leading to their decline. Mbuso and other three ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised established a co-operative venture for farming about 20km outside Bulawayo. However, Mbuso and his colleagues were continuously harassed, arrested, intimidated and interrogated on allegations that they supported 'dissidents.' After being detained for three months in 1984, Mbuso and his compatriots eventually

abandoned their co-operative to the safety of urban centres (Musemwa, 1994). Many co-operatives owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants crumbled under similar circumstances.

Incidents of harassment and meddling by ZANU-PF agents were prevalent throughout the country on co-operatives that were owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants. For example, members of the Simukai Collective Farming Co-operative Society in Seke communal lands in Mashonaland East were harassed only because they were ZIPRA ex-combatants (Musemwa, 1994). Even small business ventures by ZIPRA ex-combatants were not spared. Ndlovu and his colleagues were forced to abandon their security company, Guard Alert in Bulawayo, in 1984 because of constant searches and harassment by state security agents who argued that the company was used to hide arms and to generate money to support the 'dissidents' (Interview with Ndlovu, a ZIPRA ex-combatant who was involved in co-operative schemes, 2017).

ZIPRA ex-combatants who formed security companies were particularly targeted for harassment because it was thought that these companies were used as a conduit for sourcing weapons from different suppliers which could then be passed on to the 'dissidents' (Interview with Ndlovu, 2017). Another co-operative that was affected by PF-ZAPU-ZANU-PF rift was the Zenzele co-operative in Bulawayo. It faltered when all its members were locked up on accusations that they were 'dissidents' and were therefore hiding arms in their premises. Their best bus was also destroyed by security agents (Kriger, 2003).

However, since no arms were ever found on the premises of co-operatives, the only feasible explanation for the disruption of the economic activities of ZIPRA ex-combatants could be located in their antagonistic relationships with ZANU-PF dating back to the liberation struggle. Security-related challenges crippled most ZIPRA-owned co-operatives. The mindset of competition and hostility that undermined a couple of mooted political and military unification efforts between ZANU and ZAPU during the liberation struggle persisted into the

independence era and disturbed effective demobilisation and reintegration, especially among ZIPRA ex-combatants. The UNDPKO (1999) proposes that ex-combatants who form co-operatives should be encouraged and supported. One way of encouraging and supporting them is through availing funds to the co-operatives. Furthermore, it is also suggested that these co-operative schemes be in different zones in order to benefit as many people as possible.

5.10.4 ZIPRA Ex-Combatants' Properties

ZIPRA ex-combatants devised a unique strategy of buying properties to cater for their economic reintegration into civil society. This was a form of investment. However, all their properties were taken away by the government in 1982 as a retributive strategy for the arms cache 'discovery.' To date, ZIPRA-owned properties have not been returned to their owners. ZIPRA ex-combatants believe that their properties were confiscated under dubious circumstances whereby ZANU-PF planted weapons in their properties, especially those in Matabeleland in order to ethnicise the issue and have a pretext to eliminate ZIPRA ex-combatants who were Ndebele speaking. Properties owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants spread across the country, but government security agents mainly targeted those in Matabeleland and the Midlands and this seems to have been calculated to smear ZIPRA ex-combatants and justify the deployment of the 5th Brigade (Interview with Iphithule Maphosa, ZAPU spokesperson, 2017).

It would be difficult to know exactly the number of ZIPRA ex-combatants who partook in the purchase of properties because PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA records were confiscated by ZANU-PF at the height of the hostilities between the two in the early 1980s. However, what is clear is that PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA had a viable and long-term plan for its ex-combatants after the war. By the time of the compilation of this study, ZIPRA ex-combatants were still making frantic efforts to get back their properties after over thirty-six years of their seizure.

In one of the meetings that l attended at Castle Arms Motel where ZIPRA ex-combatants were discussing the issue of their properties, what l could observe was that they were actually disappointed over lack of government assistance pertaining to the 'mystery' surrounding their properties. They talked on top of their voices, appealed for the government to assist them to recover their properties whilst others threatened to take law into their hands and grab the properties by force since they knew them. They also argued that the government always promises to address their problem with regards to the return of their properties on the eve of every election since 2000 so as to hoodwink them to support and vote for ZANU-PF back into power.

The second observation also depicted results similar to the first one as the deliberations were characterised by anger and frustration (Personal observation of ZIPRA ex-combatants' behaviour, 2017). Even though ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU united to form one party in 1987, it seems it was a marriage of convenience between the elite groups of both parties because the unity did not significantly help the grassroots, especially ZIPRA ex-combatants who had been disadvantaged by a partisan DDR process of 1980-84.

Even if the properties were to be returned any time from now, it has to be noted that many of the genuine beneficiaries have since died and more so, they died in extreme poverty. Furthermore, most of the surviving beneficiaries are now old to such an extent that they cannot venture into any meaningful business activities. It is also doubtful that the dependants of those who have died could benefit given the fact that there is lack of accurate and up-to-date information on who contributed and who did not towards the purchase of the properties. Like the WVCF which was looted, it is possible that even if the properties are returned, they can go into the hands of the non-beneficiaries.

The lack of a lasting solution pertaining to the issue of the properties of ZIPRA ex-combatants also point to the challenges of a government led reintegration process when that government is in competition with one of the stakeholders to the DDR process. Although arms caches were 'discovered' on two of the ZIPRA-owned farms, the rationale behind the confiscation of the properties where arms were not found is questionable. The government did not only confiscate farms where arms were reportedly 'discovered', but went on to take cattle, pigs, chickens, garages and a fleet of vehicles. One is persuaded to agree with Kriger (2003) who concludes that the issue of the ZIPRA-owned properties became entangled in the web of the ruling party's (ZANU-PF) political vendetta against PF-ZAPU.

5.10.5 Employment and Job Opportunities

The ILO (2010) singles out productive employment of ex-combatants as one of the most crucial steps in promoting effective DDR, especially the reintegration process. Having taken cognisance of the ex-fighters' weak educational background, dearth of employable skills and inadequate or no start-up capital; the government had a deliberate policy that gave priority to the employment of ex-combatants. In some instances, both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants faced daunting challenges in securing decent employment due to stiff competition in the job market. For example, more than 25 000 ex-combatants were unemployed by 1990 (Kriger, 2003). This number included both ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants.

However, just like in other sectors, ZIPRA ex-combatants faced some discrimination in the job market that was deliberately caused by certain individuals who thought that ZIPRA ex-combatants should not enjoy privileges similar to those of ZANLA ex-combatants. To start with, the confiscation of ZIPRA-owned properties meant that thousands of ZIPRA ex-combatants employed in those properties lost their jobs. According to Sibanda (2005:254), NITRAM company had four farms and four businesses that employed around 4 000 ZIPRA

ex-combatants. NITRAM was a company under which all ZIPRA properties were registered. When the government confiscated it in 1982, all employees were laid off.

This happened simultaneously with loss of employment in the army by many ZIPRA ex-combatants who were unfairly dismissed. Mpande was unceremoniously dismissed from the ZNA in 1984 because he had delayed for duty by only one day due to transport problems from Bulawayo to Harare (Interview, 2017). Many ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered the same fate as Mpande. Kriger (2003) also adds that many ZIPRA ex-combatants who were illegally dismissed sought readmission into the ZNA after the Unity Accord but were unsuccessful. It was alleged that they had deserted with sinister motives and then only wanted to take advantage of the Unity Accord to get back into the army.

Further to this, some well-qualified ZIPRA ex-combatants were deliberately denied employment. The UNDPKO (1999) notes that it is always easy to reintegrate ex-combatants with specialised skills as they are employable in civilian sectors. However, that was not to be the case for several ZIPRA ex-combatants who possessed technical skills as they could not get employment. Some of the frustrated ZIPRA engineers and pilots went to South Africa where they offered their services to the Apartheid regime. However, they disguised their liberation war credentials in order to get employed (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017).

What should be noted about the DDR process in Zimbabwe is that it was the government itself that played a central role in disempowering and marginalising ZIPRA ex-combatants, and where it was not directly involved, it failed to intervene in solving the omissions and commissions of other state agents against ZIPRA ex-combatants. In other countries, for example in Sierra Leone and Liberia, it was not the government but ex-combatants and/or other military factions that were not aligned to the ruling party that isolated themselves from DDR processes, sabotaged it and carried out disruptive activities.

The case of one ZIPRA ex-combatant who was a qualified journalist from City University in London depict that there was discrimination in the employment of ZIPRA ex-combatants. One has to hasten to say that the tendency to discriminate against ZIPRA ex-combatants was not government policy *per se* but was just a common practice by mischiveous individuals within particular government departments who thought that they should frustrate ZIPRA ex-combatants.

The City University trained journalist failed to get a job in the media fraternity in Zimbabwe because the recruitment process was carried out through ZANU-PF party structures. According to Kriger (2003:179) a Mr Justin Nyoka who was Director of Information is said to have burst into laughter when the ZIPRA ex-combatant journalist presented herself to him so that he could facilitate her employment. Nyoka sarcastically asked the aspiring journalist the following question: 'Why do you want a job as a journalist? Why don't you ask Nkomo to buy you a farm? He is buying all ZIPRAs farms.'

Besides the fact that the job market was heavily skewed in favour of well-educated civilian graduates, it is noted that ZIPRA ex-combatants could in some cases face challenges that were deliberately imposed by ZANU-PF personnel. Alexander et al (2000) cite some cases of the harassment of some ZIPRA ex-combatants who were working for the government as teachers and nurses in rural Matabeleland during the time of the 5th Brigade operations. A case in point was the killing of several ex-ZIPRA nurses at Nkayi Hospital between 1983 and 1984 (Alexander et al, 2000). Kriger (2003:141) summed up the predicament of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in this way:

> ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered the party's (ZANU-PF) often violent wrath, experiencing difficulties in forming and sustaining co-operatives and obtaining employment and training where ZANU-PF had control.

According to the UNDPKO (1999), the provision of marketable skills to ex-combatants is not the panacea in reintegration. The government must create jobs specifically for ex-combatants because even if they are armed with marketable skills, they would still face stiff competition from other sections of the population. The case of ZIPRA ex-combatants was even worse. As seen above, some of them were discriminated against in the job market, and for those who acquired their own skills and got employed in the civil service as teachers, nurses and Agriculture Extension Officers among other professions, did not escape the wrath of the 5th Brigade in rural Matabeleland. Some of them abandoned their professions due to security risks whilst the unfortunate ones were killed.

All in all, the prevailing political environment immediately after independence in Zimbabwe was such that the government could not implement nor support impartial reintegration programs. Supporting ZIPRA reintegration programs could have meant that the government was empowering their rivals, and realistically that was impossible.

5.11 Second Reintegration Phase, 1997

The second reintegration program took place at a time when ZIPRA ex-combatants were working closely with ZANLA ex-combatants for the betterment of their welfare. This was after a period of nearly a decade of acrimonious relationships with the ruling party (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). The thawing of relations came in 1987, and thereafter, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants realised that they had been embroiled into a fruitless fight because even though ZANLA ex-combatants appeared to be on top of the situation, there was not very much that they benefitted material-wise through colluding with ZANU-PF to marginalise ZIPRA ex-combatants (Sadomba, 2011).

The major difference in terms of how ex-combatants benefitted from the 1997 gratuities was that ZIPRA ex-combatants specifically, were still haunted by the negative residual effects of

their prior marginalisation in demobilisation and reintegration programs which did not put them at the same economic level with their ZANLA counterparts. The second issue is that by the time ZIPRA ex-combatants were 'embraced' by the government and received similar pay-outs like their ZANLA counterparts in 1997, the economy was already on a tail spin.

Furthermore, not all ZIPRA ex-combatants immediately benefitted from the 1997 pay- outs as some of them were outside the country by that time, having run away from state security agents' harassment in the early 1980s. By the time they came to be vetted for purposes of receiving compensation, some of them experienced some challenges in getting successfully vetted as they failed to get people who could be their witnesses. Furthermore, the economic conditions had further deteriorated for those who delayed to come for compensation until the early 2000s. By then, the value of the Zimbabwean dollar had tumbled to unprecedented levels (Coltart, 2016; Interview with Kwete, 2017).

Whilst some of the ex-combatants who had experienced near to normal livelihoods in the 1980s were using their 1997 pay-outs to extend their houses, to buy new furniture and more livestock; that was not always the case for some of the ex-ZIPRAs whose livelihoods were undermined by the conflictual environment of the early 1980s. The economically vulnerable ex-combatants were starting from scratch again in 1997 and as a result, they failed to achieve successful economic reintegration. It is for some of the reasons cited above that Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) conclude that 'two wrongs do not make a right' when they look at the results of the two DDR processes on the ex-combatants. The conclusion could be motivated by the fact that the first and second reintegration processes failed to create stable and peaceful conditions for the ex-combatants and the generality of the population. The argument I maintain though is that in both processes, the predicament of the ZIPRA ex-combatants was worse than that of their ZANLA counterparts.

5.12 Conclusion

A number of developments like partial disarmament, ineffectual demobilisation, clashes at APs and within integrated military units as well as incomplete reintegration *inter alia* were a manifestation of unresolved political differences between political parties. Military forces *per se* have no problems if left on their own, but whatever negative developments take place among and between them mirror the bigger political problem. It has been noted that the DDR process, especially the integration program and the reintegration of the demobilised cadres was skewed in favour of ZANLA against ZIPRA.

The discrimination and marginalisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants was more pronounced in the integration and reintegration programs than in the disarmament and demobilisation phase. The reason was that disarmament and demobilisation took relatively shorter periods than reintegration. Furthermore, during disarmament, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants were in different cantonments, though some were juxtaposed and besides this, ZIPRA could not be coerced to disarm by ZANLA who had no conventional capacity. They could be persuaded to disarm first and then dealt with coercively and unfairly thereafter. Integration and reintegration programs were long-term, and in most cases, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants mingled. The way the integration and reintegration programs were done showed the pitfalls of a government led DDR process in a context of ethnic-related mistrusts and hostilities. As an interested party in the DDR process, the governing party used its former military wing (ZANLA) to build its political power base within the national army and in doing so, priviledged ZANLA over ZIPRA.

CHAPTER 6: CONSEQUENCES OF ZIPRA EX-COMBATANTS' DDR EXPERIENCES

6.1 Introduction

The effects of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences had far-reaching ramifications on the entire peace building process in post-independence Zimbabwe. Instead of lessening hitherto known PF-ZAPU-ZANU-PF mistrusts and hostilities, the experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants within the ZNA and outside the military structures led to the break-up of the GNU, the premature suspension of the policy on national reconciliation, the desertion of many ZIPRA ex-combatants from the ZNA and emergence of the controversial 'dissidents' issue. Most parts of Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands where the 5th Brigade operated were plunged into bloodshed for around five years. ZIPRA ex-combatants, PF-ZAPU party officials and the supporters of the party in general as well as the entire Ndebele-speaking population did not enjoy either negative or positive peace during the early 1980s because of the effects of partisan politics that were prevalent during the DDR process. In short, the consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR undermined the entire peace building process in Zimbabwe.

The nature of the experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants unequivocally demonstrated the flaws in a DDR process that is led and owned by a government that is embroiled in ethnic-based fears and rivalries against another party to the DDR process. The chapter will focus on the socio-political and economic implications of an exclusive and partisan DDR process on the general peace process in Zimbabwe from the lens of the experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants. Due to a protracted period of marginalisation in the DDR process, ZIPRA ex-combatants in particular became vulnerable to political manipulation by ZANU-PF after the second phase of reintegration because of their economic incapacitation and the legacy of fear which emanated from the botched first DDR process (1980-1984). Between 1980 and 1987,

the consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR processes hardened their feelings of hate, exclusion, and marginalisation against ZANU-PF/ZANLA and the Shona speaking people in general.

6.2 Politicisation and Ethnicisation of the ZNA

The GNU collapsed in February 1982 after the so-called arms cache 'discovery' on properties owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants. Whether those arms were meant for self-defence or to perpetrate political destabilisation was a thing which the government did not fully investigate. The issue of arms caches was dealt with in the previous chapter and what can be stated here is that ZANU-PF accused PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants for caching arms supposedly for toppling the government. That accusation sparked a chain reaction which culminated into the elimination of PF-ZAPU representatives from the GNU on 17 February 1982 (Nkomo, 1984).

The sacking of PF-ZAPU from cabinet was subsequently followed by the arrest of top ZIPRA military commanders, chief among them Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku and six others on charges of treason. Nkomo (1984:228) has argued that since his dismissal from government, 'the politics of reconciliation gave way to confrontation.' Nkomo also accepts the fact that the incarceration of Dabengwa and Masuku removed from the military domain the most prominent personnel on the ZIPRA side who were best able to keep the remaining fearful, restless and angry ZIPRA elements under control (1984).

The sacking of PF-ZAPU President and the arrest of ZIPRA Intelligence Supremo (Dabengwa) and ZIPRA commander (Masuku) especially, sparked an exodus of ZIPRA elements from the ZNA in solidarity with their commander-in-chief who was being publicly embarrassed. It is noteworth that most of ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres were recruited into their respective political parties by the Commissariat Department of each party. As such, these former guerrilla fighters had very strong respect for their political leaders. It is correct to say that both ZANLA and

ZIPRA were political-cum-military forces. Therefore, whatever happened in the political arena directly affected the military. Alao (2012) points out that quite a lot of ZIPRA ex-guerrillas had remained in the army even after the Entumbane clashes largely because of the respect and admiration they had for Nkomo.

In his explanation for the causes of the desertion of ZIPRA cadres from the ZNA in fairly large numbers from 1982 onwards, Mnangagwa (1989) also observed that some ZIPRA ex-combatants felt that government treatment of PF-ZAPU leaders as well as ZIPRA military commanders was too extreme and unjustified. Other ZIPRA ex-combatants left the army during the same period because they feared that the 'discovery' of weapons in and around their properties would lead to a witch-hunt in the army by the government.

Indeed, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) observes that wide sweeping searches for ZIPRA cadres on grounds that they were 'dissidents' were conducted. The witch-hunts did not spare former ZIPRA cadres serving in the national army (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). More terrified ZIPRA ex-combatants fled the army into different directions and destinations. Some became 'dissidents.' Tensions in the country ran high amidst accusations and counter-accusations. ZANLA accused ZIPRA ex-combatants of planning and engaging in subversive activities, whilst ZIPRA accused ZANLA personnel within the ZNA of persecuting them. Levels of mistrust between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU ran very high during this period. Not only was Nkomo sacked from the GNU, but he was vilified and persecuted on a daily basis until he fled into exile in 1983 citing threats on his life (Nkomo, 1984). All these developments made some fearful ZIPRA ex-combatants to rearm and that further undermined the disarmament program which had been shambolic from the onset. So, developments within the ZNA affected DDR processes. What these developments did was to raise the level of a 'Security Dilemma.'

When Nkomo was forced into exile, the infuriation of the ZIPRA over ZANU-PF actions was heightened and more also left the army. As they were leaving the army, some of them took weapons with them and fought against the government through sabotaging its programs and projects especially in rural areas of south-western Zimbabwe where they were based. The labelling of ZIPRA ex-combatants as 'dissidents' in the ZNA was scaled up and that opened the way for full-scale antagonistic relationships between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants within the army. 'Disappearances' of serving ZIPRA cadres became a common occurrence in the ZNA (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). As many ZIPRA ex-combatants were leaving the army, ZANU-PF leadership took advantage of that and built a partisan and highly politicised and ethnicised national army. Jackson (2011:21) states that, the initial 1980-83 'White flight' from the ZNA together with the persecution of former ZIPRA cadres created an enabling environment for ZANLA to effectively dominate the newly formed ZNA. What was happening in the political arena affected events in the military and vice versa.

The politicisation of the army was accompanied by periodic physical harassment of the ZIPRA in the ZNA. It seems the aim was to frustrate them so that they could all leave the army. When describing his ordeal in the ZNA after the collapse of the GNU, Tshuma emotionally broke down as he continuously shook his head, stared at me for some time without uttering a single word, mumbled something to himself and when he continued his story he started by saying, 'Eish, that situation' (Interview with Tshuma who was harassed within the army, 2017). He was referring to incidents that were taking place within and outside the ZNA that were making life difficult for those who fought for independence under ZIPRA. Strained relationships both in the army and in civilian life reinforced the mindset of 'us' versus 'them' and that was not good for DDR processes.

One of the results of the desertions of ZIPRA ex-combatants from the ZNA was the ethnicisation of the Zimbabwean military forces (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). There were four

new military units which were primarily formed to support ZANU-PF and its leadership and they were mainly drawn from the Shona ethnic group. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:23) has described the four military elements as 'politically correct military units' in the sense that eligibility into those units was mainly on the basis of loyalty to ZANU-PF. These were the Presidential Guard squad trained by the North Koreans after the assassination attempt on the Prime Minister; the Artillery Regiment, the 5th Brigade and the Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). The 5th Brigade which was purportedly formed to deal with the 'dissidents' became a purely Shona-dominated ZANU-PF army that was directly answerable to Robert Mugabe and did not operate like other normal ZNA units. The ZPM was recruited from ZANU-PF youths (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Coltart, 2016). The purely Shona ethnic composition of the 5th Brigade coupled with its heinous tactics against the Ndebele population increased negative feelings of the Ndebele against the Shona in general and made unity and peaceful co-existence a nullity.

The ZPM complemented the violent activities of the 5th Brigade as it was deployed to areas that were not covered by the Brigade. The violence of the ZPM was pronounced in Ndebele-speaking areas of Kwekwe and Maboleni in Lower Gweru (Coltart, 2016). The then Minister of Defence, Sydney Sekeremayi justified the formation of military units that were loyal and answerable only to ZANU-PF on the grounds that the suspected acts of sabotage on strategic military installations were 'inside jobs.' Being 'inside jobs' meant that they were perpetrated by former ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA. Sekeramayi is quoted by Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005:342) as having defended the creation of the ZPM by saying that it would work as:

> …the eyes and ears of government and people…key installations to be guarded by those loyal to the government. The attack on Thornhill air base and the disappearance of arms at Cranborne Barracks were all 'inside jobs.'

From a security point of view, ZANU-PF could not take these security challenges lightly given its experience and memory of the clashes between its military wing and that of ZAPU before

1979 and immediately after independence. Any government in any part of the world would have reacted by taking precautionary security measures. However, what can be highlighted is that the 'inside jobs' were only suspected on ZIPRA ex-combatants and not on former Rhodesian Security Forces who had caused a lot of bloodshed on both sides of the liberation movements through bombing their rear bases. ZANU-PF had developed more trust on its former 'enemies' at the expense of its former 'rivals' (ZIPRA). That attitude spoke more to lack of reconciliation between the two former liberation forces. Doran (2017) writes that whereas ZANU-PF was able to reconcile with the Whites, there was hostility against other fellow Blacks with whom they prosecuted the liberation struggle together. The allegations against ZIPRA ex-combatants is similar to what Mbembe (2002:628) describes as the 'power of the false.' As observed by Mbembe (2002), this is a scenario whereby misinformation, misperceptions and utter falsehoods create a 'Security Dilemma.'

The consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR had serious and negative effects on peace and stability especially in Matabeleland. As peace was undermined, physical violence escalated thereby undermining the whole peace building process. ZANU-PF was able to capitalise on the departure of ZIPRA ex-combatants to build its own power base within the military because it always saw ZIPRA as a threat to its political hegemony. Gleichmann et al (2004) explain that inclusive political arrangements that facilitate the cross-polination of views and ideas are crucial in DDR processes as they help to build trust and confidence between former warring political parties and their respective armies. Power-sharing arrangements lessen polarisation and political friction. They also build trust, tolerance and confidence in each other.

Nilsson's (2005) view is that inclusivity and tolerance can be built if there is a genuinely representative national government with all parties to the conflict. This means they can engage and manage to control each other and ensure transparency, accountability and impartiality in DDR programs. After the GNU crumbled in 1982, the implementation of the DDR programs

was carried out by ZANU-PF politicians and former ZANLA commanders without the participation of PF-ZAPU politicians and former ZIPRA commanders. The result was that the process was heavily tilted in favour of ZANLA ex-combatants at the detriment of ZIPRA ex-combatants. The collapse of the GNU also meant that there was no longer power-sharing within the top echelons of the various security sectors in Zimbabwe.

The most important criterion used to elavate leaders of the security sectors became based on ethnic considerations as well as loyalty to ZANU-PF party not on purely meritocratic grounds. Since ZANU-PF was organised along Shona ethnic lines, it also wanted the army to be organised along the same ethnic lines (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). As the criterion of ensuring parity at the top leadership of the ZNA gave way to political and ethnic considerations since 1982, there were more Brigadiers and Colonels from the former ZANLA side than from ex-ZIPRAs. Of the eight new Brigadiers, ZANLA had five whilst ZIPRA had three and ZANLA had eleven out of the seventeen new Colonels (Alao, 2012:40). In Evans' view, ZANU-PF's growing ethnic domination of the ZNA enabled it to 'strike at its former ZIPRA rivals' (1991:9). It was able to successfully execute that within and outside the ZNA and that exacerbated conflictual relationships and made unity and sustainable peace a pipe dream.

In all the five key pillars of Zimbabwe's security sectors, that is the Army, Police, Intelligence services, Air Force and Prisons, no single former ZIPRA cadre has ever held the highest position in all these sectors serve for Philip Valerio Sibanda who headed the ZNA but under the overall leadership of Chiwenga, a former ZANLA cadre who commanded the entire Zimbabwe Defence Forces. From a closer observation, it seems that ZANU-PF is not comfortable with entrusting former ZIPRA cadres with the top most positions in the security sectors. All the directors of the CIO and Prisons; the Commissioners General of the Police, the Commanders of the Air Force and Commanders of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces since independence until November 2017 were former ZANLA commanders.

However, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that there were no senior Ndebele officers who were former ZIPRA cadres who were at the leadership levels in the army. However, as articulated by Evans (1991:10), there were some ZIPRA ex-combatants who held middle level positions, but the promotion of Ndebele-speaking former ZIPRA cadres in the ZNA came to be determined by the degree of distance between that officer and PF-ZAPU as a party. In other words, the advancement of ZIPRA ex-combatants in the army was politically motivated. If one distanced himself from PF-ZAPU and the Ndebele people in general, he or she could be rewarded with promotions (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). This shows that the effects of the experiences of ZIPRA in DDR processes also affected developments in the army and vice versa. Those considered to be 'politically-incorrect' could not be fully accommodated in the army and the entire DDR process.

All the Ministers in charge of Defence and Security Portfolios serve for that of Home Affairs have been ZANU-PF politicians. This could not mean that there is lack of talent from the former PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA personnel. The most plausible explanation could be the lack of trust between the two former liberation movements. The Defence portfolio was first occupied by Robert Mugabe who also doubled as the Prime Minister. Enos Nkala took over from Mugabe and was followed by Moven Mahachi. Sydney Sekeremayi and Mnangagwa were recycled as Defence Ministers at various periods. The Security portfolio has been occupied by such personalities as Mnangagwa, Sekeremayi, Goche and Mutasa. What has happened is that the same Ministers who have occupied the Ministries of Defence and Security are rotated between the two Ministries or serve three or more times in one Ministry at different intervals. There has been a glaring lack of ethnic balancing at the apex of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces leadership as well as in the Ministries that are in charge of Defence and Security.

A look at the composition of the top leadership of the army since 1980 until 2017 illustrates the above points clearly.

Figure 3: Top Senior Military Personnel in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2017



Source: Constructed by the Researcher.

The ethnicisation of the top leadership of the military in favour of the Shona took place against a background of a well-documented history of superb discipline and high-quality training that ZIPRA forces had. What became clear was that it was unconceivable that ZANU-PF could promote former ZIPRA cadres to the top leadership positions of the military during the period of open confrontation between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU (1982-1987). However, the marginalisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants in leadership positions continued unabated even after the 1987 accord which narrowed the political chasm between the two former liberation movements. This indicates that it was not mistrust alone based on past history which led to the side-lining of ZIPRA ex-combatants from leadership positions in the army, but also ethnic differences were a factor. When looking at the challenges of PF-ZAPU in the GNU as well as those of ZIPRA within the security sectors, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:30) concludes that the GNU suffered from what he terms 'Shona triumphalism,' a scenario where Shona-speaking people in ZANU-PF thought they should get all the priviledges because they thought they contributed the most in liberating Zimbabwe.

The experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR programs prove true Ndlovu-Gatsheni's argument that the Shona-speaking supporters of ZANU-PF interpreted their party's electoral victory as Shona victory against the Ndebele and for also having put to rest the question of who

should rule Zimbabwe (2008). In this regard, it is Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2007) veiw that ethnicity still play a fundamental role in determing access to economic resources and even national leadership positions to date. This is mainly due to the fact that politicians from both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU failed to deal decisively with the issue of the politicisation of ethnicity ever since the liberation struggle since it benefitted them in their political power struggles.

6.3 The 'Dissidents'

One of the fundamental aims of implementing a DDR process is to ensure that a post-conflict society does not slide back into conflict. However, Zimbabwe slid back into violent conflict within a period of less than two years from independence date. This time around, the conflict was between former Black 'rivals' (ZIPRA and ZANLA) in the liberation struggle. Cawthra (1993) cited in Mashike (2000) concluded that Zimbabwe's armed struggle was the bloodiest throughout Africa with an estimated death toll of around 50 000 people killed within a period of approximately fifteen years of civil war.

However, a total of about 20 000 Ndebele speaking people, mainly civilians were killed in post-independence Zimbabwe within a period of less than five years (CCJP, 1997). The post-independence conflict was allegedly caused by government's efforts at ending the 'dissident' menace that was caused by some of the ZIPRA ex-combatants who went on a rampage after 1982. In short, the results of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR produced 'dissidents' and ultimately the death of thousands of Ndebele civilians in a military crusade to hunt down 'dissidents.' An ineffective DDR process that is led by a partisan government breeds 'dissidents.' The 'dissidents' issue heightened mistrust and hostility in the country and produced a 'Security Dilemma.'

6.3.1 Who were the 'Dissidents'?

This section will commence with a brief operational definition of the terms, dissidents and bandits so that readers appreciate the arguments raised in the foregoing discussion. Generally, a dissident is a person who strongly disagrees with and criticises a legitimate government in his or her country. That person also takes active steps to undermine that government mainly through violent means. A bandit is a person who steals and commits acts of violence in a society and the concept of banditry revolves around stealing and the engagement in violence by bandits with the aim of achieving their objectives. Dissidence has a political motive, and, in most cases, it is sponsored by politicians and the ultimate aim is to seize power through unconstitutional means.

The term 'dissidents' and to who it referred in Zimbabwe is shrouded in controversy. The term was not only used to refer to armed elements that were fighting the government but was loosely applied to all ZIPRA ex-combatants, PF-ZAPU officials, and to the Ndebele people in general and to Joshua Nkomo who was labelled as the 'Father of dissidents' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:6). In fact, the conflation of almost everyone in Matabeleland into 'dissidents' was meant to justify a military crusade to annihilate Ndebele speaking people and disrupt PF-ZAPU activities (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). Lake and Rothschild (1996:45) call such kind of fabrication as 'information failure.' Information failure is a situation whereby parties fabricate facts for purposes of undermining people they deem 'others.' In this regard, Joshua Nkomo was linked to the 'dissidents' despite lack of evidence that directly connected him to them. ZANU-PF's perceptions on who the 'dissidents' were, including their sponsorship made it difficult for them to cordially relate with both PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants. As a result, there was a problem of blocked communication which made it difficult for the two parties to engage in frank discussions to unpack and resolve the issue of 'dissidents.'

The loose application of the term ‘dissidents’ to refer to even ZIPRA ex-combatants in the ZNA meant that ZIPRA ex-combatants who remained in the national army paid heavily for the ‘sins’ of their colleagues who deserted. It was common practice for ex-combatants to take group photos of themselves during the long and idle periods they spent at APs. During the period of the height of mistrust between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants in the ZNA, those photos were used to identify those who were thought to be linked to the ‘dissidents’ in the ZNA. If one or two members in a group photograph deserted, those who remained behind were supposed to know their whereabouts. If they professed ignorance, which was always the case, they were beaten thoroughly on accusations that they were abetting dissidence (Interview with Bhebhe, 2017). Alternatively, if the ‘dissidents’ were caught and killed, photographs in their possession were taken away and used to hunt down ‘dissidents’ in the ZNA.

Scholars like Alexander et al (2000) have concluded that the labelling of ZIPRA ex-combatants who deserted the ZNA into the bush in the early to mid-1980s as ‘dissidents’ is a misnomer because those particular individuals left the army due to persecution in a ZANLA-dominated army. Their aim was not to bring down the government. Even though some of them could have harboured intentions of toppling the government, lack of political support and leadership from PF-ZAPU was a great let down to them. Most of them operated as individuals and had no support from the Ndebele population as well as from PF-ZAPU and former ZIPRA commanders. Joshua Nkomo (1984) preferred the term bandits over ‘dissidents’ in reference to the ex-ZIPRAs who deserted the ZNA and committed crimes in rural Matabeleland because, according to him, they were just loose elements who were frustrated over incidencies of persecution in the army and then went about committing crimes without any clear political motives and support. Due to the lack of support from any angle they could think of, Alexander et al (2000:245) observe that the conflict of the 1980s was much different from that of the

1970s because, 'the 'dissidents' fought without political leadership, without civilian and party support, without hope of success, but only of survival.'

It is true that ZIPRA ex-combatants deserted the army. However, what is noteworthy is that their desertions were not motivated by political reasons bordering around the widening of the political rift between their political party and ZANU-PF or any desire to violently unseat the government. Of course, there are some ZIPRA ex-combatants who deserted the ZNA in solidarity with Nkomo's dismissal from the GNU, but most of these cadres did not take up arms, but just melted into the civilian population, whilst others left the country altogether (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). According to Alexander (2008), the 'dissidents' were a development that emanated from harsh treatment within the ZNA which saw the discrimination and persecution of the ZIPRA ex-combatants within several Infantry Battalions all over the country. One should also point out that given the high levels of mutual mistrust and rivalry between the two former liberation parties plus fresh memories of inter-party antagonisms and physical clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA during the liberation struggle as well as at APs and within integrated military units, ZANU-PF could have had genuine suspicions and fears that 'dissidents' were sponsored by PF-ZAPU and that they wanted to destabilise the country and finally bring down the government.

It is important to articulate the typology of 'dissidents' before delving deeper into the discussion. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Sibanda, 2005; Alexander et al, 2000 and Alexander, 2008 identify roughly six categories of 'dissidents.' The first category was made of ZIPRA ex-combatants who deserted the ZNA due to life threatening circumstances that centred on being harassed and unexplained 'disappearances' of some of their colleagues. This group constituted the majority of the around 400 'dissidents' who were in Zimbabwe and it is the same group of the remaning about 115-122 'dissidents' who surrendered themselves to the government in 1988, taking advantage of the general amnesty that had been granted (Ncube, 1989; Mutasa,

1989). The second group consisted of ZIPRA ex-combatants who did not agree with the Lancaster House Agreement (Munemo, 2016). They thought that it was a sellout agreement. Their numbers were marginally increased by those who did not accept the outcome of the 1980 elections. Although they could have wanted to fight against the government, lack of anyone to coordinate and support their activities made them to engage in criminal activities with no direction.

The other group was made up of demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants that suffered victimisation by the 5th Brigade. There are some who were frustrated by the violent and humiliating treatment of their wartime commanders and the top leadership of PF-ZAPU by ZANU-PF. In the midst of the volatile political situation, some Ndebele youth took advantage of general lawlessness to commit acts of banditry (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). The volatile political situation did not only motivate Ndebele youth into banditry, but also gave advantage to South Africa to meddle in the domestic political affairs of Zimbabwe through creating and sponsoring a group of 'dissidents' which were popurlarly called 'Super-ZAPU' (Alexander et al, 2000). The aim of creating 'Super-ZAPU' was political destabilisation through pushing ZANU-PF further away from PF-ZAPU by increasing levels of mistrust. The strategy could also have been aimed at incapacitating PF-ZAPU so that it could not manage to continue supporting the UMkhonto WeSizwe guerrillas and the liberation struggle in South Africa in general (Sibanda, 2005).

There were some 'dissidents' who were a creation of ZANU-PF. In fact, the 5th Brigade and some elements in the ZNA impersonated 'dissidents'; went around villages in Matabeleland asking for support as 'dissidents' and came back to the same villagers accusing them of supporting the 'dissidents' (Interview with Madotshi; a ZIPRA ex-combatant who was a teacher in Tsholotsho during the period of 'dissidents' and 5th Brigade, 2017). The state-created 'dissidents' were quite vicious to the White tourists and commercial farmers. According to Sibanda (2005), these 'dissidents' wanted to hoodwink the West into thinking that 'dissidents'

were indeed a security threat and had to be eliminated. Secondly, they wanted to build a solid justification for violent state action against former ZIPRA cadres, PF-ZAPU and the Ndebele people in general.

Except for 'Super-ZAPU' and state created 'dissidents', there was no one who was responsible for organising the other groups of 'dissidents.' One former 'dissident' who was interviewed by the CCJP (1997:45) actually testified that besides self-defence, they had no other agenda for being in the bush. He said:

> We wanted to defend ourselves personally. Our lives were threatened. Apart from defending ourselves; there was very little that we wanted to achieve. In the 1980s war, no one was recruited; we were forced by the situation. All of us met in the bush. Each person left (ZNA) on his own, running from death.

As noted in the previous chapter, ZIPRA ex-combatants within the ZNA became victims of different forms of abuse, some of which were life threatening. In fact, ZIPRA ex-combatants who were brutalised deserted the ZNA and retreated to their rural villages, where, out of lack of options, they engaged in crimes like stealing from nearby stores, schools, and robbed bus operators as well as engaging in acts of sabotage against government projects and programs in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands (CCJP, 1997; Interview with Sebata, 2017). Banholzer (2014) notes that without adequate security measures, ex-combatants usually resort to armed criminality. All of what the so-called 'dissidents' did could be best be described as mere criminality because there were no clear indicators that they really wanted to bring down the government, serve that they sabotaged some government projects and programs where they operated.

Alexander (2008) states that there is no evidence that the 'dissidents' took up arms to overthrow ZANU-PF government. Alexander conducted interviews with a total of twenty former 'dissidents' and all of them confirmed that they became 'dissidents' because they were enraged due to purging in the ZNA and what they perceived as abandonment by their political

and military leaders, some of whom were in prison. The purging of ZIPRA ex-combatants did not only happen within the army but in civilian life as well where ZIPRA ex-combatants were followed up in their homesteads (desertees and demobilised ones) and victimised or killed. Two of the former 'dissidents' that l interviewed also indicated that they engaged in banditry because they had been subjected to victimisation as ZIPRA ex-combatants. Tennyson Ndlovu, widely known as Thambolenyoka said that he was forced into banditry by the prevailing political situation in the 1980s whereby scores of ZIPRA ex-combatants were butchered or incarcerated for no apparent reasons between 1982 and 1987 (Interview with Tennyson Ndlovu, 2017).

Thambolenyoka demobilised in 1982 and worked at National Foods in Bulawayo until 1985. He says that the immediate incident that compelled him to be a 'dissident' was that he witnessed innocent people being brutalised and made to queue outside a bus they were travelling in to rural Filabusi by state security agents. He discovered that the sole purpose of the road blocks and searches were to identify ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU officials for harassment. Using his military experience, Thambolenyoka eluded the security agents and became a 'dissident' (Interview with Thambolenyoka, 2017). Mr X said that he ran away from his military unit in Gutu, Masvingo, with his firearm and ended up in his rural home in Tsholotsho because he was subjected to physical harassment (Interview with Mr X, 2017).

The issue of 'dissidents' had an ethnic dimension. ZIPRA had both Shona and Ndebele-speaking cadres in its ranks although the Ndebele were in the majority. However, there were no former ZIPRA ex-combatants who were Shona speaking who partook in dissidence. Furthermore, some Shona speaking areas are said to have exhibited a war-like attitude against the 'dissidents' (Alexander, 2008). For example, the Gokwe area was a ZIPRA operational zone during the liberation struggle, but became a 'no-go' area for 'dissidents' in the 1980s since all 'dissidents' were Ndebele speaking (Alexander, 2008).

The fact that ‘dissidents’ who deserted the ZNA drifted into Matabeleland and the Midlands where there were Ndebele speakers instead of going to their former operational zones helped to regionalise and ethnicise the problem of ‘dissidents.’ ZANU-PF found it easy to link ‘dissidents’ with PF-ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo and the Ndebele speaking people in general. The ‘dissidents’ were also embroiled in ethnic politics. According to Alexander (2008:170), ‘dissidents’ infiltrated Shona-speaking areas adjacent to Matabeleland like Mberengwa with the aim of spreading the effects of the 1980s conflict to the Shona speaking people. Shona speaking civilians in Mberengwa were brutalised by the ‘dissidents.’ Alexander (2008) points out that the army forewarned villagers in Mberengwa of the escapades of the ‘dissidents’ but the situation was different in Matabeleland where civilians were not forewarned, but were linked to the ‘dissidents’ and then tortured or even killed.

Although ‘dissidents’ were at times involved in ethnic politics, what has become evident is that they were directly produced by a partisan integration and DDR process and had very little if anything to do with toppling ZANU-PF from power. Cameron (2017) states that ‘dissidents’ had legitimate grievances like that they wanted their political and military leaders to be treated in a dignified way, the government to respect ZIPRA through returning confiscated properties and a return to inter-ethnic tolerance that had briefly prevailed in the ZNA during its early days in 1980. However, lack of a platform to articulate these grievances coupled with persecution in the army led them to desert, not that they were anti-government. One can argue that the way the issue of ‘dissidents’ was handled is not entirely divorced from the way ZANU-PF handled the issue of the clashes at APs as well as the arms cache ‘discovery’. The three developments were enthusiastically exploited by the militarily insecure ZANU-PF to decisively deal with ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU as a party. The fundamental flaw about the DDR process in Zimbabwe was the lack of regulatory mechanisms to ensure fairness among all parties to the process. As a result, one of the parties to the process (ZANU-PF and ZANLA ex-combatants)

took advantage of their powerful political position to sideline ZIPRA ex-combatants and the result has been negative as the country is grappling with challenges brought about by a partisan and inadequate DDR process to date.

ZANU-PF's strategies of regionalising and ethnicising 'dissidents' resulted in what Buttlerfield and Herz term a 'Security Dilemma' (Buttlerfield and Herz cited in Muchemwa, 2015:85). A 'Security Dilemma' develops when each party in a conflict situation provokes the other in a bid to enhance its own security. The counter reaction from the provoked party makes the other party insecure as well. The result is usually a cycle of action and reaction which culminate in each party's behaviour and activities being interpreted as a threat or act of provocation. Put simply, the accusations and counter accusations between ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants and between their respective political parties produced a 'Security Dilemma' which finally plunged Matabeleland into a bloody conflict that cost many lives.

Whilst the number of ZIPRA ex-combatants who deserted the ZNA between 1982 and 1985 are put at 4 000 by Evans (1991), the actual number of those who took up arms and indulged in banditry were no more than 400 at their peak (Kriger, 2003). This means that the rest of the ZIPRA ex-combatants who deserted the ZNA melted into civilian life whilst some went to the neighbouring countries in the region and many other places around the world to seek safety. Going to South Africa was not an easy option. It meant going back to work under the oppressive White system similar to the one they had fought against in Zimbabwe. There was the risk of being caught and surrendered back to the Zimbabwean government since many of the ex-combatants did not have proper documents and crossed into that country illegally (Alexander, 2008).

Part of the 4 000 ZIPRA ex-combatants that deserted the ZNA remained at home and sought sanctuary in the urban areas whilst a few disguised their liberation war history in the rural areas.

ZIPRA ex-combatants who decided to go to their rural areas suffered from harassment by both the 'dissidents' and the 5th Brigade. Members of the 5th Brigade accused them of being 'dissidents' whilst the 'dissidents' accused them of selling-out to ZANU-PF and either beat them so as to force them to join their ranks or in extreme cases, killed them.

Mleya who survived an assassination attempt at Connemara Barracks remembers very well the harassment he endured in the hands of Kenang Nare and Doubt Siyoka whom he had known since his childhood in Gwanda, Matabeleland South (Interview with Mleya, 2017). The two had since turned themselves into 'dissidents' by the time he met them at home in 1983. Whilst they ran away from victimisation in the ZNA, ZIPRA ex-combatants were also involved in victimising civilians and other ZIPRA ex-combatants who they claimed were betraying them.

In terms of security, the 'dissidents' exacerbated insecurity where they operated. According to Ncube (1989:306), 'dissidents' murdered people, raped women, committed armed robberies, terrorised villagers in general and destroyed property worth millions of dollars. By early 1984, vast pieces of farmland lay fallow. For example, about 500 000 acres of lucrative commercial farmland could not be utilised in Matabeleland due to security threats posed by 'dissidents.' Though few in numbers; the 'dissidents' sometimes embarked on violent activities that left villagers terrified. The CCJP (1997:48) Report has some details on the violent activities of the 'dissidents' in Matabeleland. For example, about 21 civilians were mercilessly clobbered to death by suspected 'dissidents' in the early 1980s in Nyamandlovu, Matabeleland North.

As a result of the killings, many farmers sold their farms and relocated to the urban areas. Several women and men were raped and murdered respectively by the 'dissidents.' On 23 April 1982, a Cold Storage Commission cattle sale was raided about 50 kilometres South of Kezi. Z$40 000 was stolen, one person killed and four others injured from that raid (CCJP, 1997:48). The people of Matabeleland were adversely affected by the violent activities of the 'dissidents'

as the number of cattle sales were scaled down and completely suspended in some areas. Matabeleland is primarily a cattle ranching zone and people's livelihoods are mainly dependant on selling cattle to raise money to buy food and to pay school fees for children. It is important to note that problematic integration in the ZNA and the victimisation of demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants was the long-term cause of the security challenges that were witnessed in Matabeleland. However, plunder and victimisation were not part and parcel of self-preservation strategies by 'dissidents' but could have been a result of frustration and loss of direction and alternatives.

There is ample evidence that connects partisan and inadequate DDR processes to the emergence of 'dissidents' in Matabeleland. The security threat posed by the 'dissidents' led the government to react violently through the 5th Brigade thereby shattering the promising peace and unity that had started during the early years of the GNU. Undoubtedly, ZANU-PF failed to manage the DDR process mainly because it was not a neutral implementer of the process but wanted to manipulate the process in its power politics against PF-ZAPU. Through painting ZIPRA ex-combatants as 'dissidents' and thereby justifying their purging in the ZNA and civilian life in general, ZANU-PF had successfully imposed its authority over the ZNA by 1985, and by then, ZANLA had gained undisputed mastery over the national army (Evans, 1991). In his own words, 'ZANLA had managed to colonise the army' (Evans, 1991:86). Although that strategy was to the advantage of ZANU-PF politically, it undermined the entire peace building process.

The IDDRS (2006) puts inclusivity at the epicentre of the key requirements that facilitate successful DDR programs. It states that such issues as sex, age, religion, nationality, ethnic origin and political opinion should not be used to determine who gets what in DDR programs if they are to be successful. Ineffectual DDR caused the challenge of 'dissidents' in that demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants were persecuted until some of them decided to be

'dissidents.' The security challenges emanating from the threat posed by 'dissidents' undermined ZIPRA reintegration programs like co-operative schemes, employment and education endeavours as they were always hunted down as 'dissidents' and finally forced into hiding. In the final analysis, the issue of 'dissidents' was largely a result of partisan government activities within DDR processes. The government engineered the issue of 'dissidents' as it wanted to use it as a political scapegoat to eliminate both ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU and then establish unflinching political hegemony in the post-colonial state.

6.3.2 The 5th Brigade/Gukurahundi and Ethnic Polarisations

The 5th Brigade was deployed into Matabeleland in early 1983 supposedly to deal with the 'dissidents' menace in the region. Given the small numbers of the 'dissidents' who were armed, the deployment of a full-strength Brigade seemed unjustifiable. Instead of bringing peace to the 'dissidents'-affected areas, the operations of the 5th Brigade exacerbated the insecurity of the civilians as members of the Brigade were complicit in committing heinous crimes against civilians. The CCJP Report of 1997 concluded that the atrocities committed by the 5th Brigade were tantamount to ethnic cleansing. The Catholic Commissioners who compiled the Report suspect that the violence meted against unarmed civilians in the guise of hunting down 'dissidents' smacks of Shona revenge against the Ndebele for what their forefathers are alleged to have done to the Shona ancestors some time back. The activities of the 5th Brigade intensified negative feelings and relations both in the political and military arena and made successful DDR and Ndebele-Shona reconciliation difficult to achieve.

The 5th Brigade justified its unbridled brutality against Ndebele speaking civilians on the grounds that 'dissidents' could not survive without the active support of the villagers (Alexander et al, 2000). However, what it (5th Brigade) overlooked was that unlike the voluntary support that civilians gave to ZIPRA guerrillas during the liberation struggle; the

'dissidents' used coercive strategies to get whatever they wanted from the masses and there were no ways civilians could resist that. One issue makes it possible that the 5th Brigade was bent on settling old scores between Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups. The issue is that, even though the RSFs were quite aware that ZIPRA guerrillas were fed and supported by Ndebele civilians during the liberation struggle; the intensity of their wrath against civilians did not match that of the 5th Brigade against unnamed Ndebele civilians who were accused of supporting 'dissidents.'

A few selected cases illustrate the ferocious wrath of the 5th Brigade against innocent Ndebele civilians and ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised. On 3 February 1983, several people were brutalised in Kezi where they were shot at close range, pregnant girls bayoneted and foetuses thrown out (CCJP, 1997:45). More brutal and despicable murders swept across several wards and districts in Kezi and Tsholotsho in 1983. At Khumbula School in Tsholotsho, a whole village was terrorised where people were forced to dig their own graves before they were shot dead. In Mkubazi village in Kezi, three ZIPRA ex-combatants were among many who were taken to a cattle kraal and shot. Another incident of inhuman murder took place at Gulakabili area in Kezi where the whole village was abducted and beaten severely. Terror perpetrated against civilians had nothing to do with the clampdown on 'dissidents' except if the 5th Brigade was following ZANU-PF thinking that everyone in Matabeleland was a 'dissident' or 'dissident sympathiser.' The effects of 5th Brigade operations in Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands diminished any prospects of reconciliation between the Shona and Ndebele as in the eyes of the victims, the conflict that was associated with the clampdown on 'dissidents' was ethnically-motivated.

What started as military antagonism in military barracks spilled into the civilian domain and caused total political rapture which had long-lasting negative effects on the peace building endeavour in Zimbabwe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) argues that since the violence was brazenly

ethnic in nature, it could not achieve its intended goal of silencing the Ndebele people into surbodination. Instead, the 5th Brigade violence intensified what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) calls 'Ndebele particularism', that is, it made the Ndebele to resent the Shona more and to talk about their marginalisation, whether real or imagined, more and more. In simple terms, Ndlovu-Gatsheni's point is that the results of the violence that originated within the army due to problematic integration, demobilisation and reintegration, and later engulfed the whole of Matabeleland, exacerbated rather than lessened ethnic divisions, fears and hatred. In other words, the antagonism between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants was not confined to DDR issues, but it spilled out and intensified inter-ethnic hostilities between the Ndebele and the Shona civilians in general. This was possible because ZIPRA and ZANLA had evolved to become not only military forces, but also to become political and ethnic forces.

Muchemwa's study on attempts to build friendships between Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups indicate that there is indeed friction between the two and strategies to promote peaceful co-existence are needed. Ineffectual DDR processes contributed in a large measure in straining their relationships. Although Shona and Ndebele ethnic relations were acrimonious for a long time before independence, they were further badly damaged by the inter-ethnic violence of the 1980s linked to a partisan DDR process. Muchemwa (2015) believes that part of the causes of the misunderstandings between the Shona and Ndebele is due to lack of healing and reconciliation on wounds inflicted on the Ndebele by the Shona in the post-independence period.

Although there is no evidence that proves that Shona masses supported 5th Brigade violence against Ndebele civilians in the 1980s, the general perception of the victims of violence in Matabeleland is that they were accomplices (Muchemwa, 2015). What is possible is that the Shona masses could have only celebrated the violence given the history of hostility between the two ethnic groups (Muchemwa, 2015). However, the Ndebele thought it was a Shona-

constituted government that was responsible for all their miseries, especially their killings (Lindgren, 2002). Many participants in this study expressed perceptions that indicated that they thought that the Shona people in general were responsible for their marginalisation and victimisation in DDR processes and in the ZNA. It was also clear that they still harbour ill feelings against the Shona. One participant in this study said: 'Those people (Shona) wanted to wipe and finish us all. We are in this condition because of them. They do not want to see us progressing' (Interview with Mr X, 2017).

The bitterness of having lost property, friends, relatives, family members did not dissipate among Ndebele civilians with the merger of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU in December 1987. Instead, the bitterness has been expressed through the mushrooming of different organisations and pressure groups that purpot to speak on behalf of the Ndebele speaking people. These organisations are operating from Matabeleland and some from South Africa, and claim to be the voice that articulate Ndebele grievances since they argue that it was muzzled (Ndebele voice) by the Shona through violence in the 1980s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Evidence abound that the nation needs healing and reconciliation.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) gives five examples of these pressure groups. These are Imbovane Yamahlabezulu, PF-ZAPU 2000, Mthwakazi Liberation Front, Mthwakazi Action Group on Genocide and ethnic cleansing in Matabeleland and Midlands and Mthwakazi People's Congress (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The Mthwakazi Liberation Front in particular advocates for the secession of Matabeleland from the rest of Zimbabwe. These pressure groups also view the 1987 accord as a useless political pact which did not bring anything tangible to the people of Matabeleland. Furthermore, these groups view Ndebele speaking 'PF-ZAPU' politicians who are in ZANU-PF government through the 1987 agreement as apologists or sell-outs who have benefitted as individuls at the expense of the marginalised people of Matabeleland (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Currently, there is the Mthwakazi Republic Party (MRP) which is

rabidly anti-Shona speaking people and advocates for the creation of an independent Ndebele state.

The anti-Shona feeling amongst the Ndebele was due to the fact that the 5th Brigade fanned out their clamp down on the 'dissidents' into a general conflict that seemed to be pitting the Ndebele against the Shona through their loose definition of a 'dissident' to incorporate everyone who was Ndebele. 'Dissidents' did not also spare Shona civilians whom they found in Matabeleland and the same was true to Ndebele civilians whom the 'dissidents' saw as un-cooperative (CCJP, 1997). It is in this light that the ethnic dimension of the conflict cannot be overlooked. The 5th Brigade was viewed as representing the Shona masses.

Both 5th Brigade and 'dissidents' operations and expectations placed civilians in Matabeleland in a difficult situation. Civilians were attacked by the 5th Brigade accusing them of supporting the 'dissidents', whilst 'dissidents' also terrorised them for not supporting them. What can be noted is that the post-independence peace building endeavours, especially the DDR process failed to provide a platform where Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups could unite, share their experiences and work together peacefully without competition, fear and suspicion.

What made the Ndebele to conflate the 5th Brigade with the Shona people in general was that it was exclusively constituted of Shona-speaking ex-ZANLAs with a negligible component of ex-ZIPRA cadres who were co-opted into the unit because of their knowledge of Ndebele language and geography of Matabeleland. From a total of 5 000 Brigade members, only about 300-400 were Ndebele speaking people (Sibanda, 2005). Their only job was to explain in IsiNdebele to the rest of the Brigade members should the need arise (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:23). According to one of Alexander's informants, the commander of the 5th Brigade told its members during the Pass out Parade that they should be ready to deal with 'dissidents' within the same Brigade (Alexander, 2008). That was in direct reference to the few Ndebele

speaking ex-ZIPRA members of the 5th Brigade. That mentality tells us a lot about the levels of mistrust between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants.

However, the then Minister of Defence, Sydney Sekeramayi defended the ethnic composition of the 5th Brigade on the grounds that ex-ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA units that were deployed to hunt down 'dissidents' usually deserted and joined the 'dissidents.' For Sekeremayi it was as if they were reinforcing the 'dissidents' through deploying ZNA units some of whom deserted (Dzinesa, 2005). Security-wise, it was logical to put together a loyal Brigade that could be trusted by ZANU-PF. However, what was illogical was that the 5th Brigade seemed to be directing their entire wrath against Ndebele speaking civilians as well as against ZIPRA ex-combatants who were serving in the ZNA and were found in their home districts whilst on official leave and those who had demobilised and were found in their homes doing civilian work. Mr X justified the desertions of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were part of the ZNA units tasked to clamp down on 'dissidents' on the grounds that they could not be found to be fighting some of their colleagues whom they knew became 'dissidents' due to pressing security challenges. They could show sympathy by deserting, not because they were supporting violent activities by the 'dissidents' but the broader cause (Interview, 2017).

The focus of the research is not on documenting all activities of the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland but only its ramifications as far as the ZIPRA ex-combatants and the general peace building process was concerned. Immediately after its deployment into Matabeleland districts in early 1983, the 5th Brigade imposed dusk-to-dawn curfews; banned the operations of the journalists from the curfew affected areas, established roadblocks, tortured and massacred thousands of civilians (Coltart, 2016). There was a grave security risk as many people starved and children failed to attend school in some of the worst affected zones. Instead of helping in the peace building endeavour, the 5th Brigade was part of the stumbling blocks on the way of attaining

positive peace as it made free movement of civilians and people doing business where they operated extremely difficult.

Although quite a lot of civilians were caught up in the inferno, the initial target appears to have been ZIPRA ex-combatants. According to Maqhula, the 5th Brigade always stopped and searched buses in the country side and the people they were looking for most were ZIPRA ex-combatants. ZIPRA ex-combatants who could not hide themselves effectively or who could not successfully disguise their military status were usually taken to torture camps in Tsholotsho and Kezi where they were finally killed and shoved into mine shafts (Interview with Maqhula, a ZIPRA ex-combatant who survived torture by the 5th Brigade, 2017). Since the label of being a 'dissident' applied to almost every ZIPRA ex-combatant, those who were still serving in the ZNA were not spared.

The net effect of the harassment of the ZIPRA ex-combatants was that many of those who were serving in the army stopped visiting their rural areas and those who still had small businesses abandoned them to the safety of the urban areas. With the deployment of the 5th Brigade, the persecution of the ZIPRA ex-combatants had become two-pronged. It was within the ZNA and outside. The case of Thambolenyoka who became a 'dissident' after demobilising illustrates the challenges faced by ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised during the period of the Gukurahundi. The non-intervention of the government when ZIPRA ex-combatants were harassed and killed by the 5th Brigade indicates that it was in its interest to see to it that ZIPRA was crushed. So, the issue of ethnic-related tensions could explain the harassment of the ZIPRA ex-combatants and Ndebele civilians by the ZANU-PF aligned 5th Brigade. The thesis argues that a government that is taking sides in a DDR process cannot provide security to all parties to the process. Instead, it fans divisions and abets the persecution of ex-combatants deemed 'others' and their civilian supporters. These ex-combatants ('others')

are not given any security guarantees but are made insecure through partisan and exclusive tactics and strategies.

6.4 Fear and Insecurity

ZIPRA ex-combatants endured both physical and human insecurity as a consequence of their experiences in DDR processes. The insecurity they suffered did not promote peace building but undermined it.

6.4.1 Physical Insecurity

To date, general fear and physical insecurity haunts most of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were once brutalised in the ZNA or in other areas outside the army. From a point of practical observation, all the ZIPRA ex-combatants that I interviewed demonstrated that the legacy of fear and insecurity surrounding their beatings, torture, arrests and the 'disappearances' of some of their colleagues from the army and civilian life still linger. When asked about their life experiences as demobilised ex-combatants as well as in the ZNA; they first looked side-ways, and then looked above their shoulders, pulled their heads towards the interviewer and spoke in very low voices. They continuously looked above their shoulders when narrating their tribulations as if something dangerous was approaching from behind. Even though participants were assured of their security before the commencement of the discussions, they felt unease during the discussions.

In fact, one participant, a SaSidudla kept on asking the following question during the course of the discussions: 'Ndlovu! Ufuna ukungibophisa?' Translated into the English language, this means; 'Ndlovu! Do you want to get me arrested?' When asked to explain what he meant and what his fears were all about, SaSidudla revealed that he was severely tortured by state security agents and finally arrested on allegations that he was a 'dissident' and also that he had cached some firearms in his rural home in Plumtree for purposes of destabilising the government. He

said he came from the liberation struggle without a single scar but suffered life threatening injuries after independence in the hands of ZANU-PF security forces (Interview, 2017). He said he did not want to endure such horrible experiences again.

Due to the harassment by the both the 5th Brigade and 'dissidents'; many rural homes were no go areas for demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants as well as ZIPRA cadres that were in the ZNA. This meant that they missed out in the land redistribution program of between 1980 and 1984. Secondly, it meant that they could not visit their families, relatives and friends in the countryside. ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised left their parents and friends in the countryside and hid themselves in urban areas during the height of ZANU-PF/ZANLA and PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA antagonisms. Ndebele who served in the ZNA until the post-2000 period said that he could not meet with his father in rural Plumtree for a long period during the early 1980s. Ndebele had this to say about his experiences in the 1980s:

> For some of us, we stopped visiting our rural areas in 1982. We resumed going to our parents' homes in 1988 after the signing of the Unity Accord. We did not want to risk our lives because the 5th Brigade did not care whether you were in the ZNA or not; to them, all ZIPRA ex-combatants and Ndebele speaking people were 'dissidents.' How could you then be expected to marry and found a family under those circumstances? Occasionally, our parents met us in cities, especially in Bulawayo but this was also difficult due to curfews in the rural areas that made travelling risky (Interview with Ndebele, 2017).

Quite a number of ZIPRA ex-combatants said they still felt unsafe because they are unsure of what can happen to them since there was never any apology, healing or reconciliation after the state-sponsored violence against them. Some of them even fear to engage in debates on contemporary political issues as they do not want to be labelled 'dissidents' again (Interview with Ndebele, 2017). Politically, some of them have not yet reintegrated since they fear to participate in political debates which affect the country. Nilsson (2005) posits that ex-combatants should not be politically marginalised after the conflict as doing so might cause frustration and re-ignite conflict.

The insecurity of most of the ZIPRA ex-combatants partly contributed to their non-participation in the WVCF as they thought that if they set foot in Harare where the processing of the payments was made, they would be arrested and detained. An interview with Kwete who is the Secretary for Legal Affairs in the ZNLWVA in Bulawayo Metropolitan Province and is also involved in the vetting of ex-combatants who did not receive their gratuities in 1997 revealed that most of the ex-combatants who currently come forward to be vetted are mainly ex-ZIPRA. The reasons for their delay in getting vetted in 1997 are many but chief among them is that some of them did not take the vetting exercise seriously in 1997. They thought that it was gimmick by ZANU-PF to get them into the country so that they could be arrested (Interview with Mathwasa, 2017). Others did not get the information about vetting as official communication was not sent by the government to the neighbouring countries about the exercise. In general, physical insecurity led to human insecurity as many ZIPRA ex-combatants could not freely participate in economic activities that could empower them due to fear of being harassed.

6.4.2 Human Insecurity

The challenges of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in the DDR processes were not only confined to physical insecurity. They also suffered from lack of human security. Although the generality of the ex-combatants across the divide could not successfully reintegrate economically, the predicament of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in economic terms was worse. Testimony to the fact that DDR processes were generally unfriendly for both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants was given by joint demonstrations by the two groups of former liberation fighters in the mid-1990s against the government for support. Besides the fact that the DDR process was politicised and ethnicised, ZANU-PF's approach towards the process was self-centred. It was

obsessed with its own security. Muggah (2010) divides security into two categories. These are the minimalist and the maximalist perspectives.

The minimalist perspective focuses on physical security whilst the maximalist perspective gives priority to the fulfilment of the needs of the people socially, economically and politically. Put differently, many ZIPRA ex-combatants experienced structural violence as their social and economic needs were not met. According to Cockell (2010), it is not only bombs and bullets that kill and maim people. Structural violence that is embedded into the structure of political, social and economic systems of society have equally harmful effects as direct violence. Many ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered physical and structural violence at the hands of the government which decided not to pay special attention to their physical and human security needs.

With regard to ex-combatants, if the government focuses on both the minimalist and maximalist perspectives of security, it means that they can be assured of both physical and human security. In the same vein, the UNDPKO (1999) noted that reintegration support increases the potential for former fighters and their dependants to sustain themselves economically and socially and avoid violent activities. Examples of assistance that can be given to the ex-combatants include cash pay-outs that can be invested in productive sectors or agricultural inputs which can help to generate income for ex-combatants. In most of the cases, ZIPRA ex-combatants were not assisted to effectively reintegrate into civil society. Instead, their economic projects were sabotaged by the government during the period of heightened inter-party tensions and clashes in the early to mid-1980s. Furthermore, the environment was not conducive for doing business in Matabeleland before the 1987 peace accord due to stringent security issues linked to the issue of ‘dissidents’ which led to the introduction of curfews that restricted free movement of people in and outside the region.

In the light of the above developments, Mazarire and Rupiya (2000:72) argue that through meddling in the operations of co-operative schemes run by ZIPRA ex-combatants as well as confiscating all their properties, the government, almost without realising it, was undermining one of its own policies, that of demobilising combatants with a severance package. As if this was not enough, some of the ZIPRA ex-combatants forsook collecting their demobilisation stipends due to security fears. When looking at the War Veterans community, Lamb (2013) divides it into two categories. That is the empowered and disempowered War Veterans. According to Lamb (2013), the former group is predominantly made up of ZANLA ex-combatants who lived near to normal lives, experiencing minimal physical insecurities in the early 1980s if any. They were able to use whatever little benefits they received from the government to upgrade themselves in life. The second group consisted of ZIPRA ex-combatants who experienced security challenges during the first DDR process and were in deplorable socio-economic conditions.

For example, ZANU-PF was able to create avenues for the advancement of ZANLA ex-combatants in different sectors of the economy. As a result, powerful committees were established in the work place which benefitted ex-ZANLA cadres (Lamb, 2013). ZIPRA ex-combatants could not easily penetrate the job market as much as the ZANLA ex-combatants could because they were perceived as 'dissidents' and were not getting political support in their endeavour to get employment.

There was general lack of positive peace among many ex-combatants (ZIPRA), especially those who demobilised in the early 1980s and failed to secure employment. Many of them became economically vulnerable and lived in abject poverty. In Bulawayo, ZIPRA ex-combatants became well-known for pushing and pulling carts, selling vegetables, while some became sculptors, cobblers, garden 'boys' and did all sorts of menial jobs not befitting the status of liberators, but just for purposes of survival. Others like Noel Sibanda resorted to

scavenging as he could not find employment and afford decent living. Sibanda relocated from Bulawayo urban to Ngozi Mine dumpsite on the outskirts of the city (Interview with Sibanda, 2017).

One thing that has to be made clear is that ZIPRA had the largest number of cadres who 'demobilised' in the 1980s due to security challenges noted earlier. This meant that in economic terms, ZIPRA had more of its cadres in deplorable economic conditions than ZANLA. According to Ndebele, an ex-combatant who did not serve in the ZNA or left before reaching his or her pensionable age currently earns a pension of $206 bond notes per month. An ex-combatant who served in the army and retired after reaching a pensionable age receives $206 bond notes for partipating in the liberation struggle plus about minus or plus $300 bond notes pension depending on one's rank for serving in the ZNA which gives him a total of about $500 bond notes (Interview, 2017). For those ex-combatants who benefitted from the WVCF, the effects of their benefits have a bearing on their current total monthly earnings. WVCF beneficiaries earn a much higher monthly pension because the disability compensation is paid to date irrespective of whether the claims were real or fabricated (Interview with Tshuma and Vodloza, two amongst a few ZIPRA ex-combatants who benefitted from the WVCF, 2017).

The disbursement of the lump sum gratuities in 1997 found the empowered and disempowered ex-combatants in general at different economic levels. The empowered ones were able to invest their money and get returns. However, many poverty-stricken ex-combatants had to start from scratch: building homes, buying houses, a few livestock and founding families. Due to their economic vulnerability, many poor ex-combatants fell victim to manipulation by the ruling ZANU-PF party in political campaign activities during election periods. The collusion between ZANU-PF and some ZIPRA ex-combatants tarnished their images and alienated them from civilians from the Matabeleland region. Social reintegration means that ex-combatants are

accepted back and tolerated by receiving communities (IDDRS, 2006). Many ZIPRA ex-combatants have had challenges with regard to social reintegration.

From the perspectives of the civilians in Matabeleland, ZIPRA ex-combatants are seen to be embodying a mercenary attitude as they started to support ZANU-PF despite the fact that it had victimised and disempowered them in the 1980s. Civilians thought that the change of attitudes by some ZIPRA ex-combatants was due to financial and material rewards they were receiving from ZANU-PF as well as the fear of losing those benefits when a different party wins in the elections. For the first time since independence, some ZIPRA ex-combatants openly demonstrated their support for ZANU-PF and its Presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe in the June 2000 Parliamentary elections that pitted the MDC against ZANU-PF (Coltart, 2016). The politicisation of the second reintegration program of 1997 by ZANU-PF perpetuated the feeling of insecurity among economically-weak ex-combatants. Ex-ZIPRA cadres in particular were the hardest hit by this feeling of insecurity, especially those who had languished in economic oblivion for the whole decade of the 1980s. This was mainly because reintegration support given to ex-combatants in 1997 and thereafter was deliberately presented as government favour to them that could be withdrawn at any time if they 'misbehaved.' 'Misbehaving' meant supporting any political party other than ZANU-PF.

Through its propaganda machinery, ZANU-PF usually tells ex-combatants that if they fail to campaign for it to ensure that it wins elections; the MDC would terminate their monthly pensions and evict them from the farms if it comes into power. Alexander and McGregor (2004) notes that whilst the majority of the people in Matabeleland punished ZANU-PF by not voting for it in elections from 2000 onwards, ZIPRA ex-combatants together with their ZANLA counterparts worked together in campaigning for ZANU-PF, in land occupations, company and state offices seizures and in terrorising suspected and known opposition supporters. A wedge has developed between civilians and ZIPRA ex-combatants where the former accuses the latter

of being puppets of ZANU-PF whilst some ZIPRA ex-combatants accuse civilians in general and those from Matabeleland in particular of selling-out by voting for the political opposition MDC.

The people of Matabeleland were and are still expecting the ZIPRA ex-combatants to speak openly and condemn the 5th Brigade atrocities and issues pertaining to the marginalisation of the Matabeleland region in general and seek redress, but instead, they witness some ZIPRA ex-combatants going on an overdrive in praising ZANU-PF and defending its policies (Alexander and McGregor, 2004). So, strategies used by some ex-ZIPRA cadres in coercing the people of Matabeleland into 'supporting' and voting for ZANU-PF since 2000 produced negative feelings about ZIPRA ex-combatants from the civilian population of Matabeleland. What has to be noted is that the sudden 'positive attitude' of some ZIPRA ex-combatants towards ZANU-PF since 2000 was an indication of the weaknesses of both the first DDR and second reintegration processes. Due to their deplorable economic conditions, many ZIPRA ex-combatants 'support' and vote for ZANU-PF out of lack of choice since it threatens them by telling them that if it loses political power, they would also lose their newly acquired status as War Veterans and their meagre economic benefits.

The collusion between ZANU-PF and ZIPRA ex-combatants specifically made them unpopular with the civilians they were supposed to reintegrate in (Interview with Moses Mzila Ndlovu, 2017). The reintegration of ZIPRA ex-combatants has remained problematic to date. First, they could not effectively reintegrate socially in the 1980s because they could not freely go to their villages as they were continuously hunted down as 'dissidents.' Secondly, they became resented by most of the civilians in Matabeleland in the post-2000 period as they are viewed as traitors who supported the same ZANU-PF that had victimised and marginalised them since the 1980s.

The people of Matabeleland who had suffered together with the ZIPRA ex-combatants in the hands of the 5th Brigade thought that ZIPRA ex-combatants abandoned them in favour of ZANU-PF because of material benefits. Mashingaidze (2005) has suggested that some form of community-based reintegration support to the people of Matabeleland could have been implemented after the Unity Accord so that benefits trickle down to the civilian population as well to compensate them for the losses they incurred in the early 1980s and to alleviate their resentment of the ex-combatants over what they view as preferential treatment. It is true that civilians in Matabeleland lost freedom, some died, whilst others lost properties, friends and relatives during the period of the 'dissidents' and 5th Brigade operations in the region. Therefore, compensating ZIPRA ex-combatants only has generated resentment and negative feelings about the whole reintegration program of 1997.

The other effect of the physical and human insecurity on ZIPRA ex-combatants is general frustration. The case of Sigoge who preferred to be cremated and his remains thrown into the Zambezi River clearly illustrate this point. Other ZIPRA ex-combatants expressed their frustration to ZANU-PF over its implementation of a partisan DDR process through abstaining from the national electoral processes. Jack Mpofu, Hadebe and Mpande confided to me that they only voted in the first elections that ushered in independence in 1980, and they have not voted since then because they are disappointed and frustrated due to unpleasant experiences within and without the ZNA (Interview, 2017). Since civilians are also disgruntled over the incomplete and partisan DDR process, an inclusive and participatory multi-stakeholder process could help to stabilise the situation and bring about national healing, unity, and reconciliation.

6.4.3 Political Capitulation

Sustained attacks on the ZIPRA ex-combatants, PF-ZAPU officials and the Ndebele speaking people in general by a ZANLA-dominated national army and the ZANU-PF loyal 5th Brigade

finally broke ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU's will to continue resisting ZANU-PF's onslaught. As a result, they succumbed to a 'peace agreement' (Unity Accord, 1987) on ZANU-PF terms. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:181) describes the Unity Accord as a 'surrender pact' or as an agreement where 'elites accommodated each other.' Ndlovu-Gatsheni's view about the Unity Accord carries some weight given the fact that there was nothing mentioned along the lines of trauma healing, compensation or reconciliation between the parties to the conflict of the 1980s, especially between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants who were physically fighting. The victims of violence were left with physical and emotional scars which have not completely healed to date.

It is correct that political elites managed to accommodate each because PF-ZAPU politicians who were thrown into political oblivion in February 1982 (after the collapse of GNU) were brought back into the political limelight through the Unity Accord. Joshua Nkomo became second in command as the Second Vice-President of Zimbabwe and the united ZANU-PF party whilst some of his colleagues also occupied some few prominent cabinet posts (Ncube, 1989). However, the spirit of unity did not cascade down to the grassroots in Matabeleland. The opposition MDC became very popular in Matabeleland as it came in at the right time to fill the political void that had been left by PF-ZAPU which had vanished from the political scene (Masunungure, 2004). The MDC was formed in September 1999 and that was immediately after the death of Joshua Nkomo in July 1999. Joshua Nkomo had helped rally the people of Matabeleland towards ZANU-PF due to his great political status and the respect the people of Matabeleland had for him.

The enthusiasm with which the people of Matabeleland welcomed the MDC illustrated the point that the Unity Accord had not addressed the critical challenges of people of Matabeleland which were mainly a result of an ineffectual DDR process and the resultant atrocities perpetrated by the 5th Brigade and the 'dissidents.' Although promotions of ZIPRA ex-

combatants resumed after 1987; the previous anomalies at the command levels which had been a result of the purging and arrest of senior former ZIPRA military personnel in the early 1980s was not addressed (Kriger, 2003). Furthermore, as the cases of Mazinyane and Dube have shown, the promotion of ex-ZIPRA cadres was slow even after 1987.

In the absence of senior former ZIPRA commanders, ZANLA ex-combatants utilised the situation to the fullest and took an unassailable lead in terms of occupying senior positions in the army and other security sectors. The fact that there was no impartial body to look into issues of past imbalances and unfairness in DDR processes meant that the marginalisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants in the army and other sectors of society continued unabated even after the Unity Accord. It was impossible for competing parties to effectively sort out their DDR challenges, reconcile and embrace each other without the assistance of an impartial third party.

No single clause in the Unity Accord agreement referred to problematic DDR issues. Many ZIPRA personnel had been dislodged from the ZNA illegally in the early 1980s, some were arrested and detained on trumped up charges, whilst thousands were marginalised in demobilisation and reintegration processes, with their properties confiscated and co-operatives schemes undermined. Whereas in the 1980s, ZIPRA ex-combatants had grudgingly accepted their junior status in the army, after the Unity Accord, despair concerning ever getting redress on their grievances made those who remained in the army to accept their 'inferior status' to ZANLA ex-combatants and to take abnormal things as normal. In fact, PF-ZAPU leadership was coerced into accepting that it was them together with ZIPRA ex-combatants who were responsible for insecurity and violence in Matabeleland (Chiwewe, 1989:283). Clause Number 8 of the Unity Accord read:

> The present leadership of PF-ZAPU shall take immediate vigorous steps to eliminate and end insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland (Chiwewe, 1989:283).

The implication of the clause was simple. ZANU-PF shifted all the blame for the violence in Matabeleland after independence to PF-ZAPU. All that happened to ZIPRA ex-combatants in the ZNA in terms of physical persecution as well as the harsh experiences of those of them who demobilised in the hands of the 5th Brigade and the 'dissidents' was just swept under carpet and forgotten. The strategy of systematic purging of both PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants made it possible for them to accept unity on ZANU-PF terms (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The will of ZANU-PF prevailed both politically and militarily. However, the revival of ZAPU on the 8th November 2008 and the formation of the ZWVA in May 2016 to articulate specific grievances that affect ZIPRA ex-combatants indicate that some (ZIPRA ex-combatants and former PF-ZAPU officials) still have the will to see to it that past injustices brought by an ineffectual DDR process and related acts of violence are dealt with.

Although the senior leadership of the former PF-ZAPU capitulated to the political wishes of ZANU-PF through agreeing to a one-sided Unity Accord, some ZIPRA ex-combatants were adamant to accept the Accord since it did not address critical issues which troubled them. For example, one of their grievances is lack of truth on what led them to leave the army in the 1980s. They want the findings of the Simplicius Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry to be released. The Commission was set up by the government to investigate the causes of their (ZIPRA ex-combatants) desertions from the ZNA, but to date, its findings have not been made public (Msipa, 2015).

Some of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were aware of the loopholes of the Unity Accord took advantage of the formation of the MDC to challenge ZANU-PF as they took up leadership positions in the fledging opposition party and contested as Members of Parliament (MPs). Examples of ZIPRA ex-combatants who challenged ZANU-PF as MPs on an MDC ticket in elections since 2000 are Moses Mzila Ndlovu, Paul Themba Nyathi, Paulos Matjaka, and Gibson Sibanda among others. To Coltart (2016), the decision of some ZIPRA ex-combatants

to challenge ZANU-PF coupled with the overwhelming Ndebele vote for the MDC was a clear indication of their bitterness over their marginalisation by ZANU-PF. There is no evidence that Shona speaking ZIPRA ex-combatants ever joined the opposition MDC and this could also indicate the ethnic dimension of the DDR process. It is apparent that to date, the scars opened by a partisan DDR have not healed. Through supporting and voting for the MDC, it can be argued, the people of Matabeleland in general and a few ZIPRA ex-combatants are trying to put across a message that they are not happy over what they perceive as deliberate marginalisation by the government and its failure to deal with effects of acts of injustice, violence, and discrimination that took place in the past and affected them adversely, especially in DDR programs.

6.5 Heroes and Hero Statuses for ZIPRA Ex-Combatants

The conflict that pitted ZANU-PF/ZANLA against PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA after independence was fought in different battle zones. In all the battle zones, PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants emerged losers. Their antagonistic relationships which were aimed at undermining each other also disadvantaged former ZIPRA forces in hero and heroine status conferment. Since PF-ZAPU politicians were accused of sponsoring 'dissidents', they were not considered for hero status during the period of the inter-party animosities between 1982 and 1987. The same applied to former ZIPRA commanders and other luminaries of the liberation struggle linked to PF-ZAPU.

Zimbabwe came up with a national program of honouring its heroes and heroines through burying them at Heroes Acres. These shrines are divided into National, Provincial and District Heroes Acres. One is buried in any one of the three in accordance with what is deemed to be his or her contribution(s) towards the liberation of Zimbabwe as well as commitment to the post-independence state (Kriger, 1995). From the onset, one has to state that the status of being

a ‘dissident’ contradicted that of being a hero. Thus, many ZIPRA ex-combatants were marginalised in the conferment of hero and heroine status because of the loose application of the term ‘dissident’ to all ZIPRA ex-combatants.

What compounded the challenges of ZIPRA ex-combatants with regards to hero and heroine statuses was the fact that the conferment of hero and heroine status especially at the national level is decided by the ZANU-PF Politiburo (its highest decision-making body outside Congress) (Kriger, 1995). It became obvious that ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU politicians who did not and are continuing refusing to tow the political line of ZANU-PF lose out in the process of selecting heroes. Many ZIPRA ex-combatants were bitter that their liberation war contributions were undermined. It is interesting to note that there are even some few ZANLA ex-combatants and ZANU-PF politicians who have suffered like ZIPRA ex-combatants and former PF-ZAPU politicians with regards to being denied heroe and/or heroine statuses because of being deemed to have crossed the path of ZANU-PF or that of its President.

PF-ZAPU challenged the partisan way in which the heroes and heroines were identified, but was not successful since it was out of power between 1982 and 1987, and even if it was co-opted into government after 1987, it came in as a defeated party with no significant political powers. For example, PF-ZAPU felt that Ruth Nyamurowa, who was commander of Victory Camp in Zambia during the liberation struggle, qualified to be a national heroine. However, she was not declared a national heroine and the reason was that the Prime Minister was outside the country during the time of her death (Kriger, 1995).

Another luminary of the liberation struggle, Lookout Masuku, was not honoured with a national hero status. This was because he was suspected of having tried to dethrone ZANU-PF in 1982 through encouraging ZIPRA ex-combatants to cache arms. He was arrested and detained in 1982 and died immediately after his release in April 1986 (CCJP, 1997). He was buried

alongside civilians at Lady Stanley Cemetery in Bulawayo. Besides the verdict of the ZANU-PF Politiburo on one's hero status, the final decision on who should and should not be declared a national hero or heroine rested and continues to rest with the President of ZANU-PF. Many genuine heroes and heroines not known to him or whom he did not personally want to recognise as heroes and heroines lost out.

The process leading to the declaration of a person as a national hero starts from a request by his or her home Province for such a status. Mazinyane notes one major challenge in this arrangement. The challenge is that former PF-ZAPU politicians who joined ZANU-PF after 1987 feared and continue to fear to genuinely represent the interests of former PF-ZAPU politicians and ZIPRA ex-combatants (Interview, 2017). What they want is to benefit economically and politically as individuals and therefore do not want to antagonise their superiors through discussing some issues which could turn out to be controversial and unwelcome in ZANU-PF (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) cited in Munemo (2016) aptly describes the behaviour of these former PF-ZAPU leaders who are in ZANU-PF government today as similar to those of colonial constables. They think that their brief in government is to represent Mugabe and later Mnangagwa after the ouster of the former and to also defend ZANU-PF policies in Matabeleland rather than articulating the challenges faced by their former party PF-ZAPU, ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR processes, and the people of Matabeleland in general.

Coupled with the fact that the ascendancy of a ZIPRA cadre within the ranks of the army was mainly based on the distance between that cadre and PF-ZAPU and the Ndebele people in general, these former ZIPRA officers either did not know some senior ZIPRA ex-combatants who deserved national hero status, or if they knew them, feared to jeopardise their positions through speaking on their behalf (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). It is arguable that the

behaviour of both former ZIPRA cadres and former PF-ZAPU politicians within the united ZANU-PF party was and is still tantamount to selling-out. Even members of the former ZIPRA who occupied very high positions in the ZNLWVA did not use their positions and influence to specifically articulate the grievances of ZIPRA ex-combatants within the national association. For example, Chenjerai 'Hitler' Hunzvi and Jabulani Sibanda, both former ZIPRA combatants, were once in different times national chairpersons of the ZNLWVA. However, they never utilised their positions to speak out on the marginalisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR programs.

However, for someone who understands their previous negative experiences within DDR programs and in the political sphere generally would appreciate that their actions were motivated more by the fear to be found on the wrong side of the popular political discourse. ZANU-PF did not hesitate to intervene in the leadership of the ZNLWVA if it thought that it was 'losing direction' by not propagating party policies and programs. Another point to note is that since the request for hero status emanated from the home Provinces of the deceased person, many PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA personnel were so frustrated by unfair treatment so much so that they do not bother anymore to actively involve themselves in national issues and politics. In this respect, some of the former PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA leaders have declined through their relatives to be laid to rest at the National Heroes shrine even if they would have been declared national heroes and heroines by ZANU-PF, their argument being that they could not accept to be honoured in a special way at death whilst they were demonised and hunted down as 'dissidents' during their lifetime. Welshman Mabhena, former PF-ZAPU Secretary General is one example of an individual who told his family that they should not allow ZANU-PF to bury him at the National Heroes Acre even it so wished (Interview with Dabengwa, 2017). Dabengwa is the latest high profile ZIPRA ex-combatant to be declared a national heroe but buried in his home village of Manxeleni, Ntabazinduna in Matabeleland North.

Even though there is no harm in someone choosing his resting place after death, however, the high number of high profile ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU politicians who refuse (through their surviving relatives) after being declared national heroes to be buried at the National Heroes Acre compared to that of ZANLA ex-combatants and politicians from the original ZANU-PF of before 1987 speaks volumes about the nature of relationships between the two former liberation movements and their former military wings. Speeches that are usually uttered during burials of ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU politicians who refuse to be buried at the National Heroes Acre by their surviving friends and relatives indicate that true unity and reconciliation are yet to be achieved in Zimbabwe. The speeches indicate anger over past victimisation and neglect of ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU politicians by a ZANU-PF government.

The consequences of a partisan and discriminatory DDR processes pervaded almost every facet of life and undermined peace building as the common experience of most ZIPRA ex-combatants, PF-ZAPU officials, and their supporters was that of persecution, violence, humiliation, and marginalisation. Competition for power, influence, recognition, and legitimacy was notable in almost every sphere of life where the two former liberation parties and their former military wings had interests. The consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR indicate that true unity, sustainable peace, and reconciliation were undermined by conflictual and strained relationships that were brought about by compromised and partisan DDR programs.

6.6 Conclusion

ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in DDR processes revealed that a compromised DDR process that is implemented by a partisan government undermines peace building. There is the creation of a 'Security Dilemma', 'dissidents', and disempowerment of a group of ex-combatants that are deemed a threat to the government's political hegemony. Unity in the

country was undermined. Fear, ethnic mistrust and hostilities were accentuated as the DDR process was implemented along political and ethnic lines which to a large extent marginalised ZIPRA ex-combatants as their physical and human security was compromised. Through violence and political manipulation, the government was able to successfully create a 'ZANU-nised' national army which dabbled in national politics at will.

The coup that was staged by the army in November 2017, leading to the ouster of former President, Robert Mugabe, could be partly attributed to the politicisation of the army and allowing it to dabble in national politics willy-nilly. The chapter illustrated the glaring need for interactive inter-party workshops targeted at inculcating a mindset of nation building and reconciliation so that antagonistic parties could learn to tolerate and co-operate in nation building and peace building processes like DDR. The consequences of perpetual fear, mistrust and bitterness amongst ZIPRA ex-combatants and the people of Matabeleland in general is that quite a significant group of people feel marginalised and do not fully participate in nation building activities.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

The chapter concludes the thesis and draws the main arguments together. It highlights the major findings and proffers recommendations on how best a DDR process can be implemented by a government in the context of ethnic based political and military formations that are embroiled in mutual mistrusts, fears, rivalries and sometimes open clashes.

7.2 Major Findings

The thesis demonstrated that in a context of competing and ethnic-based political and military formations, the government that designs and implements the DDR programs discriminates against the rival military formation in DDR processes and also works hard to decimate the power base of its rival political party. Deep-rooted political differences between political parties negatively affect relationships, perceptions, attitudes, behaviours, and feelings between different ex-combatant factions, making it difficult to implement impartial and effective DDR programs. The government's lack of political will and commitment to cultivate and entrench a spirit of mutual respect, tolerance, trust, understanding, empathy, unity, and peace among parties to the DDR process stifles genuine reconciliation and confidence between critical stakeholders to the DDR process. This contributes significantly to military cleavages and clashes. A 'Security Dilemma' created by the political leadership is usually passed down to 'political armies.' Clashes at APs between ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants were a manifestation of rivalries between political parties. It is clear that a partisan DDR process does not restore broken relations between feuding political parties and between ex-combatants. To date, ralations between the ruling ZANU-PF government and ZIPRA ex-combatants are strained though at different intervals they forge political 'alliances' as a result of the politicisation of reintegration benefits of 1997 which were presented as a favour by the government.

It was established that it is difficult for a government to implement impartial and effective DDR programs in a context like Zimbabwe. The context under which the DDR process was designed and implemented in Zimbabwe was laden with competition, mutual suspicion, mistrust, fear, and outright hostility in many cases between the key stakeholders to the process. South Africa was able to successfully design and implement its DDR programs amidst divisions between political and military formations and without the assistance of a third party because the government was non-partisan and fully committed towards genuine reconciliation. As a result, ex-combatants respected and trusted each other in South Africa even though they had operated under different and at times hostile political formations during the fight against the Apartheid system.

In Zimbabwe, there was a 'Security Dilemma' which undermined the effectiveness of the process. Using its political muscle, the government manipulated the process at the expense of ZIPRA ex-combatants. The entire peace building process was thus negatively affected. The major challenge was that the government that designed and implemented the DDR process evolved directly from one of the parties embroiled in ethnic-based competitions and hostilities. In that way, the government tends to support one military faction against the other and this is done to promote its selfish political interests. The persecution and marginalisation of the 'Other' is caused by the fact that both political and military formations compete for resources, political power, positions, legitimacy and general recognition. If not regulated by a third party and if there are no vigorous programs meant to change the mindset of the competing parties, such competitions explode into violent clashes between opposite armed military factions.

It became clear from the findings that the agenda of the rival party in government would be to weaken and finally subjugate its rival(s), politically, militarily and economically. In a bid to underline the importance of the ethnic factor in the victimisation and marginalisation of the ZIPRA ex-combatants by the numerically superior Shona-dominated ZNA and the ZANU-PF

led government which was entirely made up of Shona speaking politicians after 1982, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:23) had this to say:

> ZANUPF's agenda was to dominate South-Western Zimbabwe and silence PF-ZAPU and the Ndebeles. In order to fulfil their agenda, PF-ZAPU was deliberately viewed as a party that sponsored 'dissidents'; Joshua Nkomo was labelled as father of 'dissidents', every young Ndebele man was a potential 'dissident', all ex-ZIPRA including those serving in the ZNA were 'dissidents', and the entire population of Matabeleland constituted a 'dissident' community.

The agenda of discriminating against political and military rivals is not only pursued within the military and political spheres, but within the socio-economic systems of the state as well and the target is to totally weaken and destroy the rival party and its supporting military wing if possible, by denying it access to vital resources.

The first strategy used by a government that is in competition with other parties, but is in charge of DDR programs is to break the military backbone of the political rivals. In the process of breaking the military power of the rival party, the government implements a partisan and discriminatory integration of the armed forces that is usually at the detriment of the armed forces of the political party without political power. In pursuit of the agenda of the governing party to achieve political hegemony, the national army is usually politicised and ethnicised and is let to dabble in national politics at will as long as it helps to push the agenda of the ruling elite.

The relationships between the members of the national army that originate from an environment of ethnic rivalries between political formations exhibit a loser-winner mentality. It became clear from the findings that it is always difficult for former antagonistic military forces to reconcile on their own even if they work together in one national army and in joint reintegration programs. It is possible that they could reconcile if reconciliation and strong confidence building workshops are held at APs and at other relevant platforms, and if there is

the creation of inclusive political, social and economic programs across political and military formations at the national level.

In that difficult process of reconciliation, parties have to be assisted by a neutral third party to lower tensions, iron out differences, and develop a common approach to national and DDR issues and finally learn to treat each other as partners rather than competitors and enemies. In that way, the transmission of political misunderstandings and rivalries into military circles and the creation of a 'Security Dilemma' could be minimised or avoided. Once at APs, no ex-combatant was left with any military equipment in Uganda. Demobilisation reduced force size whilst the VAP catered for the special needs of ex-combatants and the receiving communities throughout rural Uganda. That process promoted unity and reconciliation around villages hence Uganda's DDR process is an example of a success story (Lewis et al, 2010).

In line with the third objective of the study which sought to establish the nature of ZIPRA ex-combatants' experiences in the DDR processes, it was established that they had torrid experiences within the security establishments as well as in civilian life as demobilised cadres. The disarmament and demobilisation processes were not impartial and as a result, disadvantaged ZIPRA ex-combatants although their discrimination was not as glaring as in the ZNA and in reintegration programs. Their experiences in DDR programs denied them both negative and positive peace. Lack of negative peace forced a few ZIPRA ex-combatants into becoming 'dissidents' whilst lack of positive peace led them to be vulnerable to political manipulation by ZANU-PF after the second reintegration program of 1997.

The study exposed that a DDR process that is led by the government amidst contestations for power between political factions is inclined to be partisan and undermines other critical elements of the peace building process. Ethnic-related rivalries and hostilities have adverse effects on the entire DDR process. Therefore, the consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants'

experiences in the DDR process was that they undermined peace building efforts. Four distinct but interrelated processes were rolled out simultaneously with the DDR process in Zimbabwe. These were the national elections to choose the government of the state, the GNU, the policy on national reconciliation and socio-economic development programs. All these peace building processes were negatively affected by a partisan and ineffectual DDR process.

Elections that are carried out in the context of ethnic-related political and military rivalries exacerbate inter-party tensions. There were allegations by PF-ZAPU of electoral meddling by ZANLA ex-combatants in favour of ZANU-PF in the 1980 elections. As a result, PF-ZAPU believed that without the involvement of ZANLA cadres in intimidating its supporters, it could have fared much better. So, the questions that were raised regarding the credibility of the 1980 elections cast doubts on the legitimacy of the government. Further to this, the GNU could not hold beyond 1982 due to military-related security challenges linked to the arms cache 'discovery' and the issue of 'dissidents' that were all directly blamed on ZIPRA ex-combatants. In the midst of the two challenges, the policy on reconciliation crumbled as the conflict that had been White on Black during the liberation struggle turned out to be Black on Black after independence. Hostile and competing military formations cannot successfully integrate themselves, neither can they reconcile easily if there is no political will from the governing party to design and implement impartial and inclusive DDR programs. It can be noted that political challenges easily spill over into the military arena as the case of the inadequate DDR process in Zimbabwe has shown.

The results of an ineffectual DDR process affect socio-economic programs and political dynamics and relationships for a long time. Due to the lingering residual effects of their challenges in the first DDR process (1980-1984), some ZIPRA ex-combatants were hoodwinked by ZANU-PF to be its storm troopers who became involved in the terrorisation of villagers in Matabeleland regions into 'supporting' and voting for ZANU-PF from 2000

onwards. In the first process there was violence on ZIPRA ex-combatants, but in the second one (1997 and the period afterwards), there was violence by some ZIPRA ex-combatants on civilians. All these developments undermined the peace building process as fear, violence, and uncertainty dominated. In all, the experiences of ZIPRA in DDR programs were to a large extent negative. Developmental programs and projects were adversely affected in Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands during the period of overt violence (1982-1987).

The thesis explored the phenomenon of dissidence and established that there was a strong nexus between 'dissidents' and the experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR processes. It became clear that ineffective, partisan and discriminatory DDR processes produce 'dissidents.' The victimisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants within and outside the ZNA by government agents produced 'dissidents.' In the context of mutually hostile ethnic based military formations, the problem of 'dissidents' is usually ethnicised, regionalised and politicised by the ruling party/government in order to have a pretext to eliminate its rivals.

All in all, it became clear that the issue of arms caches, their 'discovery' as well as the phenomenon of 'dissidents' especially after 1982 were to a large extent fabrication by the government that was yearning to legitimise its violent strategies of subduing both ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU. Testimony to this argument is given by the fact that the alleged chief architects of the arms cache issue and the purported masterminds behind the 'dissidents,' Masuku and Dabengwa, were once arrested, detained, acquitted by the courts but later re-arrested and kept under unlawful detention for half a decade until 1986. Later on, the two were declared national heroes, though for Masuku it was done posthumously and moreso, long after his death. The argument is that they could not have been declared national heroes by ZANU-PF government if indeed they were behind those alleged treasonous and reactionary developments.

7.3 Recommendations

In the light of a plethora of challenges that undermine peace building efforts if a DDR process is led by the government in an environment where political and military formations are competing against each other based on politicised ethnic differences, the thesis recommends that there has to be open and frank dialogue predicated on truth telling, acknowledgement of wrongs done in the past, and if possible, compensatory justice to heal the wounds of victims of unfair DDR programs and foster sustainable peace, unity and reconciliation.The purpose of dialogue is to narrow and finally eradicate differences between political and military formations through facilitating mindset transformation and positive engagement. Common nation building approaches should replace narrow and partisan approaches to nation and peace building predicated on intolerance, suspicion, rivalry, refusal to co-operate and a quest to outcompete each other.

Although the first DDR process in Zimbabwe took place over thirty years ago, the formation and operationalization of a NDDRC could still help in the present moment to deal holistically and in a transparent way with challenges that beset ZIPRA ex-combatants due to the design and implementation of a defective DDR process. This could include among other things, the return of ZIPRA properties or compensation of some kind, affirmative economic action and psycho-social counselling to cater for victims of economic marginalisation as well mental and physical victimisation. The recommendations of this study go along with AUC (2014) proposals. It suggests that a NDDRC with a broad group of critical stakeholders be established to spearhead and cater for the facilitation of successful DDR programs. The NDDRC would take a lead in consultation with various stakeholders to ensure that those who need and deserve support in DDR processes are taken care of. The NDDRC can also coordinate with some international organisations like the AU and the UN as well as with funding partners to deal with problem areas in the DDR processes (AUC, 2014). This would help avoid the

manipulation or abuse of the DDR process by any of the parties, including the government. In other words, the government should not be left alone to design and implement DDR programs in a context like Zimbabwe.

Even in the context of ethnic based political and military formations, it is recommended that government lead the DDR process but with the assistance of a well-constituted NDDRC that would provide the much needed political and strategic oversight on the whole DDR process. Drawing from the AUC (2014) propositions on DDR programs in the context of the continent of Africa, inclusivity and impartiality should be made top priorities in the context of competing and sometimes contradictory interests of parties to the DDR process. In order to achieve this, the NDDRC should co-ordinate with relevant government Ministries and non-governmental organisations.

Inclusive and participatory programs and activities that can transform conflictual, exclusive, competitive, selfish and divisive mindsets in a context of a government led DDR process with ethnic and regionally-based competing political and military formations into those of mutual trust, confidence, empathy, inclusivity and tolerance towards each other can help build peace, unity and reconciliation. The key issue is that the DDR process should be as inclusive and participatory as possible to make sure that there is building of collaborative problem-solving mechanisms between competing military and political factions that help to reduce negative and divisive feelings, attitudes, perceptions, and relationships. This approach would help counter the spirit of trying to weaken and subjugate one of the parties to the DDR process and develop that of learning from each other's experiences to implement an effective and impartial DDR process.

The aim of undertaking inclusive and participatory activities in the political and military spheres would be to breakdown stereotypes and prejudices and avoid the discrimination of one

of the parties to the DDR process. ZIPRA ex-combatants were viewed as 'dissidents' and anti-establishment by the government. As a result of this stereotype, they were isolated in reintegration programs and persecuted in military and civilian circles. If the government was not overwhelmed by the desire to entrench itself politically and to get rid of its competitors and 'enemies', it could have found it easy to establish common ground and mindset between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants because they shared the same ideology from the liberation struggle.

The national government, external and internal implementing partners as well as the NDDRC should promote collaborative, inclusive inter-political and inter-military processes and activities to create a conducive platform for an effective DDR process. If PF-ZAPU politicians were not dismissed from the GNU, if senior ZIPRA military personnel were not purged from the ZNA, and if sensitive security ministries were co-shared between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU politicians; then that could have made it possible and easy for them to work collaboratively with their counterparts from ZANU-PF and ZANLA to decisively and impartially find durable solutions to challenges that affected ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR processes.

Key among the processes and actions that could help inculcate an inclusive and collaborative mindset is the holding of reconciliation, peace building and nation building workshops, first at APs before disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, and integration programs; and then later, within integrated security sectors, among demobilised ex-combatants, within and across political parties in order to help transform the mindset of violence, fear, mistrust, suspicion, bitterness, and competition to that of mutual trust, tolerance, co-operation and peaceful co-existence. Holding reconciliation, peace building, and nation building workshops at APs or cantonment sites would be specifically targeted at assuring ex-combatants of their future so that they could agree to disarm and demobilise. As indicated in chapter four, competing military factions that have feelings of mutual mistrust and insecurity have a tendency of holding

back some of their military personnel as well as caching some of their weapons during the disarmament process. The disarmament process was shambolic due to mutual mistrust and fear.

Secondly, inclusive and collaborative activities like reconciliation, nation and peace building workshops would be aimed at transforming negative and exclusive mindsets so that different military factions learn to tolerate each other during military integration into a single army and also develop enough mutual trust and confidence that would enable them to work together in joint reintegration programs without friction. Operation SEED, a joint reintegration program between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants crumbled partly because they could not accommodate each other and work together. They started to fight each other during the course of the program (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). This was partly caused by the fact that national reconciliation was only pronounced but not effectively practised. It was more theoretical than practical and left fundamental issues that divided ZANU-PF/ZANLA and PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA unadressed.

If ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres were taught to hate, despise and fight each other by their respective political leaders and Commissariat Departments during the liberation struggle and thereafter, it is possible that they could be taught again to change that mindset by the same political leadership, working together with the NDDRC through open and frank dialogue and workshops for them to be tolerant, empathetic, respectful, and loving towards each other for the benefit of effective DDR processes, peace, unity and stability. In the case of political-cum-military forces, it is recommended that these workshops be targeted at depoliticising the ex-combatants so as to diminish entrenched hardline political positions and develop a common and shared national vision.

For example, one hardline political position which ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants held was that they had imagined the post-colonial state through an ethnic mindset and therefore

expected nothing less than victory for their respective political parties in the 1980 and 1985 general elections. ZIPRA ex-combatants were badly haunted by the loss of PF-ZAPU in both elections, and to make matters worse, ZANLA ex-combatants capitalised on that electoral loss in their relationships with them and that disturbed DDR programs. Political and military inclusivity can play a critical role in bringing together adversaries in DDR programs and help the government to succeed in the implementation of DDR programs. It is possible that ex-combatants with a depoliticised mindset are not easily affected by what happens between their respective political parties.

Where possible, there should be compensation for damages and losses incurred through omission or commission by any of the parties to the DDR process to facilitate genuine reconciliation that would enable former adversaries to leave the past behind, focus into the future and be willing to work together without any challenges. Ex-combatants should be actively involved in defining the type of justice that they prefer in order to bring finality to their challenges. Engagement in those workshops should be frank and be facilitated by a NDDRC to help parties find each other peacefully and to lessen tensions. Third parties should facilitate the process of engagement, reconciliation, offer advice and recommendations but should not dictate what should be done. This ensures local ownership of the process, hence its sustainability.

Moving forward, the NDDRC if it is formed, together with the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) which is currently seized with issues of past injustices, peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe, should, among other things, specifically target ZIPRA ex-combatants who experienced abuse, disempowerment, and unfairness in the DDR process, and come up with positive and viable strategies of dealing with those challenges. With regard to Matabeleland regions, the NPRC is currently dealing generally with the issue of Gukurahundi and there is no deliberate strategy of targeting ZIPRA ex-combatants who

experienced challenges in DDR processes with the view of addressing them. In that context, the NPRC could possibly help in addressing the contentious issue of ZIPRA ex-combatants' properties and other issues where ZIPRA ex-combatants felt disadvantaged and marginalised.

Focus should be on building a national army not a party army. Songs and slogans should promote nation building not the interests of a single party. Ex-combatants should be made aware that they fought for national interests not partisan party interests. It is suggested that the administration of key and sensitive security ministries be co-shared between political parties at first up until enough trust and confidence is built so as to cultivate a spirit of stakeholdership in the government among all ex-combatants. In that way, incidences of inter-faction clashes could be minimised. If representatives of all military factions are incorporated into the leadership structures of the army, police, intelligence, and airforce, issues pertaining to discrimination of some elements could be effectively attended to.

Again, all ex-combatants would feel represented in the security sector and in this way, they are bound to co-operate in peace building efforts. The case of the removal of ZIPRA military leaders from the army illustrates this point. After the removal of Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku from the ZNA as well other senior ZIPRA commanders from 1982 onwards, the victimisation of ex-ZIPRA cadres in the ZNA escalated leading to their desertions and 'demobilisation' *en masse.* Their desertions presented a 'Security Dilemma' as ZANU-PF/ZANLA felt vulnerable. The feeling of vulnerability led to the creation of the 5th Brigade which diminished the security of PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA.

Other intervention measures that could be recommended to facilitate effective government implementation of DDR processes include the recognition of war or battle songs/music of all the military factions and playing them on national television, radio and during the commemoration of important national events on a rotational basis; the creation of a war

museum that keeps the war history of all political and military formations and the formation of a neutral all-stakeholders committee to look into the heroe and heroine status of all ex-combatants, politicians and other deserving civilians. By doing that, all politicians and military personnel would feel recognised and honoured and would participate positively in peace building processes like DDR. When enough trust and confidence has been built between rival political and military formations, then, new and inclusive songs/music could be developed reflecting the inclusive nature and character of the government and its security establishments. Tensions between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants after independence were exacerbated by the state radio and television which was consistent in praising ZANLA whilst at the same time discrediting ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU (Doran, 2017).

Political processes that generate acute competition like winner-takes-all electoral systems to be discarded or minimised in favour of inclusive processes where parties do not vigorously compete and undermine each other. It is not only in Zimbabwe where competitive elections caused further divisions and heightened emotions between political parties and pushed them to incite their military wings to fight, and in the process, undermine DDR processes. Angola is a case in point. After its defeat in the 1992 elections, the UNITA rebel movement of Jonas Savimbi refused to concede defeat and re-ignited the civil war. In the case of Zimbabwe, some of the political and military challenges could have been averted had it been that the 1980 elections were contested by the PF as one political entity. Campaigning for the February and August 1980 general and local government elections respectively heightened inter-party competition and tensions.

Although liberal peace building theorists argue that the holding of elections is one of the fundamental elements of peace building, in a context of hostile and competing political and military formations, elections tend to accentuate divisions and incite violence and should be avoided in favour of other inclusive and non-competitive processes that confer legitimacy to

political parties to govern. Competitive elections are divisive and conflictual and usually cause instability in many societies. This is worse in a multi-ethnic community where campaigning and voting are usually done along ethnic and regional lines.

In a conflict situation, political parties and leaders are the ones that mobilise, politicise and deploy soldiers to achieve particular objectives. In the same vein, in a post-conflict environment, political parties and leaders have the potential and power to depoliticise ex-combatants and develop in them a positive nation building and peace building mindset that can help to achieve successful implementation of DDR. Clashes at APs, as well as within integrated military units and government infringement on ZIPRA reintegration programs was a manifestation of challenges in the political arena, not the other way. It is recommended that reconciliation, nation building, peace building and mindset change workshops and efforts also target politicians within political parties to enable them to accommodate each other and speak with one voice pertaining to issues to do with DDR. Soldiers always follow and emulate the mindset of politicians not vice versa.

The mindset of viewing all ZIPRA ex-combatants as 'dissidents' emanated from ZANU-PF as a governing party and cascaded down to the ZANLA ex-combatants. For effective DDR, that attitude and perception needed to be transformed to enable the ex-combatants to work together harmoniously. To illustrate the point that attitudes, feelings, perceptions, and relationships can be positively transformed to some extent, one has to look into the case of ZANU-PF-PF-ZAPU unity agreement of 1987. When the two parties united and stopped treating each other as enemies, it did not take a long time for ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants to embrace and work with each other positively through the ZNLWVA. The signing of the Unity Accord changed ZANLA feelings and perceptions that all ZIPRA ex-combatants were 'dissidents.' It is noteworth that negative perceptions and feelings can be changed through inclusive and collaborative processes.

The purpose of the NDDRC is to coordinate with other players and design a DDR policy that speaks directly and effectively to all the critical players in the DDR process, especially the competing ex-combatants and their political parties. The framework of the NDDRC should be provided for in the peace agreement, but the finer policy details should be left to the government and the NDDRC itself. All key and relevant Ministries to the DDR process should be consulted to ensure that the reintegration of the ex-combatants is carried out in tandem with their needs and the general developmental trajectory of the state, and all other contextual factors, especially the nature of relationships between political and military formations involved in DDR processes. It was noted in chapter two that one of the determinants of successful DDR is political will and trust from the political parties and military formations. It is assumed that the participation of all critical stakeholders to a DDR process in a NDDRC would help to generate the much-needed political will and trust in the entire DDR process. It is envisaged that if parties work together through a NDDRC in DDR programs, then they would gain trust and confidence in each other and avoid a 'Security Dilemma.'

The inclusion of external implementing partners can assist in securing adequate funding to cater for the needs and challenges of the competing factions. External implementing partners could be the AU, UN. EU, the World Bank among others. The implementing partners could also be guarantors of the DDR process to check on breaches and sanction the culprit(s) if necessary. The suggested DDR approach is built on the general AUC (2014) DDR proposals for the African continent and these are supported by the logic of TOC which seeks to facilitate inclusivity in all projects and programs. Inclusive implementation of programs can facilitate positive behavioural and attitudinal changes among and between key stakeholders to the DDR process.

The AUC (2014) suggests that national governments together with implementing partners should establish a technical and management body to practically implement the DDR policy

developed by the NDDRC. The technical implementation and management body should act as the secretariat of the NDDRC, making sure that all decisions and plans are followed through. As seen in chapter two, national ownership and leadership of the DDR process is not an option, but that ownership and leadership should be exercised in an enabling environment which does not allow for the manipulation of DDR programs by one rival party at the expense of another or other parties.

Overall, DDR processes and programs should be context-specific and change-oriented. General guidelines could be drawn from the policy pronouncements from the international community, but at country level, there should be a NDDRC that drafts a DDR policy in line with contextually-relevant factors. There is no one-size-fits-all DDR conceptual framework that can be universally superimposed on different contextual backgrounds. Context-specific DDR approaches that speak directly to background issues like the relations between the former warring parties, economic conditions, needs, challenges and aspirations of ex-combatants and socio-cultural issues among others are recommended in a post-conflict environment in order to achieve peace, stability and security and to complement other peace building processes.

REFERENCES

Alao, A. (2012). *Mugabe and the politics of security in Zimbabwe.* McGill: Queens University Press.

Alexander, J., McGregor, J. and Ranger, T. O. (2000). *Violence and memory: One hundred years in the 'dark forests' of Matabeleland*. Oxford: James Curvey.

Alusala, N. and Dye, D. (2010). *Reintegration in Mozambique: An unresolved affair*. Institute of Security Studies. Paper 217. Pretoria.

Babbit, E., Chigas, D. and Wilkinson, R. (2013). *Theories and indicators of change: Concepts and primers for conflict management and mitigation.* Tufts University: United States Agency for International Development.

Ball, N. and Goor, L. (2006). *Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration: Mapping issues, dilemmas and guiding principles.* Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Banholzer, L. (2014). *When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed?* Bonn: German Development Institute.

Barnes, T. A. (1995). The heroes' struggle: Life after the liberation war for four ex-combatants in Zimbabwe. In N. Bhebe and T. Ranger (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War Volume 1*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Beach, D. N. (1980). *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900-1850*. London: Heinermann.

Beach, D. N. (1986). *War and politics in Zimbabwe 1840-1900*. Gweru: Mambo Press.

Beach, D. N. (1994). *The Shona and their neighbours.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Berdal, M. (1996). *Disarmament, demobilisation after civil wars: Arms, soldiers and the termination of conflict.* Adelphi Paper No. 303. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berg, B. L. (2001). *Qualitative research methods for social sciences (4th ed.).* Long Beach: California State University.

Bhebe, N. (1999). *The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran church in Zimbabwe.* Gweru: Mambo Press.

Brickhill, J. (1995). Daring to storm the heavens: The military strategy of ZAPU 1976 to 1979. In N. Bhebe and T. Ranger (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's liberation war Volume 1*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Bryden, A. (2007). *Linkages between disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and security sector reform.* Kinshasa: UN/OSSA.

Buxton, J. (2008). *Reintegration and long-term development: Linkages and challenges.* Thematic Working Paper 5. Bradford: University of Bradford Press.

Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (2005). *Zimbabwe: The next 25 years*. Harare: Benaby Printing and Publishing (Pvt) Ltd.

Chitiyo, G., Taukeni, S. and Chitiyo, M. (2015). The observation method. In C. Okeke amd M. van Wyk (eds.), *Educational research: An African approach*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa (Pty) Limited.

Chitiyo, K. and Rupiya, M. (2005). Tracking Zimbabwe's political history: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980-2005. In M. Rupiya (ed.), *Evolutions and revolutions: A contemporary history of militaries in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies.

Chiwewe, W. A. (1989). Unity negotiations. In C. S. Banana (ed.), *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990*. Harare: The College Press.

Chung, F. (2006). *Re-living the second Chimurenga: Memoirs from the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.* Stockholm: The Nordic Africa Institute.

Cockell, J. G. (2010). *Conceptualising peace building: Human security and sustainable peace.* University of KwaZulu-Natal. Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies Programme.

Colleta, N. J., Kostner, M. and Wiedershofer, I. (2004). *The transition from war to peace in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Washington DC: World Bank Publications.

Coltart, D. (2016). *The struggle continues: 50 years of tyranny in Zimbabwe.* Sannyside: Jacana Media (Pvt) Ltd.

Cresswell, J. W. (2007). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches.* London: SAGE Publications.

Curtis, D. (2013). The contested politics of peace building in Africa. In D. Curtis and G. A. Dzinesa (eds.), *Peace building, power and politics in Africa*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Dabengwa, D. (1995). ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe war of national liberation. In N. Bhebe and T. Ranger (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's liberation war Volume 1*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Dawson, C. (2002). *Practical research methods: A user-friendly guide to mastering research techniques and projects.* Oxford: Routledge.

Day, J. (2008). The insignificance of the tribe in the African politics of Rhodesia. In W. H. Morriis (ed), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and beyond Lancaster House.* London: Routledge.

Denscombe, M. (2003). *Strategies for social research*. Berkshire: Open University Press.

Dzinesa, G. A. (2008). *The role of ex-combatants and veterans in violence in transitional societies,* Concept Paper: Violence and Transition Roundtable, 7-9 May 2008. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR).

Dyck, C. (2016). *DDR and SSR in war-to-peace transition*. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Dzinesa, G. A. (2013). Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Southern Africa: Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. In D. Curtis and G. A. Dzinesa (eds.), *Peace building, Power and Politics in Africa*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Evans, M. (1991). *The making of an African army: The case of Zimbabwe, 1980-87*. AFSAAP Annual Conference.

Gbemisola, A. A. (2010). *Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration*. Lagos: National Open University of Nigeria.

Gleichmann, C., Odenwald, M., Steenken, K. and Wilkinson, A. (2004). *Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration: A practical field and classroom guide.* Frankfurt: Druckerei Hassmuller Graphisele Gmblt and Co. KG.

Gultung, J. (1989). *Peace and development in the Pacific hemisphere*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace.

Gumbo, M. and Maphalala, M. (2015). The focus group discussion method. In C. Okeke and M. van Wyk (eds.), *Educational research: An African approach*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa (Pty) Limited.

Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. (2005). *Disentangling the determinants of successful demobilisation and reintegration.* Working Paper number 69. Washington DC: Centre for Global Development.

International Labour Organisation (2010). *Socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants*. Geneva: Switzerland.

Jackson, P. (2011). *The civil war roots of military domination in Zimbabwe: The integration process following the Rhodesian war and the road to ZANLA dominance.* Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

Kingma, K. (1997). *Post-war demobilisation and the reintegration of ex-combatants in civilian life.* Bonn: USAID Conference.

Kingma, K. (2000). *Demobilisation in sub-saharan Africa: The development and the security impacts.* Houndmills: McMillan Press Ltd.

Kingma, K. (2001). *Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in post-war and transition countries: Trends and challenges of external support*. Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft fur.

Kothari, C. R. (2004). *Research methodology: Methods and techniques (Second revised ed.).* New Delhi: New Age International Publishers.

Kriger, N. (1992). *Zimbabwe's guerrilla war: Peasant voices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kriger, N. (1995). The politics of creating national heroes: The search for political legitimacy and national identity. In N. Bhebe and T. Ranger (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's liberation war Volume 1*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Kriger, N. (2003). *Guerrilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and violent politics, 1980-87*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lamb, G. and Ginifer, J. (2008). *Current approaches to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme: Design and implementation*. Thematic Working Paper 1. Bradford: Centre for International Co-operation and Security.

Lamb, G. (2012). *Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies: The cases of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan.* Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Lamb, G. (2013). *DDR 20 years later: Historical review of the long-term impact of post-independence disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Southern Africa.* Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Lewis, N., Harris, G. and dos Santos, E. (2010). *The demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants: Peace building and recovery from armed conflict*. University of KwaZulu-Natal: Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies Programme.

Magwa, W. and Magwa, S. (2015). *A guide to conducting research: A student handbook.* Singapore: Strategic Book Publishing and Rights Company.

Martin, D. and Johnson, P. (1981). *The struggle for Zimbabwe*. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.

Masunungure, E. (2004). Travails of opposition politics in Zimbabwe since independence. In D. Harold-Barry (ed.), *Zimbabwe: The past is the present*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Mazarire, G.C. (2009). Pre-colonial Zimbabwe: Some reflections. In B. Raftopoulos and A. S. Mlambo (eds.), *Becoming Zimbabwe: A history of Zimbabwe from pre-colonial times to 2008.* Harare: Weaver Press.

Michael, S. (2006). *Reintegration assistance for ex-combatants: Good practices and lessons for the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP).* Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Mnangagwa, E. (1989). Post-independence Zimbabwe (1980-87). In C. S. Banana (ed), *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990*. Harare: The College Press.

Moore, D. (1995). The Zimbabwe People's Army: Strategic innovation or more of the same? In N. Bhebe and T. Rnager (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe' liberation war Volume 1*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Mouton, J. (1998). *Understanding social research*. Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik Publishers.

Msindo, E. (2012). *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: Transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele societies, 1860-1990*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.

Msipa, C. G. (2015). *In pursuit of freedom and justice: A memoir*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Mudenge, S. I. G. (1988). *A political history of Munhumutapa 1400-1902*. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.

Muggah, R. (2010). *Innovations in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration policy and research reflections on the last decade.* Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Musemwa, M. (1994). *The ambiguities of democracy: The demobilisation of the Zimbabwean ex-combatants and the ordeal of rehabilitation 1980-1993.* University of Witwatersrand, History Workshop Conference.

Musemwa, M. (2011). *Zimbabwe's war veterans: From demobilisation to re-mobilisation.* Transformation 75.

Mutasa, D. N. (1989). The signing of the Unity Accord: A step forward in Zimbabwe's political development. In C. S. Banana (ed.), *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990.* Harare: The College Press.

Nan, S. A. (2010). *Theories of change and indicator development in conflict management and mitigation.* George Mason University: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

Ncube, W. (1989). The post-unity period: Developments, benefits and problems. In C. S. Banana (ed.), *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990*. Harare: The College Press.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2003). The post-colonial state and Matabeleland regional perceptions of civil-military relations, 1980-2002. In R. Williams, G. Cawthra and D. Abrahams (eds.), *Ourselves to know: Civil-military relations and defence transformation in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2009). *Do Zimbabweans exist? Trajectories of nationalism, national identity formation and crisis in a post-colonial state.* Bern: International Academic Publishers.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2011). *The changing politics of Matabeleland since 1980*. Solidarity Peace Trust.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2011). *The Zimbabwean nation-state project: A historical diagnosis of identity and power-based conflicts in a post-colonial state*. Discussion Paper 59. The Nordic Africa Institute.

N'Diaye, N. (2012). The Central African Republic. In Bryden, A. and Scherrer, V. (eds.), *Disarmament, demobilisation and security sector reform: Insights from United Nations experience in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo.* Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Nilsson, A. (2005). *Reintegrating ex-combatants in post-conflict societies*. SIDA: Department for Co-operation with Non-Governmental Organisations and Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management.

Nkomo, J. (1984). *The story of my life.* London: Methuen Limited.

Nzombe, S. (1989). Negotiations with the British. In C.S. Banana (ed.), *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe: 1890-1990.* Harare: The College Press.

Omach, P. (2013). The limits of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration. In D. Curtis and G. A. Dzinesa (eds.), *Peace building, Power, and Politics in Africa*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Omer Cooper, J. D. (1987). *The Zulu aftermath: The nineteeth-century revolutions in Bantu Africa.* Harlow: Longman.

Parsons, J., Gokey, C. and Thornton, M. (2013). *Indicators of inputs, activities, outputs, outomes and impacts in security and justice programming.* London: DFID.

Ranger, T. O. (1969). *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia: A study in African resistance*. London: Heinemann Educational Books.

Ranger, T. O. (1985). *The nineteeth-century in Southern Rhodesia.* In T. O. Ranger (ed.), Aspects of central African history. London: Heinemann.

Rogers, P. (2014). *Theory of change: Impact evaluation 2.* Florence: UNICEF Office of Research.

Rufer, R. (2005). *Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration: Conceptual approaches, specific settings, practical experience.* Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Sadomba, Z. W. (2011). *War veterans in Zimbabwe's revolution: Challenging neo-colonialism and settler international capital.* Harare: Weaver Press.

Sambanis, N. and Schulhofer-Wohl, J. (2010). *Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs: An assessment.* Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy.

Seibel, W. and Wirtz, R. (2006). *Reintegration of former combatants: Variables determining success and failure: A study of the reintegration processes in Liberia and South Africa.* Bachelorarbeit: University of Konstanz.

Shamuyarira, N. (1965). *Crisis in Rhodesia.* London: Andre Deutsch.

Sibanda, E. (2005). *The Zimbabwe African People's Union 1961-87: A political history of insurgency in Southern Rhodesia*. Trenton: Africa World Press.

Simonetta, R. and Antonio, G. (2006). *Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Afghanistan: Constraints and limited capabilities*. Working Paper No. 2. Crisis States Research Centre.

Sithole, M. (1999). *Zimbabwe: Struggles-within-the-struggle (1957-1990).* Harare: Rujeko Publishers.

Soderstrom, J. (2013). *The concept of political reintegration in current peace research.* Uppsala: Uppsala University Press.

Stein, D. and Valters, C. (2012). *Understanding 'Theory of Change' in international development: A review of existing knowledge*. London: Justice and Security Research Programme.

Stiff, P. (2000). *Cry Zimbabwe: Independence: Twenty years on*. Alberon: Galago.

Todd, J. (2007). *Through the darkness: A life in Zimbabwe*. Cape Town: Zebra Press.

Tungamirai, J. (1995). Recruitment to ZANLA: Building up a war machine. In N. Bhebe and T. Ranger (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's liberation war Volume 1*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

United Nations Development Group (2017). *Theory of change*. UNDAF Campaign Guidance.

USAID (2016). *An analysis of Theories of change in USAID solicitations for education programs in crisis and conflict affected environments*. Education in Crisis and Conflict Network.

Valters, C. (2015). *Theories of change: Time for a radical approach to learning in development.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

Van, M., Guijt, I. and Vogel, I. (2015). *Theory of change thinking in practice*. Wageningen University and Research Centre: Centre for Development Innovation.

Van de Merwe, H. and Lamb, G. (2009). *Transitional justice and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration: The case of South Africa.* Pretoria: International Centre for Transitional Justice.

Vogel, I. (2012). *Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in international development*. UK Department for International Development (DFID).

Woodrow, P. and Oatley, N. (2013). *Practical approaches to theories of change in conflict, security justice programmes*. Harvard: Department for International Development.

Journal Articles

Ake, C. (1993). What is the problem of ethnicity in Africa? *Transformation,* 22, pp. 1-15.

Alexander, J. (2008). Dissident perspectives on Zimbabwe's post-independence war. *Journal of International African Institute,* 68(2), pp. 151-182.

Alexander, J. and McGregor, J. (2004). War stories: Guerrilla narratives of Zimbabwe's liberation war. *History Workshop Journal*, 57. pp. 79-100.

Chitiyo, T. K. (2000). Land, violence and compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe's land and war veterans debate. *Journal of African Conflict and Development,* 1, pp. 62-91.

Cobbing, J. (1976). The absent priesthood: Another look at the Rhodesian risings of 1896-1897. *Journal of African History,* 17, pp. 61-84.

Ferry, T. (2014). Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Cambodia: How DDR programmes could have facilitated the establishment of long-term conflict prevention in post-conflict Cambodia. *Cambodia Law and Policy Journal*, 29, pp. 128-155.

Knight, W. A. (2009). Linking DDR and SSR in post-conflict peace building in Africa: An overview. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations,* 4(1), pp. 29-54.

Kriger, N. (2000). War victims compensation: Collusion between Zimbabwean ex-combatants and government. *Journal of African Conflict and Development*, 1, pp. 35-45.

Lake, D. A. and Rothschild, D. (1996). Containing fear: The origin and management of ethnic conflict. *International Society,* 21(2), pp. 41-75.

Mashike, L. (2000). Standing down or standing out? Demobilisation and reintegrating former soldiers. *African Security Review,* 9(5), pp. 64-71.

Mazarire, G. and Rupiya, M. (2000). Two wrongs do not make a right: A critical assessment of Zimbabwe's demobilisation and reintegration programmes, 1980-2000. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies,* 1(1), pp. 69-80.

Mazarire, G. C. (2011). Discipline and punishment in ZANLA, 1964-1979. *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 37(3), pp. 571-591.

Mbembe, A. (2002). On the power of the false. *Public,* 14(3), pp. 629-641.

Msindo, E. (2007). Ethnicity and colonialism in urban colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo, 1950-1965. *Journal of African History*, 48, pp. 267-290.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2006). Nationalist-military alliance and the fate of democracy in Zimbabwe on Conflict. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution,* 6(1), pp. 49-80.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2008). Nation building in Zimbabwe and the challenge of Ndebele particularism. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution,* 8(3), pp. 27-56.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. and Muzondidya, J. (2007). 'Echoing silences': Ethnicity in post-colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007. *African Journal of Conflict Resolution: Special Issue on Identity and Cultural Diversity in Conflict Resolution in Africa,* 7(2), pp. 275-292.

Olayode, K. (2016). Beyond intractability: Ethnic identity and political conflicts in Africa. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 6(6), pp. 242-268.

Ozerdem, A. (2002). *Disarmament, demobilisation and reintergration of former combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons learnt from a cross-cultural perspective.* Third World Quartely. 23 (5): pp. 961-975.

Phimister, I. and van Onselen, C. (1979). The political economy of tribal animosity: A case of the 1929 Bulawayo location 'faction fights.' *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 6(1), pp. 1-43.

Xu, J. (2012). The ethnic Security Dilemma and ethnic violence: An alternative empirical model and its explanatory power. *Journal of Undergraduate Research*. Vol. 17. Issue 1.

Theses and Dissertations

Bangidza, L. B. (2016). *Security sector reform: State security and human security relations in Zimbabwe: The case of Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) 1980-2008*. D.Phil thesis, University of Zimbabwe.

Chimhanda C. C. (2003). *ZAPU and the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, 1957-1980.* MA thesis, University of Cape Town.

Dzinesa, G. A. (2005). *Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, Repatriation and Resettlement (DDRRR) in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.* PhD thesis, University of Witwatersrand.

Lindgren, B. (2002). *The politics of Ndebele ethnicity: Origins, nationality and gender in Southern Africa.* PhD thesis, University of Uppsala.

Muchemwa, C. (2015). *Building friendships between Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups in Zimbabwe.* PhD thesis, Durban University of Technology.

Munemo, D. (2016). *The search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe: From the 1978 Internal Settlement to the 2008 Global Political Agreement.* PhD thesis, University of South Africa.

Ngwenya, D. (2014). *Healing the wounds of Gukurahundi: a participatory action research project.* PhD thesis, Durban University of Technology.

Stauffer, C. S. (2009). *Acting out the myths: The power of narrative discourse in shaping the Zimbabwe conflict of Matabeleland, 1980-1987.* PhD thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Tapfumaneyi, A.W. (1996). *Problems of demobilisation: A comparative study of aspects of the forces demobilisation carried out by the Southern Rhodesia government 1945-1947and that carried out by the Zimbabwean government 1980-1985*. BA. Hons thesis. University of Zimbabwe.

DDR Policy guidelines, Reports and Acts of Parliament

African Development Group (2011). *The role of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in post-conflict reconstruction: Some lessons learnt.* Office of the Fragile States Unit (OFSU).

African Union Commission (AUC, 2014). *African Union disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration capacity program. National DDR frameworks: Operational guideline.* Addis Ababa: Ethiopia.

Almqvist, J. (2014). *A Peace building Commission for the United Nations.* Policy Paper No. 4.

Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa Report (ACT-Southern Africa, 2012).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, '*An Agenda for peace, preventive diplomacy, peace making and peace keeping',* A/47/277-524111, June 17, 1992.

CCJP/LRF. (1997). *Breaking the silence, building true peace: A Report on the 1980s disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1987.* Harare: Catholic Commission for Justice and the Legal Resources Foundation.

Department of Information and Publicity, ZAPU (2012).

Development Assistance Committee (DAC, 2005). *Mainstreaming conflict prevention: Peace building overview.*

Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS, 2006). New York: UN Resource Centre.

Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR, 2005). *Testing the principles.* Sweden: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee (2007).

United Nations Department of Peace keeping Operations (UNDPKO, 1999*). Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peace keeping environment: Principles and guidelines: Lessons learnt unit.* New York: United Nations.

War Veterans Act, 1992.

War Victims Compensation Act, Chapter 11:16 22/1980, 31/1983 (s. 25), 33/1984 (s. 8), 24/1987, 20/1994.

Newspapers and Online Sources

Baare, A. (2005). *An analysis of transitional economic reintegration*. Swedish Initiative for DDR (SIDDR) (online) www.sweden.gov.se/se/content1/c6/04/39/e2f4e518. Accessed 16.10.17.

Cameron, H. (2017). *The Matabeleland massacres: Britain's wilful blindness.* The International History Review. (Online) http://www.the independent.co.zw/2017/. Accessed on 12.01.18.

Doran, S. (2017). *Kingdom, power, glory: Mugabe, ZANU and the quest for supremacy, 1960-1987*. (Online) http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/. Accessed on 05/10.17.

European Commission and Council of the European Union (2006*). European Union concept for support to DDR.* Brussels: EC and Council of the EU. (online) <http://www.eplo.org/documents/EU-Joint concept. Accessed on 12.08.17

Mashingaidze, T. M. (2005). *The 1987 Zimbabwe National Unity Accord and its aftermath: A case of peace without reconciliation*. (Online) http://www.cordesria.org.IMG. Accessed on 10.10.17.

Willibald, S. (2006). *Does mone work? Cash transfers to ex-combatants in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes* (Online) http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0361-3666. Accessed on 11.08.18

Daily News, 18 February 2018.

Southern Eye, 15 February 2016.

Sunday News, 16-22 July 2017.

Sunday News, 2-8 July 2017.

The Financial Gazette, 27 October 2016.

The Standard, 13-19 November 2016.

Zimbabwe Independent, 11-17 August 2017.

Zimbabwe Independent, 1-7 September 2017.

Zimbabwe Independent, 18-24 August 2017.

Zimbabwe Independent, 25-31 August 2017.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

Name	Category	Place	Date
Gwakuba-Ndlovu	Senior ZAPU cadre	Bulawayo	15.04.17
Rtd. Brigadier Mazimnyane	Senior former ZIPRA commander	Bulawayo	01.03.17
Dumani	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (demobilised in 1980)	Bulawayo	13.04.17
Jack Mpofu	Former ZIPRA High Command member (arrested in early 1980s)	Bulawayo	19.02.17
I.G	Ex-ZIPRA cadre	Bulawayo	28.07.17
Rtd. Lietenant Col. Dube	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Chairperson of ZIPRA Veterans Trust)	Bulawayo	28.02.17
Ndebele	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Integrated into ZNA until early 2000s)	Bulawayo	15.03.17
Bhebhe	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Integrated into ZNA until early 2000s)	Bulawayo	14.03.17
Berry	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Demobilised in 1983)	Bulawayo	21.03.17
Ngxongo	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Failed to get a place in the ZNA)	Bulawayo	14.10.17
Duze	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Retired from the ZNA in 2006)	Bulawayo	19.03.17

Rtd. Sgt. Sibanda	Rtd ZNA member (Ex-ZIPRA)	Bulawayo	05.03.17
Nyathi	Former RSF member	Bulawayo	11.03.17
Leornard Ndlovu	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (fled victimisation from the ZNA)	Bulawayo	05.02.17
Lot	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Teacher in the ZNA, Rtd)	Bulawayo	12.06.17
Rtd. Brig. Gatsheni	Senior ZIPRA commander	Bulawayo	20.05.17
Cecil Banda	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Logistician during the armed struggle)	Bulawayo	04.04.17
A Mpofu	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Was involved in caching arms)	Bulawayo	12.04.17
Mpande	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Was in specialist units in the ZNA)	Bulawayo	12.03.17
Ndazi	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Was in specialist units in the ZNA)	Bulawayo	15.03.17
Sebata	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Ordinary ZIPRA soldier in the ZNA)	Bulawayo	30.04.17
Mleya	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Ordinary ZIPRA soldier in the ZNA)	Bulawayo	16.03.17
Sasidudla	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Demobilised in early 1980s)	Bulawayo	09.03.17
Mathwasa	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Demobilised and fled to South Africa)	Bulawayo	14.04.17

Ndatshi	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Demobilised in 1981)	Bulawayo	20.03.17
Mzila-Ndlovu	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Demobilised and joined teaching but left due to harassment)	Bulawayo	22.03.17
Ndlovu	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Demobilised in 1983, formed a company but it fell)	Bulawayo	15.03.17
Vodloza	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Retired from the ZNA in early 2000)	Bulawayo	12.09.17
Madotshi	Ex-ZIPRA cadre (Demobilised in early 1980s and joined teaching)	Bulawayo	12.05.17
Thambolenyoka	Former 'Dissident'	Bulawayo	19.03.17
Mr X.	Former 'Dissident'	Bulawayo	13.03.17
Maqhula	Ex-ZIPRA cadre	Bulawayo	14.07.17
Kwete	Vetting Officer	Bulawayo	17.06.17
Noel Sibanda	Ex-ZIPRA cadre	Bulawayo	22.08.17
Hadebe	Ex-ZIPRA cadre	Bulawayo	13.02.17
Iphithule Maphosa	ZAPU Spokesperson	Bulawayo	22.02.17
Dabengwa	ZAPU President	Bulawayo	31.10.17

Appendix 2: Sample of questions for semi-structured interviews

1. What did you hope to achieve after the liberation struggle?

2. Were your aspirations fulfilled? If the answer is no, explain why and how?

3. What are your views and comments on the following?

a) Disamament and demobilisation processes

b) Clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA at APs and within the ZNA

c) Arms caches and their 'discovery'

d) The 'dissidents'

e) The 5th Brigade/Gukurahundi

4. What were you experiences in the ZNA?

5. What were your experiences as a demobilised cadre?

6. What is the nature of your relationship with ZANU-PF? What influences that relationship?

7. What is the nature of your relationship with the civilian population in Matabeleland?

8. What perceptions do civilians have about ex-combatants and ZIPRA ex-combatants in particular?

9. Do you think ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants experienced DDR processes differently? Why?

10) What can you say about the government-led DDR process in Zimbabwe? Was it successful or not? Explain your answer.

11) If it was not successful, what were the major impedements? In your opinion, how could it have been implemented to achieve positive results?